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SUMMARY
The paper begins with an analysis of the fact that a
confrontation between scientific mechanism and vitalism, in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contributed
to the development of what is today called "Process Philos¬
ophy." During this same period, in which new sciences arose
and old sciences were transformed, men, who were sensitive to
metaphysical questions, became aware of a pressing demand to
test established cosmological formulations against the rapid
advances made in scientific research. One of the first dilem¬
mas to emerge from these efforts was that, from a metaphysical
viewpoint, the sciences were producing conflicting data in
support of both absolute medhanism and also ultimate pluralism.
In the hands of such thinkers as Bergson, Driesch, Ward, Morgan
and Whitehead these two alternatives were clarified and evalu¬
ated through a gradual realisation of new possibilities being
opened by science for the reinterpretation of the term "absol¬
ute". How an issue over the meaning of the term absolute came
to be an element in the creation of a Process cosmology, that
was finally able to incorporate data from all the new sciences,
is our first topic.
However, the development of Process thought cannot be
understood only as a response to modern science. Its formu¬
lation was also aided because Process thinkers had a solid
grounding in philosophical tradition. In particular the field
of epistemology — most notably the Kantian and Hegelian
schools — supplied insights about how the term absolute could
ii
be understood and applied. Indeed, it was the Process discov¬
eries about the term absolute, based on the data from both the
sciences and philosophy, that helped to pave the way for such
concepts as "dipolar universe," "temporal duration," "ultimate
creativity," and "emergent evolution."
The analysis of developments in the understanding of the
term absolute leads both to a general definition of Process
Philosophy, and also becomes a means of sorting out the various
strands of thought that led up to the writings and conclusions
of Alfred North Whitehead. Approximately one-half of this
paper is a survey of the preliminary efforts at the creation
of a systematic Process position. Once we see a complete Pro¬
cess cosmology explicated in Whitehead's works, our interests
can quite naturally shift to his particular influence on subse¬
quent developments. We are especially interested in how White¬
head's understanding of the term absolute shapes the development
of various Process Theologies.
In our study we suggest that Process theologians can be
divided into two groups according to whether or not they accept
Whitehead's point that the term absolute refers to one "pole"
of a dipolar God. Furthermore, the different conclusions of
the two groups on such topics as Christology, soteriology,
eschatology and God as Creator have part of their explanation
in the two groups' respective understandings of the term abso¬
lute.
Hartshorne, Christian, Williams and Ogden represent phil¬
osophers of religion and theologians who adopt Whitehead's
understanding of the term absolute. On the other hand, Thorn¬
ton, Pittenger, Meland and Cobb illustrate thinkers who are
iii
sympathetic to many of Whitehead's ideas, but who attempt to
alter his understanding of the term absolute.
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The thesis proposed in this paper is: that a clear under¬
standing of the use of the term "absolute" in Process Philosophy-
is essential, if one wishes to relate Process to a context ref¬
lecting both the philosophical and scientific influences which
promoted its development; and that an understanding of the
Process use of the term absolute greatly clarifies the influ¬
ence of Process thought upon certain theological formulations.
As our thesis is, in part, a way of defining "Process Philos¬
ophy," it would be premature to begin with other than a
provisional definition.
In this paper the term "Process" will be used in two dif¬
ferent ways, and we must begin by distinguishing them. First
the term "Process" will be used as the name for a cosmology
which adopts a concept of universal "process." Second, the
term "process" appears as a specific interpretation of the con-
ept of activity. According to this view, process is universal
activity understood as a continuity of antecedences and conse¬
quences brought about by an interrelation between "true" unity
and "true" multiplicity. These usages will be clarified in
our first several Chapters.
For those who are somewhat familiar with Process, the
title of our study may come as a surprise. Generally theories
of "relativity," rather than discussions about an "absolute,"
are associated with Process. There are reasons why this asso¬
ciation is justified. In the first place, Process accepts as
valid, and incorporates, many of the cosmological formulations
proposed by modern theories of relativity. Furthermore, the
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topic of "relationships" dominates many of the works whose
authors are called Process philosophers and theologians. Fin¬
ally, absolutisms, finalisms and determinisms are rejected by
Process as inconsistent and unsupportable.
However, in spite of the above, Process does not ignore
a concept of the absolute. Process detains absoluteness as an
aspect of reality which, along with relatedness, forms a "di¬
polar" universe. More precisely, Process makes an absolute
pole and a pole of relativity complementary aspects of the
universe.
From the standpoint of dipolarity the absolute pole always
appears in company with the relative pole. Together these
poles "function" in realising the universal principle of pro¬
cess, which may be thought of as an "abstract" principle.
However, taken separately each pole has a "concrete" content
the importance of which is not exhausted by its functional
associations. To be fully understood each pole must be consid¬
ered in both its abstract and concrete aspect. The reason for
mentioning this point early in the paper is twofold. First the
use of the terra absolute by Process can only be understood if
one sees that the two poles have different aspects, depending
on whether they are taken together or separately. Second the
dual aspect of each pole is the reason for our use of the term
"role of the absolute" rather than "function of the absolute".
The former, we believe, comes nearer to capturing the concept
that Process' absolute pole has both a concrete content and
also an abstract reference in terms of the universal principle
of process.
We should next consider how the term absolute is used by
Process apart from the concept of dipolarity. Kant, for
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example, observed that the term "absolute" is applied in two
senses. First in the narrow sense it means that "something is
true of a thing in itself".1 In terras of this usage, one might
say that the relative pole is absolutely relative, or that the
principle of process is absolutely a process.
Process thought would agree with the Kantian suggestion
that such a usage of the term absolute is ambiguous. Therefore,
it would favour a wider use of theiterm, which is described by
Kant as implying that something is the same "in every relation
possible." According to this wider usage something referred to
as absolute must have an inner necessity, which "remains the
same in all relations possible". In this sense the relative
pole cannot be absolute. The entities which make up its con¬
tent vary from instant to instant. On the other hand, the
absolute pole does have an inner necessity by which it is, ab¬
stractly considered, always the same.
However, having arrived at an agreement that the term
"absolute" should be used in the wider sense, the ambiguous
nature of the term is not completely resolved. When the term
absolute is applied in the widest possible sense one may assume
that (l) it refers to the total content of the universe as an
unified Given, or (2) that it refers to an attribute of some
ultimate, universal principle. Between these two interpreta¬
tions one can detect a significant difference in emphasis.
The former emphasises the fact that the Absolute has all reality
as its concrete content, while the latter suggests that absol¬
uteness is a characteristic of an abstract principle which in
turn directs all reality. The former suggests that the Absolute
1Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans., Norman Kemp Smith.
(London:Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1929.) pp.316-318.
if
"is" the unity of all reality; the latter suggests that an
absolute principle "functions" to unify all reality. The
former might be illustrated by Hegelian idealism. For Hegel
the outcome of his dialectic is that the unity of all reality
will be the content of the Absolute. The latter can be illus¬
trated by Newton's principle of gravity. This principle holds
reality together, but is itself an abstraction having no con¬
crete content. The former permits a strong ontological basis
for its concept of the Absolute, but it is weak in accounting
for "becoming", i.e. change or activity. The latter suggests
that a concept of becoming or progress is connected with the
absolute physical principle, but, having a weak ontology, it
ultimately denies true "being" to "becoming."
The point to be observed is that Process thought accepts
neither of these interpretations of the wider meaning of the
term absolute. While it does say that the absolute pole has a
concrete content, the acceptance of the relative pole means
that this content cannot be all of reality. Likewise, while
Process does say that absoluteness applies to an abstract prin¬
ciple, this principle does not function apart from the relative
pole, and thus it does not direct all reality.
When the widest sense of the term absolute is taken to
mean that the Absolute contains all of reality or that absol¬
uteness is an attribute of some ultimate principle, Process, as
we shall see, views the resulting formulations as deterministic.
It is in an effort to avoid determinism that Process wants to
equate the term absolute with a specific content other than all
reality, and thereby also avoid suggesting that absoluteness
is an attribute of some ultimate principle.
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What in fact Process does is to suggest that both of the
above interpretations of the term absolute are significant only
when taken together and in the context of a dipolar universe.
This view leads to a new understanding of the term "absolute,"
but it does not lack connections with traditional meanings.
The understanding is that of a "role"; implying that the absol¬
ute pole has a definite character of its own and also plays a
part in the cosmic drama.
How Process reached the conclusion of the complementary
nature of an absolute pole and a relative pole as necessary
aspects of process is the topic of Chapters I through XIX.
In Chapters I through IX we will consider how the history of
certain scientific developments, during the end of the last
century and the beginning of our present century, influenced
the formulation of the understanding of the term absolute in
Process metaphysics.
At the beginning of our period of study, the guiding prin¬
ciple of most scientific investigations was a conviction that
the cosmos was ultimately mechanistic. Mechanism is a position
which holds that a single absolute principle of order underlies
reality. Newton, whose physics was still serving as the foun¬
dation for scientific Investigations, saw this principle mani¬
fested in the Laws of Gravity.
Given the presupposition of an absolutely ordered cosmos,
the test for scientific validity was the discovery of how
various aspects of the phenomenal world exemplified this order.
One must not be misled into believing that the multitude of
scientific laws implied an ultimate pluralism. Many laws could
share the attribute of absoluteness because they could be in¬
terpreted as consistent formulations of the single absolute
6
law of cosmic order. Within this structure, a hypothesis was
a proposal about how phenomena, apparently inconsistent with
an ordered cosmos, could be reconciled to that order. Re¬
search, therefore, was the collection of data establishing any
such reconciliation. In view of the above assumptions,physics,
as we shall see, has an implicit metaphysics.
Mechanism was popular because it worked beautifully. With
the help of Newtonian physics and metaphysics, the sciences
reached new heights of achievement. Because mechanism then
dominated science and greatly influenced metaphysics and in
many ways continues to do so, and because the assumption of
absolute physical laws is a key to its procedures, any position,
such as Process, which rejects pure mechanism, must confront
the question of absolute order. That is, if one is unhappy
with traditional mechanistic conclusions, one has the choice
of either suggesting that physical laws need to be reformulat¬
ed, which is what Einstein said, or that the physical laws are
not absolute, which is the Process position.
To deny the absoluteness of physical laws suggests the
belief that the universe is chaotic — the position of some
existentialists. Few men of science could be happily exis¬
tentialist. However, for reasons that are discussed in our early
Chapters, some, nevertheless, felt it essential to call mech¬
anism into question. Therefore, the issue which science
raised for Process metaphysics is whether or not scientific
data support the conclusion that philosophy must always choose
between absolute physical order or total chaos.
We will begin Chapter I by discussing mechanism in order
to show how it presents the issue of the absoluteness of
7
physical laws to both physics and metaphysics. This will be
followed in Chapter II by a discussion of scientific/philos¬
ophical grounds for rejecting mechanistic conclusions in favour
of a pluralistic theory. In Chapter II we will give special
attention to so-called "vitalistic" arguments. Finally, in
Chapters III through IX we will demonstrate how Process resolves
certain physical and metaphysical issues by showing that, given
a dipolar universe, scientific data must be interpreted in a way
that makes necessary a choice between order and chaos, i.e.
unity and multiplicity, the one and the many, the absolute and
the relative.
Of course, the meaning of the term absolute was a long¬
standing topic of philosophical discussion at the time of the
rise of modern science. Chapters X through XIX of our paper
are concerned with fitting Process into a philosophical context,
by comparing its use of the term absolute with the usage of that
term in other contemporary philosophies.
The choice of this approach is not an arbitrary one. The
tradition of German Idealisms, which dominated philosophy at
the early part of our period of study, illustrated, unlike mech¬
anism, an understanding of the "Absolute" as that which contained
all reality. The chief difference between the two systems may
be summarised by saying that mechanism was materialistic, while
idealism was spiritualistic. Spiritualism centered many of its
formulations around explanations for the existence in the uni¬
verse of human self-consciousness, which it argued could not be
explained in terms of absolute physical laws. The unity which
existed in a universe containing consciousness had to be of a
spiritual order. The source of unity was not a physical prin¬
ciple, but a supreme "Subject".
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As only an absolute Subject — God — could account for
a universe containing consciousness, the absolute subject can
also be thought of as the ground of consciousness. In this
formulation any particular knowledge content can be validated
only if it is demonstrated to be consistent with the spiritual
order of the cosmos. This view also means that knowledge de¬
rived wholly from the material laws cannot be ultimately valid.
With reference to whether absoluteness should be attri¬
buted to a concrete Subject or an abstract physical principle,
idealism and mechanism appear to hold opposite positions.
However, in terms of Process thought both positions lead to
determinism, which in large part results from their respective
understandings of the term absolute.
Of course, what has just been said requires fuller devel¬
opment. However, the point to be introduced here is that the
understanding of the term absolute can serve as a touchstone
to illustrate the ideals, which both related and divided many
sciences and philosophies in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Finally, by looking at the Process under¬
standing of the term absolute, we arrive at a common denomin¬
ator through which Process can be related to both disciplines.
The usual term for philosophical discussions concerning
the problem of human knowing — including self-knowledge — is
epistemology. Therefore, the topic of Chapters X through XIX
is also the topic of epistemology. We will begin with a dis¬
cussion of idealism, and show its relationship to scientific
mechanism with respect to the understanding of the term abso¬
lute. Next we will consider the development of several
epistemologies influenced by realisms which, supported by the
9
anti-mechanistic scientific pluralisms, rejected the determin¬
istic aspects of idealism's "Absolute Subject." Finally we
will consider how Process does away with the mind/matter dual¬
ism, which develops as a result of the differences between
idealism and realism, by suggesting that for consciousness the
absolute pole is both "subject" and "object."
As our Introduction has already suggested, there is a
direct parallel between the Process metaphysical understanding
of a dipolar universe and its explanation of consciousness.
Therefore, the Process understanding of the term absolute helps
to define Process thought both in terms of science and philos¬
ophy. Indeed, our point is that only in terms of the under¬
standing of the term absolute in Process thought can one clearly
see the full dynamics of how Process, as a metaphysics, is able
to incorporate data from the scientific and philosophical dis¬
ciplines. At the conclusion of Chapter XIX Process Philosophy
will have been defined as a position which holds that activity,
including self-conscious activity, is a "process" of a dipolar
universe.
Chapters XX through XXVII are devoted to an analysis of
how the Process understanding of the term absolute in metaphy¬
sics becomes a significant aspect of the Process influence on
theology. As questions about the nature of absoluteness are
a regular part of theological discussions, the field of theol¬
ogy not only illustrates our thesis, but also helps to clarify
the "role of the absolute" in Process thinking.
On the one hand, this paper attempts to survey the field
of Process thought. However, the most fully developed and
influential Process metaphysic is that of Alfred North White¬
head. Because of this, we will give his works far and away
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the greatest attention. In Chapters XXI through XXVI, for
example, we will discover that the majority of prominent Pro¬
cess theologians are either students of Whitehead, or otherwise
greatly influenced by the "Whiteheadian School."
On the other hand, this is not merely a study of White¬
headian thought. Our purpose is to trace general influences
which led to the development of Process. Therefore, we do not
attempt to show how Whitehead himself was specifically influ¬
enced by the other thinkers in the field. For example, we are
not going to suggest that Whitehead represents a final synthe¬
sis of all the elements of Process thinking. He does not.
Plainly his works, as he himself says, are influenced by many
thinkers. They show parallels with the works of other writers
considered here, as well as differences from all of them.
What we do want to show is that there were several attempts to
develop Process systems. These attempts all reflect certain
common influences, and generally influence one another.
Certainly, one of the reasons for Whitehead's influence
is that he is very consistent in developing the implications
of the concept of process throughout his metaphysics. In the
case of most other writers, who are sympathetic to the concept
of process, not all of their works are dominated by the concept
in the sense that Whitehead's are. This means that in the
case of certain writers we will tend to consider only the por¬
tions of their works which do, in our opinion, reflect the idea
of the concept of process. In other words, we will point to
the respects in which they are Process thinkers, realising
that one could also make a good case for the fact that their
works contain elements which are inconsistent with the concept
11
of process. We have, of course, attempted not to misrepresent
the overall tone of a writer's position by searching for the
Process aspects of his thinking.
PART I: THE TERM ABSOLUTE IN PROCESS METAPHYSICS
CHAPTER I: Mechanism
The term "mechanism" as applied here refers to the pos¬
ition, characteristic of the physical sciences in the late
nineteenth century, that all occurrences in the phenomenal
world follow fixed natural laws, which reflect an absolute
principle of cosmic order. The function of this principle is
to predetermine all events causally. Moreover, the term mech¬
anistic may be used in a wider sense to describe many of the
scientific, philosophical and metaphysical positions at the
end of the nineteenth century. Our first purpose in this Chap¬
ter is to illustrate mechanism by showing how widespread was
the scientific conviction that reality is absolutely ordered.
Second we will show that mechanism suggests a particular un¬
derstanding of the term absolute. Finally we will see how
mechanism's use of the term absolute relates to spiritualism's
understanding of the term.
A. Mechanism in Science
As applied toward the end of the nineteenth century, the
term mechanistic refers to the position, generally adopted by
the physical sciences, especially physics itself, which main¬
tains that the laws governing the material world are applic¬
able, without exception, to all reality. As James Ward said,
"...mechanical explanation has therefore long been accepted as
2
the ne plus ultra of what a scientific explanation can be."
2
Ward, James. The Realm Of Ends or Pluralism And Theism.
(Cambridge: The University Press, 191lT. pA.
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Prom the scientific viewpoint the phrase "without excep¬
tion" was used with real confidence only after the middle of
the nineteenth century. And it is this part of the mechanis¬
tic explanation which will become the key issue for biology
and philosophy. To be more specific, mechanism of the late
nineteenth century suggested that even the problems posed by
the apparently ultimate plurality of life forms were merely
temporary difficulties for those who supported the universal¬
ity of the physical laws.
Indeed the reason for many of the strong reactions against
mechanism during this period was the boldness with which physi¬
cal science applied it to the phenomenon of life. Of course,
it is true that there were earlier attempts to present a purely
mechanistic interpretation of life. The most outstanding
example is Descartes in his works De Homine and De Formatione
Foetus. However, wide acceptance of such a view, even among
scientists, did not take place until the nineteenth century.
William McDougall, in his book Body and Mind, suggests
that three key factors in the scientific world accounted gener¬
ally for this wider acceptance of mechanism. These three
factors were: (l) the mechanistic account of evolution sug¬
gested by Darwin's principle of adaptation through Natural
Selection; (2) the discovery in physiology that the brain is
a vast and complex system of reflex nerve paths; (3) the est¬
ablishment of the Law of the Conservation of Energy.^ These
points require some development.
3
McDougall, William. Body and Mind. "A History And A
Defense Of Animism." (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1911)*
p.**8.
l*f
Charles Darwin radically changed the scientific approach
to life. As G. Gaylord Simpson says, his two greatest con¬
tributions were the establishment of evolution as an incontes¬
table fact; and the identification of Natural Selection as a
major element in adaptation.
Essentially Darwin viewed Natural Selection as a. factor
in the process of elimination of those individuals that did
not show the characteristics which happened to be useful for
5
the survival of their species of organism. However, to
grasp the mechanistic nature of Natural Selection one must
see it in terms of Darwin's theory of "descent," which Hans
Driesch describes as follows: "The theory of descent is the
hypothetic statement that the organisms are really allied by
£
blood among each other, in spite of their diversities."
The chief characteristics of each species are passed mat¬
erially between generations by some undetermined process of
heredity, i.e. some abstract physical principle. Selection is,
so to speak, the elimination by chance of any defective pro¬
ducts of this heredity.
L.
Simpson, George Gaylord. The Meaning of Evolution. "A
Study of the History of Life and of Its Significance for Man."
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952). p.268. Both Simp¬
son and also Hans Driesch (The Science and Philosophy of Or¬
ganism. 1908) point out that Natural Selection was proposed
by Darwin as an element within the process known as adapta¬
tion. The extreme position taken by the so-called Neo-
Darwinians, that Natural Selection was the sole explanation
for adaptation, is not the direct impact of Darwin's work.
Modern biology, while continuing to accept Natural Selection
in the general sense suggested by Darwin, clearly rejects
the much more radical Neo-Darwinian interpretation.
x
^Driesch, Hans. The Science and Philosophy of Organism.
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1908). Vol. I, p.290.
^ibid. p.251.
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To say that Natural Selection totally explained adapta¬
tion was of course impossible. Adaptation thus explained
continues to have the appearance of purposefulness, which elim¬
inates its purely mechanistic explanation. However, Darwin
was successful in introducing a major step toward a purely
7
mechanistic understanding of adaptation.
In the hands of the Neo-Darwinians, moreover, Natural
Selection was a closer ally for physical mechanism. The fluc¬
tuating variations in organisms were explained as merely acc¬
idental differences in the arrangement of particles of matter
O
in the body, and nothing more.
Undoubtedly part of the reluctance of some to accept the
position of the Neo-Darwinians was the somewhat different —
but earlier — theory of adaptation proposed by Lamarck. Here
we are confronted with a confusion between Lamarck's own teach¬
ings and those of his followers, the Neo-Lamarckians.
It is fair to say that Lamarck was himself somewhat less
materialistic or mechanistic than Darwin. His theory centers
around the belief that adaptation resulted from the conscious
9
effort of the individual organism. The most famous example
7
The contemporary biologist JacquesMonod helps to clarify
the Darwinians' problem. He says, "Indeed natural selection
operates upon the products of chance and knows no other nour¬
ishment; but it operates in a domain of very demanding con¬
ditions, from which chance is banned. It is not to chance but
to these conditions that evolution owes its generally prog¬
ressive course, its successive conquests, and the steady dev¬
elopment which it seems to suggest." Chance and Necessity.
"An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology." trans.,
Austryn Wainhouse. (London: Collins, 1972). p.11*+.
8
Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. I. p.283.
9
Lamarck. Philosophie zoologiaue. trans., Alpheus S. Pack¬
ard. Lamarck The Founder of Evolution. "His Life and Work."
(New York: Longmanns, Green, And, Co. , 1901). p.329.
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of the Lamarckians1, used against the Darwinians, was that
something — some conscious effort — must have made the first
fish leave the water and walk on land. That choice cannot be
explained by Darwin's theory of Natural Selection; for until
the fish left the water any adaptation making it suitable to
live on land would have made it less suitable'to the water.
Therefore, by the theory of Natural Selection it could never
10
have reached the land at all.
Henri Bergson points out that under the Neo-Lamarckians
conscious effort became the sole explanation for adaptation.
This probably was not Lamarck's intention. The weakness of
the Neo-Lamarckians is ^uite clear when explicated by Bergson:
"But if this cause is nothing but the conscious effort of the
individual, it cannot operate in more than a restricted number
of cases — at most in the animal world, and not at all in
the vegetable kingdom."1"'"
The theory of Natural Selection as the explanation for
adaptation is biology's contribution to the popularity of the
mechanistic theory. The second contribution, that of psycho¬
physical parallelism, was made by the emerging science of
physiology. Bergson gives a very concise definition of paral¬
lelism. He says that parallelism assumes that physiological
12
brain states and psychical mental states are parallel.
10For a more complete discussion of Lamarckian "vitalism"
cf. Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. I, p.283f.
11
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution, trans., Arthur Mit¬
chell. (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1911). p.92.
12
Bergson, Henri. Matter And Memory, trans., Nancy Mar¬
garet Paul and W. Scott Palmer."TLondon: Swan Sonnenschein &
Co., Lim., 1911). p.xi.
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Physiology's discovery of the nervous system and its
biochemical functioning was the primary source for the concept
of parallelism. Based on these discoveries the assumption was
made that all mental processes could be explained by the purely
mechanistic laws of brain chemistry.
Of course, vast amounts of important research went into
the establishment of the theory of parallelism. Therefore, the
fact that we are mentioning it only briefly does not indicate
its lack of importance. However, it will be more valuable to
reserve further comment until we consider the various objec-
1^
tions to parallelism. J
The third, and in the minds of many the most conclusive,
argument for a mechanistic theory was the establishment of the
Law of The Conservation of Energy, the first law of thermody¬
namics, and the Theory of Entropy, the second law of thermody¬
namics. This is a contribution made by physics to the mechan¬
istic theory.
Simply stated, the first law of thermodynamics is that
energy can neither be created nor destroyed. The best way to
show why this would suggest mechanism is through an example,
such as the following one used by Haldane: "Any 'guidance' of
living organisms by the vital principle would imply a creation
or destruction of energy; and this would be the case even if
1^
^Parallelism quickly became a term associated with psy¬
chology. Within this discipline it meant that all mental
states could be accounted for through one of three explana¬
tions: (1) by some stimulation reaching the organism from its
environment; (2) by some chemical function or malfunction;
(3) by some structural injury to the nervous system. Hans
Driesch, for example, nearly always associates parallelism
with psychology.
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the energy created in the living substance were again des¬
troyed before it could escape to the outside, and so become
Im¬
measurable. "
In other words, anything which alters the physical laws
could do so only by the creation or destruction of energy,
which according to thermodynamics is not possible. Therefore,
in all cases, even in the case of life, the mechanistic laws
apply without exception. This means that no truly unique fac¬
tor can be introduced into the universe; rather our understan-
1 m
ding of the laws of nature can only be expanded and refined. y
Ward defines entropy as, "The steady downward trend, the
katabolic, leveling tendences attributed to unchecked mechan¬
ism...""^ The theory of entropy stems in part from the intro¬
duction of the concept of potential energy to accompany the
then already established theory of kinetic energy. With the
introduction of the concept of potential energy, activity be¬
came understood as the conversion of potential into kinetic
energy. According to the theory of entropy the potential
energy in the universe will eventually be depleted and all
activity will cease.
The suggestion of the possibility of an entropic state
arose from the observation that areas having various air
]Ll
Haldane, J.S. Mechanism. Life And Personality. "An
Examination Of The Mechanistic Theory Of Life And Mind."
(London: John Murray, 1913)* p.28.
yThe Law of The Conservation of Energy was introduced
in Germany by von Helmholtz and by Joule in England at about
the same time.
-| £
Ward. The Realm Of Ends. p.9.
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temperatures (differing potentials) demonstrated a tendency
to establish a unified temperature. Once this occurred, the
movement of molecules in the air ceased, because diversity
was necessary to potential, and potential was necessary to
17
activity; i.e. the conversion to kinetic energy.
In the following Chapters we will look more carefully at
the implications of conservation and entropy. However, the
tone of these implications will continue to be the rejection
of purposefulness, which leads to the acceptance of mechanism.
Just as any other assumption, mechanism — the theory of
absolute physical order — required supporting data before
gaining wide acceptance in the scientific community. In this
regard any data which showed that possible exceptions to mech¬
anism could be accounted for was especially persuasive. Life
appeared to be an exception. However, Darwin's theories of
descent and Natural Selection suggested that life forms devel¬
oped according to material laws. Human consciousness was a
second possible exception. However, parallelism suggested
that it could be explained through observing chemical reactions
in the brain. Finally, the total activity of the universe it¬
self was discovered to be subject to the physical laws of
thermodynamics.
For science the chief implication of mechanism is that
all occurrences in the universe are both predictable and ex¬
plainable. Nothing is totally unique, and nothing is an
17
JacquesMonod gives a simple, straightforward account
of entropy as it is understood by a modern biologist.
Chance And Necessity. pp.l85f«
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exception to absolute order. Ultimately everything can be
described as "blind" adherence to the material laws. Indivi¬
dual purposefulness is mere appearance. Furthermore, there
is nothing to be said about the purpose of reality — it
simply is. There is no way to get behind the material laws
to ask their meaning.
B. Mechanism In Philosophy
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
when moving from the area of science into the field of philos¬
ophy, the term "materialism" is used in place of mechanism.
That is, philosophers tended to call men of science mechanists
— but others in their own field of philosophy, holding mech¬
anist views, were often referred to as materialists.
Thus, for example, the term "spiritualism" might be used
to mean the opposite of either mechanism or materialism. The
following quotation from Bradley illustrates this: "The idea
1 P
of spirit, we may say, is directly opposite to mechanism."
Materialism in the middle to the late nineteenth century
was the philosophic position which held that all activity can
be explained by the potential already present within matter.
This clearly makes it consistent with a physics which explains
all motion in terms of potential and kinetic energy. It is
opposed to any form of spiritualism which would posit an
19
extra-material force working upon matter. The three major
1 O
Bradley, F.H. Appearance And Reality. (London: George
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916). Sixth Impression. p. *+98.
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Naturalism is used by Ward as synonymous with material¬
ism and mechanism. In his Gifford Lectures of 1896 he says,
21
forms of materialism were evolutionism, atomism, and secondary
causality, or historical determinism,;; .
The term evolution, which will be a significant term in
this paper, was chiefly a philosophical concept prior to its
establishment as a scientific fact by Darwin. Even as a pre-
Darwinian philosophical concept it was an example of material¬
ism, because evolution was understood asthfe gradual unfolding
of what was already possible within matter. Ward illustrates
this concept of evolution by a scroll being gradually unrolled
20
to reveal more and more of the "already possible" text.
Darwin's theory of evolution by Natural Selection was, as
we saw, suited to a mechanistic interpretation, but undoubtedly
the most influential statement of materialistic evolution is
21
to be found in Herbert Spencer's First Principles. An alter¬
native understanding of evolution is that of "Epigenesis."
Epigenesis is the position that evolution, even as a scientific
fact, demonstrates that the development which occurs in an
organism represents something more than the actualisation of
the potentiality of matter. This concept will be discussed
more fully in Chapter II.
"This naturalistic philospphy consists in the union of
three fundamental theories: (I) the theory that nature is
ultimately resolvable into a single vast mechanism; 12) the
theory of evolution as the working of this mechanism; and
(3) the theory of psychophysical parallelism or conscious
automatism..." Naturalism And Agnosticism. (London: Adam and
Charles Black, 1906). Third Edition. Vol. I, p.186.
20
Ward. The Realm Of Ends♦ p.97.
pi
Spencer, Herbert. First Principles. (London: Williams
And Norgate, 1870). Third Edition.
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Aside from the materialistic interpretation of evolution
it will be helpful if we comment on two other ways of expres¬
sing a belief in a materialistic philosophy. Atomism is what
one might call the classic statement of materialism. The
principal characteristic of all forms of atomism is the ass¬
umption that there exists an absolutely smallest material
particle, which is not subject to further division. However,
Ward says, "Thus, in spite of the etymological identity of
atom and individual, pluralism has nothing in common with at¬
omism beyond the bare fact that both recognise a many; for the
atom is credited with no spontaneity and is completely deter-
22
mined from without."
The third of the materialistic philosophies might well
be described as historical determinism or secondary causality.
This form of mechanism is illustrated by a position which
assumes that "...beyond humanity and history, beyond, if you
will, the whole realm of sentient life, Nature is there all
the while, and there as no mere background but as the basis
of the whole, the fundamental plasma which can only be shaped
23
because it is itself determinate and orderly." J
In other words nature is assumed to be a mechanistic
whole quite apart from any consideration of what man is able
to know specifically about this whole. Furthermore, one might
suggest that the concept of "ether", i.e. the medium or plasma
in which activity occurs, a concept re-popularised in the
""Ward. The Realm Of Ends, pol¬
aroid. p. 20.
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nineteenth century, also comes under this form of mechanism.
To put the above in another way, extension is believed
to be the only primary quality, and all other qualities are
secondary. Bradley describes this form of mechanism by say¬
ing, "That doctrine, of course, holds that the extended can
pL>
be actual, entirely apart from every other quality."
Our discussion of materialistic philosophy would not be
complete without mentioning the concepts of teleology and
finalism. Scientific mechanism is essentially non-teleol--
ogical. That is, it refuses to admit that the activity in
the world is purposeful in any ultimate sense. The laws of
nature are not working toward any observable goal. What may
appear to be purposefulness in a particular situation is a
totally "relative" factor.
Generally we might suppose that any philosophy which pro¬
posed a teleological position would not be mechanistic. How¬
ever, Bergson points out that this is not the case with "final¬
ism." Both finalism and mechanism proceed on the assumption
of a pre-established order. Scientific mechanism has merely
oLL
Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.17. Henri Bergson
assigns the formation of this position to Kant: "...space
would be a reality as solid as the sensations themselves,
although of a different order. We owe the exact formulation
of this latter conception to Kant: the theory which he works
out in the Transcendental Aesthetic consists in endowing
space with an existence independent of its content, in laying
down as de .jure separable what each of us separates de facto,
and in refusing to regard extensity as an abstraction like
the others. In this respect the Kantian conception of space
differs less than is usually imagined from the popular belief.
("Popular belief" here refers to the concept of ether). Far
from shaking our faith in the reality of space, Kant has shown
what it actually means and has even justified it." Time And
Free Will. trans., F.L. Pogson. (London: Swan Sonnenschein &
Co., Lim., 1910). p.92.
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eliminated the anthropomorphic, i.e. ontological, character
25
of most finalism, and has gotten rid of the end pursued. y
Finalism could be well illustrated by the belief that in
retrospect one can see the human species as representing the
very organism which the entire evolutionary process was des¬
tined to create. At every stage in the process Natural Selec¬
tion was oriented to preserving just those structures which
would make for the highest possible life form — man. In
other words, the evolutionary stages demonstrate a teleologi-
26
cal aspect implicit within the natural laws. G. Gaylord
Simpson, in his discussion of mechanism and finalism, suggests
that the word "progress" be used as a more precise understan-
27
ding of purpose.
Each of our examples of materialistic philosophy, i.e.
evolutionism, atomism, historical determinism, and finalism,
are developments in philosophy that are associated with scien¬
tific mechanism. They all conclude that the key to under¬
standing the material reality rests in seeing that universal
order is the result of some abstract principle inherently in¬
corporated by matter. This abstract principle is absolute
2C>
^Bergson. Creative Evolution, pp.9**-100.
Hans Driesch makes a distinction between "statical tele¬
ology", and "dynamical teleology." Statical teleology he says
may apply to a part of a machine, which has purposefulness
only because it stands in a special relation to other single
processes, and for no other reason. Dynamical teleology he
says is characteristic only of "life." It is autonomic and
does not result from a combination of other agents, but is
elemental in itself. The Science And Philosophy Of Organism.
Vol. II. pp.135-136.
^'Simpson. The Meaning Of Evolution, p. 2^-1.
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because it remains the same in every relation possible. As
the absolute principle is innate to matter, men, who are them¬
selves grounded in material reality, have no source of infor¬
mation about an absolute principle which is independent of
material reality. Quite apart from what the physical sciences
may have intended, the above philosophical positions are all
formulations with a specific understanding of the term absolute.
C. Mechanism In Metaphysics
Writing in 1911) William McDougall makes a comment about
his work which helps to capture the understanding of the term
metaphysic for his day. He says, "Of course, if the term meta-
physic be taken in the older sense as implying an inquiry into
that which is not physical, the theme of this work is meta¬
physical; but that is a usage which is no longer accepted;
metaphysic is now distinguished from empirical science by its
23
aims and methods rather than by its subject-matter."
One way to think of the aim of metaphysics is that it
29
attempts to comprehend the universe as a whole. And further¬
more its aim is to achieve as precise a conception as possible.
If one accepts the above definition of the aim of meta¬
physics, this aim would appear to be totally satisfied by
mechanism. Mechanism is a way of understanding the universe
in terms of a single unifying principle. The laws of nature,
functioning without exception, and applicable in all situ¬
ations, are a very precise explanation of how the universe
McDougall, William. Body And Mind. "A History And A
Defense Of Animism." (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1911). p.
xiv.
29
Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.l.
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holds together.
As mechanism's explanation is wholly physical, the aim
of metaphysics seems to be achieved without the need of a
metaphysic. However, as we will see in Chapter II, where we
consider the topic of "vitalism", there was substantial scien¬
tific evidence that "life" was an exception to the physical
laws. Indeed, it is in an effort to account for life in the
universe that McDougall developed his own theory of "Animism."
Before moving into the topic of vitalism, however, it is
important to note an interesting connection between some vit¬
alisms and the mechanism we have been discussing. In moving
beyond the physical, animists or vitalists do not necessarily
deny mechanism's belief in a universal order. Instead they
may merely argue that the source of order is outside of the
material realm, and is not innate to matter.
Therefore, the aims of some animisms and vitalisms differ
from those of mechanism in that the former attempt to find
the "source" of order, while the latter investigate the "pheno¬
menon" of order. However, their subject matter — the order
of the universe — is the same.
In speaking of the order of the universe, we are referring
to the organisation of "activity." According to mechanism
activity is inherently contained in matter, and is organised
in terms of material structure. On the other hand, some anim¬
isms and vitalisms argue that the activity of living organisms
is not organised according to the same plan as the activity
of dead matter. If this latter contention is supported, then
the two most likely conclusions are: (l) that matter repre¬
sents one kind of activity and life another, or (2) that a
27
single source of activity, outside of matter, can account for
the organisation of both matter and life.
The first option clearly suggests a dualism between physi¬
cal and metaphysical activity. The second option supposes a
single metaphysical source of activity. This single metaphysi¬
cal source would be absolute because it unifies all reality on
the basis of activity. As it would be contradictory to speak
of a unity "outside" of the absolute principle, unity must
take place within the principle of activity. Furthermore,
given the fact that the metaphysical order is absolute, the
physical order, which it makes possible, must be determined
by the metaphysical order.
Based upon such reasoning McDougall, for example, says
that material order reflects the divine or spiritual order.
This spiritual order is not innate to matter but works upon
matter. However, this merely amounts to saying that while
activity is indeed more complex than mechanism allows, it is
nevertheless ultimately deterministic because it is unified
throughout. Furthermore, if activity is ultimately ordered
there is no place for such factors as freedom, uniqueness,
novelty, creativeness and purpose.
The point is that metaphysics may have an understanding
of the term absolute, which is very different from the impli¬
cit meaning of that term in materialism, and yet by its own
use of the term absolute arrive at a determinism parallel to
^Bergson, Henri. Time And Free Will, trans.. F.L. Pog-
son. (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1910;. pp.151-
152.
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materialistic determinism. It is in order to avoid determinism
that a man like Bergson, as we will see in Chapter IV,prefers
to remain somewhat of a dualist and not accept that matter and
life are unified by a common source of activity.
CHAPTER IIj Vitalism And Animism
Vitalism is the belief that the activity of organisms
cannot be totally accounted for by a mechanistic theory, which
holds that activity is innate to matter and is ordered accor¬
ding to the material structure. Instead vitalism holds that
activity can be fully explained only by the introduction of
some extra-material source. Under the general category of
vitalist will come a wide variety of thinkers who hold very
different positions. Nevertheless, the above definition of
vitalism holds true for such diverse positions as those held
by Bergson, Driesch, Ward and McDougall. However, when we
get to the question of the nature of the vital activity,
thinkers are widely separated.
In Chapter I we mentioned that the strengthening of the
mechanistic position resulted from three areas of scientific
achievement: (l) a mechanistic explanation for adaptation;
(2) a mechanistic account of the nervous system; and, (3)
the formulation of the Laws of Thermodynamics. We will there¬
fore begin our study of vitalism by considering why leading
vitalists attempted to call into question the conclusions
which developed out of the above developments in science.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the
issue of vitalism was the issue of the "uniqueness of life."
The chief problem was whether or not the phenomenon of the
activity of life could be explained by a purely mechanistic
formulation. Certain men, many of whom were students of the
developing science of modern biology, said that life could
30
not be explained mechanistically.
A. Vitalism In Science
One of the most influential arguments for the interpre¬
tation of evolution as epigenesis, i.e. the position that
evolution produces something beyond the potential already
present in matter, was introduced by the German biologist
Hans Driesch. He presents three, from his point of view
conclusive, arguments against the concept that a living organ-
ism is merely a machine.
The first of the three proofs is based on discoveries
that he made in the area of individual morphogenesis. The
cells of certain life forms, in at least the second and third
stages of cell division, were, he discovered, "harmonious-
equipotential systems." This term means that, if the cells
after their initial divisions are separated, each new cell
demonstrates the potential of developing into a full organism
(of sometimes reduced size). Driesch says,
Therefore, there can be neither any sort of a
machine nor any sort of causality based upon con¬
stellation underlying the differentiation of har¬
monious -equipotential systems.
For a machine, typical with regard to the three
chief dimensions of space, cannot remain itself if
3 It is significant to the general theme of the develop¬
ment of biology as an independent science that Hans Driesch
was the first biologist to be invited to present the Gifford
Lectures at the University of St. Andrews (1907-1908).
^2Drieseh generally uses the word "machine" in a chemical
sense: "A machine" is a typical configuration of physical and
chemical constituents, by the acting of which a typical effect
is attained.
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you remove parts of it or if you rearrange its
parts at will.^
As we have already indicated, vitalism supposes that some
extra-material source of activity must account for the activity
of organisms. Driesch chooses to call this a force or an
"entelechy." The term entelechy is widely used by vitalists
who look to Driesch for support.
The fact of heredity is Driesch1s second proof of vital¬
ism. Perhaps from a modern point of view, it would be clearer
to call this a proof based upon the process of sexual repro¬
duction. Indeed, most of the modern information about genetic
heredity was totally unknown to Driesch. However, the point
concerning reproduction is that it comes about by cell division.
Nevertheless-, the result of this division is a whole organism
essentially like the parent organisms. No machine, says
Driesch, is able to go through a series of divisions and remain
what it is.
Driesch's third proof is a refutation of the purely mech¬
anistic functioning of the nervous system. In the widest sense
Driesch argues that the response of individuals does not direc¬
tly correspond to a given stimulus. For example, Driesch
argues that no machine is capable of spontaneous regeneration
of organs; nor can a machine respond with anything similar to
the development of antibodies by the blood of living organisms.




To account for the abilities of organisms to make unique res¬
ponses to stimuli Driesch posits the existence of forces which
he names "psychoids."
While these three proofs are central to the biological
refutation of the traditional understanding of evolution as
an "unfolding", we have not yet made any direct mention of
Darwin's theory of adaptation by Natural Selection. One reason
is that Driesch holds that the science of his day did not know
enough about adaptation to use it as a proof either for or
against vitalism. He believed that accurate knowledge was
limited in biology to some information about individual mor¬
phogenesis. Of adaptation he therefore says, "Morphological
adaptation is no part of individual morphogenesis proper, but
occurs at the end of it; at least it never occurs previous to
the full individual life of an organism, previous to its true
functional life; for it relates to the functions of the com-
37
plete organism."-^
Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution makes two additional
observations concerning biology's ignorance about how adapta¬
tion occurs. First he says that a mechanistic adaptation
should produce increasingly perfect harmony among organisms.
However, this is not the case. Adaptation appears to be some-
O
thing which promotes individuality.
Bergson's second observation is that many biologists of
his day continued to interpret evolution as if the Aristotelian
•^Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. II. p.82
37 .Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. I. p.168.
-^Bergson. Creative Evolution, p.53.
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hypothesis, that vegetative, instinctive and rational life
represent three successive degrees of development, was suppor¬
ted by modern evidence. Bergson argues that the difference
among these three is not "a difference of intensity, nor, more
o 9
generally, of degree, but of kind."J
As the formulation of the conservation of energy and of
entropy were believed to be the climactic achievement in the
establishment of pure mechanism, the vitalists centered a great
deal of attention upon the refutation of their formulation.
We might begin with Driesch's explanation of how entelehijy
avoids entropy. This is the best way to express Driesch's
opinion as he, like certain other thinkers, does not say that
entropy is wrong; rather that it is not adequate to include
all reality, and is thus avoided by life.
Driesch says that entropy involves merely an explanation
appropriate to energy. However, entelechy is not a form of
energy. Therefore, it cannot violate the principle of the
conservation of energy.^0
The justification for this position becomes clearer if
we introduce still another way of interpreting the implica¬
tions of entropy. Namely, entropy implies the impossibility
of an increase in the degree of manifoldness, i.e. of com-
l+l
plexity or order. Manifoldness implies that there is a
^^Bergson. Creative Evolution. p.l*+2.
^Driesch, Hans. The Problem Of Individuality. (London:
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 191*+) • pp.35~36.
^ibid. pp.51-52.
3*+
corresponding increase in potential. For example, in the case
of the harmonious-equipotential system, described by Driesch,
each cell appears to have the potential to form a total
organism. The more complex the organism becomes, the greater
the corresponding potential within each cell. Therefore, life
with its increasingly complex organisation would appear to be
creating energy.
However, in order to avoid saying this Driesch suggests
that entelechy is in fact non-energetic. Therefore, instead
of an increase in potential energy, he believes that something
new has been introduced.
Bergson's position on entropy is characteristic of his
essentially dualistic view of matter and life. Entropy he
suggests applies to inert matter but not to life. Or in his
own words: "In vital activity we see, then, that which sub¬
sists of the direct movement In the inverted movement, a real¬
ity which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking
1+2
itself."
What is characteristic of life, says Bergson, is its
being able to accumulate energy and to redirect it without
expending energy. He says, "...Life has a tendency to accumu¬
late in a reservoir, as do especially the green parts of vege¬
tables, with a view to an instantaneous effective discharge,
l+o
like that which an animal brings about..." J In this sense
entropy is not necessarily overcome, but it is clearly retar¬
ded. Such activity, however, led Bergson to adopt vitalism,
because he sees in life a conscious effort to overcome
L+o
Bergson. Creative Evolution. p.26l.
ibid. p.26(Du
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the general laws of inert matter.
Finally we will look at Ward's objections to entropy.
Ward points out that thermodynamics cannot answer the question,
why its prediction of potential energy becoming unavailable
has not already happened? He says,
On these assumptions that energy can only last a
finite time, and the ratio of finite time to in¬
finite duration is strictly infinitesimal. The
chances then are infinity to one in favour of the
universe being at any given moment 'played out. ')|)|
B. Vitalism In Philosophy
While it is true that the arguments in favour of vitalism
did not cause scientists to flock into the camp, these argu¬
ments nevertheless did pose some significant problems, especi¬
ally interesting to philosophy. Therefore, we may well review
some of the implications of vitalism as a philosophical posi¬
tion, as it was differently presented by certain major expon¬
ents.
Bergson suggests that the source of vital activity, his
so-called "elan Vital," may be a new kind of energy. J Bergson
points out that Leibniz developed his philosophy on the basis
of kinetic energy alone. Only later was the concept of poten¬
tial energy added as a necessary adjunct. Therefore, one might
suppose a new kind of energy which is necessary in order to
account for the activity of life. This necessary elan, says
Bergson, is transmitted by heredity in the same way as the
LL
Ward. Naturalism And Agnosticism. Vol. I. p.171.
^-'Bergson. Time Ahd Free Will♦ pp.151-152.
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other characteristics of the organism.
Essentially, says Bergson, we may think of the elan as a
hurst of pure energy. The source of this pure energy one may
wish to call God. Matter represents the decay of this pure
potential.
Driesch, as we have already mentioned, thinks of his
entelechy not as a new kind of energy, but rather as a non-
energetic force. Driesch persists in calling entelechy "It."
It is eternal. It is neither matter nor energy. It is not
subject to space or time. In short, he says, It is the teleo-
1+7
logical factor within the universe. It is apparently an
eternal factor built into reality.
For McDougall it is appropriate to call the vital force
"mind" rather than "spirit." Mind, says McDougall, is a non-
physical reality. It acts upon matter, and is not in any way
the result of the material world. By this statement he rejects
Huxley's concept of "epiphenomenalism," in which the mind is
believed to be somehow dependent for its existence on matter.
1+8
Furthermore, if one prefers, as McDougall himself sometimes
l+g
does, the word "soul" may be used in place of mind.
Haldane distinguishes two chief modes of vitalism. In
general he suggests that vitalism proper assumes that living
organisms are guided by some non-physical factor which is said
Ll6
Bergson. Creative Evolution, p.2¥+.
1+7
'Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. II. p.205-
^McDougall. Body And Mind. p.llf9«
^ibid. p. 299.
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to act blindly and necessarily. The animists also assume the
non-physical factor, but they tend to identify it with the
50
soul which acts somehow sub-consciously.
C. Vitalism In Metaphysics
It is perhaps most common to call the post-Darwinian
vitalism, which we have been discussing, Neo-Vitalism. At
least this is the designation that was assigned to it in the
early twentieth century. The most significant characteristic
of neo-vitalism, in terms of metaphysics, was that it profoun¬
dly reopened the issue of individuality. In a purely mechan¬
istic system certain concepts such as individuality, novelty,
freedom, creativeness, purpose and becoming have no really
ultimate meaning. In a vitalistic system, however, this is not
the case.
Vitalism, as we have been discussing it, is necessarily
pluralistic in many respects. Such pluralism, so the vitalists
argue, is necessary in order to fulfill the task of metaphy¬
sics; namely, to comprehend the universe in its totality. Of
course, the chief dilemma for pluralism is how to also account
for the apparent unity admitting diversity. The effort to do
just this is the second characteristic of neo-vitalism. Chap¬
ter IV will deal with vitalists' attempts to reconcile unity
and diversity. However, at present we will only give an ac¬
count of the pluralistic aspects of vitalism.
Undoubtedly the most comprehensive statement concerning
£f)y Haldane, J.S. Mechanism, Life And Personality. "An
Examination Of The Mechanistic Theory Of Life And Mind."
(London: John Murray, 1913pp.17-18.
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pluralism during this period was Ward's Pluralism And Theism.
Therefore, we will begin with his work.
It should be quite clear that the theory of mechanism is
the theory of an order, or of laws, that predetermines the
entire universe. These laws can be discovered by science.
However, Ward points out that there are unique acts and deeds
that have their origin in the individual centers of experience,
51
i.e. in individual minds. For example, Ward argues that
value is not intrinsic to nature, but value results from the
52
individual's attitudes and interests. Likewise, such physi¬
cal concepts as atom or monad imply some sense of plurality.
It is most especially in the field of biology that Ward
sees proof of individuality. For example, among life forms
there is real evidence of diversity. Plants, the lower animals,
and man — in their presently existing forms — are not prod¬
ucts of a single line of development, but are cases of actual
diversity; of a true multiplicity of forms. Adaptation also
appears to Ward to act according to the particular organism,
rather than universally. Finally, the fact that life seems to
violate the concept of entropy implies a real diversity. That
is, the violation of entropy indicates that mechanistic laws
5^
do not apply to life. J
To put this last point in other terms, the mechanical
world moves man along with all creation toward a neutral world




or state, devoid of activity. However, life appears to con¬
tradict this point of view. Indeed life is a movement toward
an increasingly greater order of complexity.
Ward believes that individualisation is the chief fact of
history. Individuality, he felt, is more and more apparent as
5*+
one moves to the higher life forms. Furthermore, Ward says
that progress can only be defined as an interaction of a plur¬
ality of individuals.
As a necessary consequence of the interaction of a
plurality of individuals, intent on self better¬
ment as well as self-conservation, there should be
a general tendency to diminish the mere contin¬
gency of the world and to replace it by a definite
progression. And this, so far as our experience goes,
we find to be in fact the case.^
Bergson in his Time And Free Will uses a more physiologi¬
cal approach for the proof of individuality. He points to a
large number of experiments which disprove parallelism. That
is, he declares that mental states are not totally predictable.
In his book Creative Evolution he returns to this theme saying,
For to foresee consists of projecting into the
future what has been perceived in the past, or
of imagining for a later time a new grouping,
in a new order, of elements already perceived.
But that which has never been perceived, and
which is at the same time simple, is necessar¬
ily unforeseeable.^
But what turns out to be one of his most powerful argu¬
ments for pluralism is Bergson's use of the concept "time."
Generally philosophers of his day believed that one of Berg¬
son's greatest achievements was his particular introduction
^*ibid, p.18.
-^ibid. p.97.
^Bergson. Creative Evolution. pp.6-7*
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of the concept of time into philosophy. Time, he says, is a
reality accepted by physical science. Yet the very concept of
time itself is a refutation of a mechanistic explanation of
the universe. For he points out that if all reality is prog-
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rammed, as finalism supposes, time is a useless concept.
Bergson says that, in establishing their mathematical
(mechanical) laws, scientists select a hypothetical point.
Based upon this point they make measurements and construct
their theories. Time in the sense of "duration," however, can¬
not be explained by a single point. Rather, a series of points
is necessary in order to account for the movement of time.
That time does so move, and that this movement has meaning, can
be proven by the simple fact that a man grows older.
For the fact of evolution to have taken place, says Berg¬
son, one must assume a persistence of the past into the present.
That is, there must be a duration, a hyphen, a connecting link
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between points. Thus in accepting time we must accept a plur¬
ality.
In fact, Bergson has introduced the hypothesis that in
order for activity to take place one must assume a multiplicity.
He illustrates his point primarily in terms of life. Indeed,
we must remember that Bergson associates activity solely with
life. Entropy, inactivity, is the characteristic state of
matter.
Bergson further holds that, in life forms, feelings are




is not a unity but a complexity. In Time And Free Will Bergson
points out that science has proven that the intensity of a
feeling is directly related to the multi'p licity of simple
states, which consciousness dimly discerns within the total
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feeling. For example, the intensity of a pain is determined
by the number of pain-sensitive nerves affected. There is no
other way of explaining intensity within conscious states.
Thus consciousness of itself demands the reality of a multipli¬
city.
F.H. Bradley agrees that the fact of consciousness demands
a pluralism. He says,
I still insist that for thought what is not rela¬
tive is nothing. But I urge, on the other hand,
that nothings cannot be related, and that to turn
qualities in relation into mere relations is im¬
possible. £q
Bradley also picks up the often repeated theme that change
makes no sense apart from diversity. He says, "Thus to the
religious mind, everything which is good is but the bringing
to light of God's perfection and glory; and yet to the same
religious mind nowhere is God more really present than in that
will for good which in myself and others makes changes in the
world.
^Bergson. Time And Free Will, pp.31-32.
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Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.30. One must be
careful not to confuse the use of the term relativism in
Bradley's works with the modern concept of "relativity." The
point of relativism is that the cognitive process is not to
be understood simply as a machine. Rather, it must be the
result of a multiplicity within objective reality. In Chapter
III we will consider Bradley's problem of how the universal¬
ity of relationships appears to conflict with relativism.
^Bradley, F.H. Essays On Truth And Reality. (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 191*+). pp.105-106.
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From a scientific viewpoint, vitalism suggests that the
phenomenon of the activity of life is an exception to the
principle that all activity is organised in terms of material
structure. This means that the absoluteness of the physical
laws cannot be maintained. Although there was a strong ten¬
dency among many vitalists to accept that the physical laws
were absolute when applied only to "dead" matter.
In the hands of metaphysics vitalistic conclusions sug¬
gested that life was unlike matter, in that only the former
demonstrated "true" individuality or multiplicity. The concept
of true individuality includes the principle that the activity
of entities is not determined. Materialism demonstrated that
the activity of particles of matter was determined by their
structures. In other words the organisation of their activity
was, so to speak, built-ih. However, as we have just seen,
material structure did not appear to fully account for the ac¬
tivity of living organisms. Pushed to an extreme, vitalism
could be used to support the rejection of any concept of abso¬
lute principles, and in favour of an ultimate pluralism.
The thinkers whomwe will be considering in the next several
Chapters are not prepared to ignore the implications of either
mechanism or vitalism. On the one hand they will feel it nec¬
essary to speak to mechanism's conclusion that some absolute
principle orders or unifies all reality. On the other hand
they will attempt to confront the issue of multiplicity being
necessary to the activity of life. The problem, therefore,
will be to formulate a cosmology in which both order and diver¬
sity -- unity and multiplicity — have a place.
Of course, we are especially interested in looking at how
>+3
the term absolute is used and understood. As we said earlier,
the term absolute implies that something has an inner neces¬
sity which remains the same in all relations possible. Vitalism
has already opened the point that physics' abstract principle
cannot be absolute, as it is not valid in relation to life.
The apparent contradictions that life poses, for the est¬
ablishment of a comprehension of the universe as a whole, may
not be a direct concern for the biological sciences. However,
it is a concern for a metaphysics, which does seek comprehen¬
siveness. Metaphysics, therefore, must either accept some form
of pluralism, or discount vitalistic data, or formulate some
principle of activity that by inner necessity is the same in
relation to both matter and life; this principle of activity
would thus become absolute. It is in large part the effort
within metaphysics to determine a reference for the terra abso¬
lute, with regard to the apparently conflicting data coming
from the modern sciences, that causes the concept of process
to begin to take shape.
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CHAPTER Ills F.H. Bradley's Absolutism
In one sense F.H. Bradley's work represents a strange
place to begin a discussion of whether the factors of unity
and diversity can be reconciled within either materialism or
vitalism. His position is that neither system answers the
dilemma. Indeed he holds that the solution can only be reached
on a purely metaphysical level. On the other hand, he does
admit that both systems have specific insights which agree
with metaphysics.
Bradley's book Appearance And Reality was one of the
first to make clear that the issues between materialism and
vitalism point to a central problem for metaphysics. In the
process of establishing his position, he so clearly illus¬
trates the factors involved that this, rather than his ultimate
conclusions, makes it appropriate for us to begin with him.
The physical world, said Bradley, "appears" to us as a
multiplicity — a world of many values in which no value seems
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to be able to involve all the rest. Yet we do not compre¬
hend the world as simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow
as a whole.^
However, like an exponent of mechanism, Bradley believes
that whatever unifies the cosmos must somehow be absolute.
Yet he cannot see how materialism justifies its belief that it
^2ibid. pp.6-7.
^Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.30.
^5
can explain this unity or order by a physical principle. Thus
he says that the explication of the absolute order is a topic
only for metaphysics.
Bradley uses many examples of the inadequacy of attempts
by materialists to discover the cosmic principle of unity with¬
in the physical laws. For example, he points out that the
concept of time, which was often credited as proving unity,
was in fact not able to do so. To illustrate his point he
looks to Bergson's discussions of time.
According to Bradley's understanding of Bergson, time is
common only to life and actually implies the existence of
"mind." It is within the mind, as we will see, that time does
provide unity for Bergson. This means that time is relative
to mind. Aiid says Bradley, what we are looking for in the
principle of unity is something which relates — not a relat¬
ionship. Time is a mere relationship, argues Bradley, used
by materialism as that which relates.
The Absolute for Bradley is that which relates, but in
itself is free from relationships. Bradley's point that the
Absolute is not capable of relating dates to Hegel's treatment
of the Absolute, and this issue becomes a central topic in
Process philosophies.
Space, the theory of extension, is another common materi¬
alists' proof of unity. However, according to Bradley, space
also depends upon relationships, and therefore cannot be the
principle of relatedness.
Not only did he feel that the materialists were unable to
account for unity, but he also believed that religion failed
to prove unity metaphysically — although the spiritual level
1+6
was where unity should have been demonstrated. In his treat¬
ment of the "God of Religion" Bradley is especially careful
to point out that its God cannot be understood as the Absolute.
The God of religion, says Bradley, is personal. He has rela¬
tionships. Therefore, this God can only be an appearance of
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the Absolute, and not the Absolute itself.
Nevertheless, the fact of unity remains a reality, quite
apart from the situation that we have only been able to account
for appearances of it. Bradley concludes, therefore, that what
we must say is tnat unity is nothing other than an experience.
"It will hence be a single all-inclusive experience, which em-
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braces every partial diversity in concord."
At this point the way is opened for another understanding
of the term absolute. It does not in Bradley's work refer to
an abstract physical principle. Instead the term refers to an
actual concrete unity of the complexities, and even contradic¬
tions, of reality.
This use of the term absolute is validated by experience.
Experience itself is a whole; yet it is composed of unresolv-
able contradictions. However, says Bradley, if these contra¬
dictions remain unresolvable, then there could be no permanence.
And permanence is demanded because there is change. Bradley
points out,
I do not say that this demand is consistent, and,
^ibid. p.*+48.
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ibid, p.1^-7. Whitehead refers to Bradley in both Process
And Reality, and also in Adventures Of Ideas. In particular
Whitehead credits Bradley with being an important reference for
his own understanding and use of the concepts feeling and
experience.
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on the contrary, I wish to emphasise the point
that it is not so. It is inconsistent, and yet
it is none the less essential. And I urge that
therefore change desires to pass beyond simple
change. It seeks to become a change which is
somehow consistent with permanence.^
Bradley admits to change and diversity, and he says that
the evolution of life, for example, demonstrates them. Here
of course he would be in agreement with the vitalists. Yet he
says, that vitalism, when it accounts for unity at all, con¬
tinues to depend upon the material as the ground of permanence
or unity, and we have already been shown that such dependence
cannot be supported.
Neither mechanism's call for unity nor vitalism's support
for plurality is wrong -- but neither system can account for
both. According to Bradley, therefore, a unified reality can¬
not be described by any form of materialism or vitalism. Acc¬
ording to Bradley we are so limited to appearances that we
cannot be sure of a difference between the organic and the in¬
organic. Furthermore, even to assert that matter came before
mind is beyond us. Nature, says Bradley, as a general category,
is itself appearance. Bradley's Absolute is beyond nature;
that is, it is totally metaphysical.
Later we will see more clearly the value of many of Brad¬
ley' s observations for Process thought. However, we may next
move to his discussion of the concept of "the spiritual,"
which is his suggested solution to the demand for a single
system including both unity and diversity.
66ibid. p.207.
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In talking about the spiritual it is important to keep in
mind Bradley's distinction between religion and metaphysics.
Religion for Bradley deals with relationships — especially
morals. The establishment of morals he admits is a valuable
task for religion. However, metaphysics deals with what is
absolute. And by its very nature the study of the Absolute is
a topic which religion should avoid.
Religion, he says, is limited by being unable to deal with
the Absolute, and it should recognise this limitation. He
makes his position quite strongly by saying, "I can enter here
no further on this matter than to express my opinion that to
invade the region of philosophy is contrary to the interests
£ rj
of a sound morality or religion."
As we have already said, an experience of wholeness is
supposed to be reality. Yet argues Bradley, this experience
is non-rational and it is not discovered in the world. Thus
one must conclude that this reality enters the process of
events.88
Bradley quickly admits that this theory makes all of our
sensual experience illusory. Here is, in general, the great¬
est problem for his system the material world must be accepted
as lacking ultimate reality; yet this very thing is what seems
so contrary to our experience.
Again Bradley cannot fully accept the implication that
our sensual experience is meaningless. He says that somehow
our sense impressions must, although they are mere appear¬
ances, have meaning. Therefore, Bradley once more pushes the
^Bradley. Essays On Truth And Reality, p.11.
68ibid. p.337.
^9
problem into a metaphysical or spiritual realm. Somehow on
the spiritual level he believes that the problem must find a
resolution.
Bradley believes that he has eliminated the possibilities
of solving the riddle of the ultimate truth of materialism or
vitalism. For him the term absolute must be completely sepa¬
rated from the material world. Materialism was quite right
about the term absolute referring to that which relates,
but it could not include the metaphysical dimension within its
absolute physical principle. Vitalism rightly saw a meta¬
physical dimension, but from this insight it inferred plurality
at the cost of unity.
Generally, the philosophers of this period were unwilling
to accept Bradley's conclusions. They believed that either
vitalism or mechanism could be proven true, or that the two
positions could somehow be reconciled without the introduction
of a total denial of either the metaphysical or the physical.
Bradley would make science and philosophy completely separate
disciplines. But his associates, by and large, sought for
some marriage of the two.
In Chapters IV and V we will be looking at some of the
attempts to show that a predominately vitalistic position can
account for the apparent unity in the cosmos. The attempts
to make the essentially pluralistic vitalism capable of accoun¬
ting for unity develop still further certain of the major
aspects of a Process philosophy.
CHAPTER IV: Neo-Vitalism
Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch have within their posit¬
ions a number of similarities. In part the reason for this is
that both of their positions use the language of biology.
As we have already said, the biology of this period
seemed to be presenting some substantial arguments, which
could be documented by experimentation and research, against
the mechanism of physics. However, biology was a very new
modern science, and it was only in the first stages of becom¬
ing established as an independent discipline. Therefore, one
must be sensitive to the relatively primitive state of the
science as compared with early twentieth century physics, and
certainly with the biology of today.
Indeed, from today's point of view most of the proofs for
vitalism were totally negative. That is, the conclusions were
chiefly the results of inadequate experimental techniques or
inferior equipment. Vitalism was a possible explanation for
what could not be proven experimentally in biology; but truly
positive evidence for vitalism seemed woefully lacking.
Yet Bergson and Driesch were both vitalists, and it is
unfair to assume that they were in fact satisfied completely
with the experimental "proofs" for vitalism. The evidence for
this is that they felt it necessary to formulate a vitalistic
position, which would include an explanation for mechanism's
success in establishing an absolute physical principle.
Their efforts resulted in what we will consider Process
philosophy. It was the problem of making a place for the
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concept of unity within vitalism that led Bergson and Driesch
to Process conclusions. In Chapter V we will see that Ward,
Hocking and McDougall also represent variations on this par¬
ticular approach.
A. Henri Bergson's Elan Vital
In his Adventures Of Ideas Alfred North Whitehead says,
"The point which is here relevant, is that the zest of human
adventure presupposes for its material a scheme of things with
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a worth beyond any single occasion." In spite of many par¬
ticular differences between the Process thought of Whitehead
and Bergson, the foregoing quotation captures extremely well
an essential formulation introduced in great part by Bergson's
writings. Bergson might use the word "state" instead of "occa¬
sion", but his point would be much the same. The real, as we
know it, argues Bergson, appears to be made up of separate
flashes that are independent of each other; yet value must be
understood in terms of a continuity. He therefore tries to
show that the vital principle, which is used to argue against
mechanism in favour of true diversity, also provides the scheme
of unity behind the diversity. Thus he hopes to answer the
need for both unity and diversity within a single system.
The general answer to both of these demands is that ac¬
tivity, as a given, provides individuality and is the source
of unity. Bergson expresses this by saying that action itself
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creates what men suppose to be the cause of action.
^Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures Of Ideas. (Cam¬
bridge: The University Press, 1933P«372.
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Bergson. Creative Evolution. p.l6l.
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In other words, activity is composed of both plurality
and unity. The name that he gives to activity is elan vital,
which we have already mentioned. This elan enters into real¬
ity and it is part of it only because of life. It is unifying
in that it is common to all life, but it is diverse in that it
is not harmonious.7"*"
Activity does not simply presuppose relationships. It is
that which both relates and has relationships. The discussion
of entropy clearly demonstrated this. When all activity
ceases, diversity ceases. However, a single unified tempera¬
ture was reached within the movement of molecules.
The fact that life is activity presupposes diversity and
unity. Yet intellectually mechanism tried, according to Berg-
son, to explain unity by material forms and laws. Mechanists
tried to make these laws absolute; thus eliminating the possi-
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bility of diversity. However, what one experiences is a
complementarity not a unity of forms. The unity of these com-
7^
plementary forms the intellect cannot solve. J
Unity cannot be explained by physical laws; thus it is
not explained by the intellect through reference to the mater¬
ial. What does account for unity is our intuition. Our
intuition, says Bergson, is of the common elan, which is not
mechanistic.
Activity, because it demands true diversity, cannot be





man's Intellect which tries to impose forms upon action.
Bergson says,
...the intellect lets what is new in each moment
of history escape. It does not admit the unfore¬
seeable. It rejects all creation.
On the other hand, intuition takes us to the very depths
of the reality of experience. In experience we discover pure
duration. Duration is characterised by a past which swells
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into a present that is absolutely new.
As yet we have not been told how the intellect arises as
life participates in the elan. The intellect arises through
heredity. We have already said that the elan vital is passed
by heredity. The nature of this heredity is repetition, as
well as modification. In each new generation characteristics
are modified, but the repetition seems also to be essential to
rpS
the physical order.
Thus heredity, which is activity, is also characterised
by individuality and unity. Its repetition is not mechanistic,
as it is an activity implying diversity. However, in matter,
where true activity is not present, repetition appears to be
cause and effect. Seeing cause and effect in matter, one then
expects to see cause and effect in the repetition of life.
"One hypothesis only, therefore," says Bergson, "remains pos¬
sible, namely, that the mathematical order is nothing positive,
that it is the form toward which a certain interruption
75-
ibid, p.172. It is worthwhile to quote Whitehead on
this point: "The factor of activity is what I have called
•creativity.' The initial situation with its creativity can
be termed the initial phase of the new occasion. It can
equally well be termed the 'actual world' relative to the
occasion." Adventures Of Ideas. p.230.
75ibid. p.210 76ibid. p. 254.
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tends of itself, and that materiality consists precisely in
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an interruption of this kind."
The first characteristic of Process philosophy, which sup¬
ports vitalism, is that activity is held to be composed of
both unity and diversity. Now we may observe the second char¬
acteristic; namely, the belief that activity requires the
existence of what Bergson calls "mind." For it is only in
mind that the two elements of activity are truly present.
That is, only mind, or self-consciousness, is composed of both
intellect and intuition. Furthermore, the special way in which
activity is present in the mind is duration: that is, the move¬
ment of the past into the present.
The conclusion finally reached is that self-consciousness
participates in creation. This, therefore, accounts for the
new within activity. However, the potential for creativity is
a given. The potential must have some source outside of the
physical.
The problem which most men seemed to have with Bergson's
metaphysics was with its strong dualistic implications. Mind
and matter appear as categorically non-compatible. Mind is
the source of all activity, and matter is entropic. Certain
of the vitalistic Process thinkers are going to attempt to
nQ
mediate this dualism, but it will remain a consistent problem.
77ibid. p.231.
ry O '' A.E. Taylor points out that the real advance made in
physical science by the Theory Of Relativity is the under¬
standing of the indivisibility of Space and Time. Bergson's
separation of duration and extension, which leads to a dual¬
ism of mind and matter, seems unable to speak to the modern
concept of relativity. A Commentary On Plato's Timaeus.
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928). pp.689-691.
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Little explicit reference has been made to the term abso¬
lute in our presentation of Bergson's position. This was
intentional as, at this point, it is better for us to merely
draw a few implicit conclusions. Bergson would agree with
Bradley that the material laws are not absolute, and that
unity cannot be accounted for by reference to them. The elan
is not a material principle. Therefore, the best candidate
for what is absolute is activity itself. However, this leads
to the very dualism about which Bradley warned vitalists.
Matter is excluded from activity under Bergson's view, and is
therefore excluded from the absolute unity. Such dualism re¬
affirms that the function of the "absolute" is to provide
unity, because to separate anything from the content of what
is referred to as absolute, as Bergson does with matter, is to
prohibit an inclusive system. In Chapter XII we will see that
Bergson does have some specific things to say about the use of
the term absolute, but here we only want to demonstrate the
problem facing him with regard to the term.
William James, however, finds one formulation of Bergson's
dualism important to his work; that is, the dualism of intel¬
lect and intuition. James in his A Pluralistic Universe app¬
lauds Bergson, because of what James calls the conclusive
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refutation of the intellect in favour of experience. Indeed
the emphasis upon experience will be a regular theme in Process
thought.
B. Hans Driesch's Entelechy
79
'James, William. A Pluralistic Universe. (London: Long¬
mans, Green, And Co., 1909). pp.258-260.
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In his "scientific" proofs of vitalism Driesch proposes
that in order to explain life two non-energetic factors must
be active — entelechy and psychoid. Psychoids are similar
to what Bergson would call minds, or what McDougall would call
souls. That is, the psychoids function in directing the
action of the organism. However, in speaking more philosoph¬
ically Driesch tends to use the term entelechy to include
psychoids, which procedure we will now follow.
Like Bergson, Driesch understands that the vital force,
or source of activity, must somehow be consistent with unity
and diversity. However, he realises the logical problem in
suggesting that entelechy is something which can remain whole
in spite of its division into parts. Thus he suggests that
one can simply say that the wholeness of entelechy is not ef¬
fected by the diversity observed within the division of a
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given organic body.
This suggestion clearly hints at what could become the
dualistic problem faced by Bergson. Prom Driesch's position
one must assume that entelechy itself is somehow one thing,
and its manifestation within an organism is another. This
must surely mean that the me.dium in which it is manifested,
i.e. the matter of the organism, is somehow distinct from
entelechy.
However, in an attempt to resolve dualism Driesch intro¬
duces his concept of "becoming." He says, "The definition --
and the only strict definition — of th&uconcept of Nature is,
o0
Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. II., p.258.
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that Nature is a something which satisfies the postulates of
a rational theory of becoming, and which behaves at the same
time as if it were independent and self-persistent in itself."
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Here is a decisive difference from Bergson's position.
Nature, which for Driesch is the matter-energy reality, shares
becoming with entelechy. For Bergson matter is devolution,
but Driesch suggests that all reality participates in becoming.
One problem, of course, is that Driesch tends to eliminate the
possibility of explaining such obvious biological phenomena as
regressions.
Granted, Driesch has already denounced entropy as an abso¬
lute fact; but his system then ignores all other regressions;
it only implies a necessary progression. The problem of how to
deal with regression will be a source of real difficulty for
Process thinkers, who attempt to generally apply what amounts
to a theory of continuous progress.
Perhaps this issue will be clearer if we look closely at
what Driesch means by his concept of becoming. Interestingly,
his chief illustration of becoming is one used by Bergson —
memory: memory which is understood as the constant movement
of the past into the present.
Bergson says that memory is a present unity formed by a
past plurality of events. Thus for memory events form an
organised whole. This organisation is the result of memory's
participation in intuition, and it is not an aspect of the
^Driesch. The Problem Of Individuality. p.*f5«
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material world given to memory. Although the intellect would
try to convince us that the latter is the case. The material
world, according to Bergson, lacks activity, i.e. either unity
or diversity. Thus the organisation of memory is always more
than the events which seem to compose it.
Driesch, on the other hand, holds that the form taken by
memory is in fact a legitimate model for nature. "In other
words," he says, "with regard to Nature the concepts of sub¬
stance and causality have a meaning; with regard to Nature a
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rational theory of causality is possible."
With regard to nature, Driesch says, one can pick out a
particular It which endures, and connect the changes that occur
in that It. Likewise within memory there is that which endures
as well as changes. A natural system according to Driesch can
increase in complexity, i.e. manifoldness, and yet retain an
essential identity. His classic example is the "organism."
In this sense all of nature is more than a mere sum of
elementary concepts. Natural systems do demonstrate a mani¬
foldness not unlike that of Bergson's "memory." It is this
manifoldness — this category of wholeness — which Driesch
would call entelechy. However, he insists that entelechy is
something which must be understood as coming from outside of
the natural order.
Kant's method of establishing his categories serves
Driesch as an example of what he himself is doing. Just as
Kant's categories were deduced, Driesch says, a new category
of wholeness — of entelechy — must be deduced.^
^ibid. p.*f6. ^ibid. pp.55~5&.
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In his Philosophy Of Organism Driesch refers to the fact
gL
of the "It" as being a "window into the absolute." The dis¬
cussion clearly indicates that Driesch thinks of entelechy as
somehow absolute. In other words, he sees the source of be¬
coming as absolute.
The model for this becoming is the organism. The organism
which is not merely a mechanistic sum of elementary concepts,
but a true manifold — a complex unity. The dualistic nature
of vitalism is avoided by excluding nothing from the concept
of organism.
Later we will see that Whitehead also speaks of his cos¬
mology as a "Philosophy of Organism." Indeed, this concept
becomes a standard part of Process philosophies. However, the
argument in favour of this concept will be carefully refined
to eliminate more and more the possibilities of a dualistic
interpretation.
Driesch's philosophy of organism, as we have said, still
retains many of the aspects of Neo-Vitalism. Indeed, MdDougall
in his history of animism tends to class Driesch as a vitalist.
By the time of Whitehead's major philosophical works, we will
see that the term "Vitalism, if applied to the Philosophy of
Organism at all, must carry a somewhat new meaning with quite
different implications.
What we are most interested in, however, is the point that
Driesch's concept of entelechy, unlike Bergson's elan vital,
applies to matter as well as life. Driesch has argued that
activity as an organic principle, rather than as a physical
8 Ll
Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. II. p.363.
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principle, includes all reality. However, if the organic
principle, entelechy, is absolute, Driesch is never able to
give a satisfactory answer to how entelechy as a whole remains
unchanged by division into parts. Furthermore, as we have
seen, entelechy is not the same as the matter-energy reality,
but it merely shares becoming with that reality. Clearly this
means that entelechy and the matter-energy reality have as¬
pects outside of their common becoming. Therefore, dualism is
not completely avoided. Of course it makes sense to say that
matter and life have something in common, but this will not
account for an overall unity of reality.
Thus we must conclude that here neither Bergson nor
Driesch were able to show that vitalism could explain absolute
cosmic unity, while allowing for diversity. On the other hand,
they have shown that the concept of cosmic unity may not be
nearly as simple as materialism Suggested. What was long
clear to philosophy, now became apparent in the field of sci¬
ence; namely, that the implications of absolute unity are not
easily reconciled to a demand for a concept of true diversity.
On the positive side, their concept that the existence
of activity, which is so much taken for granted by physical
sciences, is itself difficult to reconcile with the implica¬
tions of materialism will grow in importance as we continue
our survey of Process. Physics was so concerned to show that
the organisation of activity followed absolute physical laws
that it neglected to notice that, as activity never occurred
apart from diversity, it could not be innate to matter.
Matter of itself lacks true diversity — and Bradley even said
that it lacked unity. If not inherently within matter,
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activity must have another source. Both Bergson and Driesch
have suggested that this source is some sort of interaction
between unity and diversity. Driesch says that all organisms
are characterised by such an interaction. Thus he further
suggests that as a whole the universe should be thought of as
an organism. This organism would be absolute in the sense
that it contains all reality in itself. Thus we are here re¬
minded of Bradley's use of the term absolute. However, as we
saw, Driesch does not succeed in fully establishing his formu¬
lation.
CHAPTER V: Spiritual Evolutionism
As we have already suggested, vitalistic systems are
teleological. That is, they characterise activity in indi¬
vidual organisms as having purposefulness, iste. activity is
not totally predetermined by the material structure. Formu¬
lations of this concept, as we have seen, led both Bergson
and Driesch into a pluralism — in at least the sense of
dualism.
It is at this point that the thought of men such as Ward
and Hocking makes a new contribution. While they do not fin¬
ally resolve the dualistic implications of vitalism, they move
much further toward explaining Driesch's dilemma of how the
vital force can remain a whole in spite of its division into
parts. Using Bradley's understanding of the term absolute,
as referring to something which unifies all reality by con¬
taining it, they will attempt to show that the nature of an
absolute cosmic unity is consistent with the relative inde¬
pendence of the parts of the unity. Furthermore, they gener¬
ally adopt Driesch's idea of an organic model to illustrate
the absolute metaphysical unity.
A. James Ward's Individualisation
For Bradley all reality is a mystery, and for Bergson
matter remains somewhat of a mystery. Ward says that the
spiritualistic interpretation eliminates the concept that
knowledge of nature is in any sense an inexplicable mystery
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subject to specific errors. y
By the term "spiritual" Ward means a unity or harmony
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which results from increasing individuality. The movement
toward harmony, according to Ward, is the only way in which
pluralism can account for the reality of unity. Human history
is for Ward the chief example of what he is suggesting.
Ward calls humanity "the spiritual society. Man is
more truly an individual than any other organism. Yet the
level of his social organisation is also greater. This situ¬
ation Ward says is progressive, because it allows for the
highest possible level of self-betterment.
Organisms that lack social organisation tend to be less
successful, and likewise organisms which are highly organised,
but whose members lack individuality (for example an ant col¬
ony), tend not to progress. Therefore, mankind represents a
progress beyond that of life forms which lack organisation or
which are statically organised.
However, one might ask whether the characteristic nature
of spiritual society could not have been hit upon by accident
or chance. Ward would answer that indeed it was not. "The
principle of continuity indeed almost forces us to posit
^Ward. The Realm Of Ends or Pluralism And Theism, p.l.
o ✓
This is very similar to the concept of spirit used by
Teilhard de Chardin. For example, Teilhard says, "By spirit
I mean 'the spirit of synthesis and sublimation,' in which
is painfully concentrated, through endless attempts and set¬
backs, the potency of unity scattered through the universal
multiple: spirit which is born within, as a function of
matter." Christianity And Evolution, trans., Rene Hague.
(London: Wm. Collins, 1971). pp.107-108. The above was taken
from "Pantheism And Christianity," an unpublished lecture of
1923-
^Ward. The Realm Of Ends. p.387.
6^
higher orders of intelligence than our own; and the fact that
we are able to control and modify the course of evolution
suggests that if there are higher intelligences they can exer-
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cise this power in a still higher degree."
Ward thus agrees that there is a vital force of some des¬
cription. However, he insists that this force could not be
described as merely an elan or entelechy. Rather,it must be
characterised ontologically. That is it must have a concrete
content, which has qualities consistent with those of creation.
He is now ready to address himself to Bradley's dilemma
of what relates. As one may recall, Bradley insists that any¬
thing with relationships cannot be that which relates. Ward
denies this. He insists that history proves that the greater
the number of relationships the greater the individuality;
that is, the greater the unity.
If we therefore posit an increasingly individualised
unity, we must also say that the number of relationships with¬
in that unity increase. If we posit God, which Ward believes
we must, we posit in fact an unlimited unity composed of un¬
limited relationships. Thus God is the absolute cosmic unity
which makes possible creativity through individuals. Just as
society is a unity which makes individualisation possible.
Such a position is consistent with both biology and psy¬
chology. However, Ward points out that it is also consistent
with some of the classical teachings of theism.
For example, thinking of God as making individual creat¬
ivity possible is a concept most capable of dealing with the
88ibid. p.185.
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problem of evil. A given individual can never be aware of
all the factors relative to his choice of action. Therefore,
he is faced by alternative choices. This means that the indi¬
vidual in order to accomplish a goal must proceed on the basis
of trial and error. This error may be considered as the con¬
tent of evil. Of course, such evil is inevitable, but its
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existence tends to support the fact of individuality.
Thus Ward takes another step toward establishing the
Process use of the term absolute. In the first place, like
the other vitalists, he argues that absoluteness cannot be as¬
signed to an abstract physical principle, because material
structure cannot be the source of vital activity. Second, he
understands that unless all activity has a single source, there
is no basis for the unity of the cosmos. Third, he argues that
activity must be absolute since its inner necessity is a pro¬
cess of individualisation. Fourth, whatever is absolute must
have a concrete content; otherwise concrete reality would not
be included in it, and cosmic unity could not be achieved.
Fifth, he says that the source of activity (creativity) is an
absolute cosmic source — God —, whose inner necessity of
movement toward harmony is not contrary to, but actually pro¬
motes, individualisation. Thus Ward, unlike Bergson (in his
works si=§fcfced) and Driesch, gives activity an ontological basis,
which Ward argues allows for "Becoming". Vitalistic pluralism
results from the vital force not having a concrete ontologi¬
cal basis, because the source of activity there appears to
rest in individual organisms.
^ibid. p.356.
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What makes Ward's position different from traditional
theism is its strong monistic implications. The individu-
alisation model supposes an absolute individual who harmonises
all other individuals within itself. This being the case, we
are back to the conclusion of materialism that absoluteness
refers to the ultimate principle of unity. Ward has merely
accounted for individual purposefulness by suggesting that
the "absolute" has a purpose, and that it is not the purpose¬
less absolute physical law of mechanism. Nevertheless, Ward's
point that purpose cannot come out of purposelessness is an
interesting one. It reaffirms philosophy's point that the
Absolute must somehow include purpose, and Ward's understand¬
ing of individualisation in this regard is helpful. However,
Ward does not explain the simple repetition in the material
world if everything is ordered according to a purpose.
B. W.E. Hocking's The Mystical Experience
Hocking's work The Meaning Of God In Human Experience may
be considered a work relevant to the level of development in
Process thought that we are now considering. Hocking will
accept the general position put forward by Ward, but will go a
step further. He adds what might be called the "mystical
vision" to a formulation quite similar to that of Ward's.
Hocking generally would accept a model of individualis-
ation for the concept of becoming. That is, he believes in
the reality of a cosmic unity, but he holds that is is a unity
which does not destroy individuals — rather it is one that
provides for them.
Furthermore, he would accept Ward's position that man is
involved in creativity. Hocking says,
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There are certainly some regions of reality which
are unfinished. We are endowed with wills only be¬
cause there are such regions, to which it is our
whole occupation to give shape and character. In
such regions the will-to-believe is justified,
because it is no will-to-make-believe, but a veri¬
table will to create the truth in which we believe.
And what we must believe, says Hocking,is that all real-
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ity is one. That is, we must believe that individual wills
are a part of reality, but also that there is a reality beyond
any particular will.
A cosmic will he argues is the only possible basis for
optimism. To accept mere plurality leads to the pessimistic
view that harmony can never really be achieved.
Thus Hocking would agree to call himself a monist. On the
other hand, he is sympathetic to the position that becoming
might be a basic part of reality. He does not exclude the
possibility that cosmic unity may employ individual creativity
92
as its working-character.
Although sympathetic to what the particular form of mon¬
ism, exemplified by Ward, is trying to say, he does not feel
that it goes far enough. Rather he insists that monism can
only be retained as meaningful in the following form:
Monism begins to offer significant basis for our
prospects when it seizes upon the actual processes
of the world, and declares that they are all cases
of One Process. In the nature of that One Process
can be read something of the presumable outcome.^
9GHocking, William Ernest. The Meaning Of God In Human
Experience. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 191277 p. 1*4-0.
91ibid. p.168. 92ibid. pp.171-172.
9^ibid. p.172.
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The question of what the outcome will be for the possi¬
bility of becoming is really a new one. Ward's position that
individualisation is the model for becoming never goes so far
as to suggest clearly the final outcome. Ward simply says
that the purpose is individualisation. However, does this
mean that man as we now know him is the conclusion of evolu¬
tion? Indeed this seems to be the implication of what Ward
says.
Such a conclusion would not be very surprising. The idea
that man is the pinnacle of evolution is a long-standing
concept. Nevertheless, man has himself changed. Does Ward
mean to tell us that man as he now is, is the end of the evolu¬
tionary process? This is perhaps the sort of question that
disturbs Hocking. To look at man as he now is, even if we
admit that he is an individual, is far from an optimistic hope.
Again we must refer to what Hocking says about optimism.
"Optimism, I say, requires this degree of monism; — belief in
an individual Reality, not ourselves, which makes for Tight¬
ness, and which actually accomplishes Tightness when left to
Qlf
its own working."
By this he suggests that talking about individualisation
is not enough. Indeed we must be more specific about the
nature of individuality. Certainly it is already clear that
individuality is composed of both unity and diversity. Or to
borrow a term applied by Morgan, it is Bi-polar.
However, for Hocking this individuality is an "Ideal"
rather than a description of the present condition of man.
9S-bid. p. 177-
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As an Ideal, therefore, the absolute unity must be changeless
in the sense that it always makes for right.
Man, says Hocking, must have a changeless Absolute.
Otherwise man will fix upon "some concrete things as Change¬
less, something which ought to be forever revisable, and then
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we must either stagnate or break." ^ This error is what he
assumes that materialism has made.
Hocking feels that the closest man comes to a true 'under¬
standing of the concept individual is in the mysticel experience.
The mystical experience, he says, is one of "redemption of
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Solitude." That is, the mystic by his conscious effort at
super-subjectivity, of super-individualisation, reclaims a
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new increment for the general use.
In his book Hocking speaks at considerable length in
order to describe the mystical experience. Indeed he attempts
to show the -universal character of this experience through
several of the world's major religious traditions.
In our discussions of epistemology we will include con¬
siderations about the nature of experience in general.
However, for the moment, we will not spend time on the impli¬
cations of this term. Rather we will conclude by observing
how Hocking's formulation relates to vitalism.
When he says the 'individual' is an Ideal, we must not
take this to mean that it is purely abstract. Indeed, worship,
for example, has an object. The object of worship is the very







Hocking speaks of man as being in pursuit of this whole.
That is, man is in pursuit of becoming fully individual in
the sense that we have been describing that term. Thus we
must conclude that the objective whole is an active force
which somehow qualifies the material world. This is therefore
adequate reason to place Hocking in an essentially vitalistic
category.
C. Conclusions On Neo-Vitalism
In Chapters IV and V we have moved through several at¬
tempts to reconcile the concepts of unity and diversity in a
single vitalistic formulation. A vitalistic formulation is
one which argues that certain activities of life, especially
purposive self-conscious activity, cannot be explained by
materialism. In other words, vitalism argues that a material
principle of unity cannot be absolute, as life demonstrates a
plurality of forms inconsistent with material laws.
What has emerged from these discussions is that on the
level of spirit or "mind" unity and diversity are complemen¬
tary, while on the level of matter they are contradictory.
The term absolute is therefore understood by vitalism as
referring to a unity of diversities. With regard to Bergson's
£lan, Driesch's entelechy, Ward's individualisation, and Hock¬
ing's mystical experience the development of this formulation
is clearly illustrated.
Behind each of the vitalistic positions lies the assum¬
ption that diversity and unity are imposed upon the material
world by mind. Thus the reality of matter is not denied.
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Yet none of these vitalists satisfactorily explains the fact
of matter. If mind reflects absoluteness, matter appears to
remain outside of it. Even a complex cosmic unity makes no
sense if some aspect of reality is excluded. The use of the
term absolute, as referring to a unity of all reality, there¬
fore, makes the vitalistic formulations contradictory.
Of course, Ward and Hocking professed to be monists.
That is, they must argue that matter is not excluded from the
cosmic unity. Matter must somehow fit into God1s plan of
harmony. While it is difficult to see their supporting this
contention, let us for a moment suppose it valid. The neces¬
sary implication of this is that plurality is not ultimately
real. The absolute unity, as a final harmony, is just as
deterministic as the material laws, understood as an already
realised harmony. Although the former does have the advantage
of accounting for the human experience of disunity, which is
one of the aspects of consciousness that materialism cannot
explain. Here it is the concept absolute that ultimately
prevents true diversity.
Vitalism gives a world view that is more satisfying to
self-conscious beings, but it is unable to convince all self-
conscious beings that its viewpoint is the right one. There¬
fore, in Chapters VI and VII we will consider an alternative.
This alternative is an attempt to account for unity and
diversity within a materialistic system. That is, this will
be an attempt to demonstrate that the materialistic understan¬
ding of the absoluteness of the physical laws can allow for
the self-conscious experience of plurality.
Finally, we can suggest why the men here considered
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should be called Process thinkers. The reason is that all have
pointed to the fact that activity, even if only the activity
of life, is composed of both unity and diversity.
73
CHAPTER VI: Neo-Mechanism
Vitalistic conclusions, based upon the unique aspects
of life, implied, as we saw, that the very fact of activity,
which required both unity and diversity, could not and was
not being explained by physical laws. Activity could only be
understood as a force working through or upon matter. The
position of Neo-Mechanism, on the other hand, is that the
material laws can in fact account for both the unity and div¬
ersity required by activity, if they are properly interpreted;
and that vitalism is an unsupportable position. Finally the
"new mechanism," as it is sometimes called, admits that other
forms of mechanism have encouraged the rise of vitalism by
inadequate explanation of the matter/energy relationship.
A. J.S. Haldane's Organic Theory
As we have already said, the vitalists tended to be
dualists or monists. This poses a problem for Haldane. He
begins by pointing out that all vitalists want to emphasise
the fact of individuality, i.e. of true diversity. However,
they all end up with some non-material force that in one way
or another controls or animates the organism. This animating
force may work blindly and be unconscious as in the case of
the elan vital or entelechy; or, the force may be individual,
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so to speak, and work somehow subconsciously.
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Haldane, J.S. Mechanism. Life And Personality. pp. 17-
18. and cf. pp.28-29.
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Haldane felt that in his day vitalism was accepted by
only a small minority of scientists. However, this minority
remained very vocal. The chief reason for this, he believes,
was that much of the experimentation that could have supported
mechanism was being inadequately carried out. Therefore, room
was always being left for vitalistic conclusions.
Driesch's work is a particular target of Haldane's criti¬
cism. This is to be expected as it represented one of the
most careful accounts of vitalism, and one that appeared to
be supported by a weighty amount of experimental evidence.
Of Driesch's famous proof of entelechy based on the nature
of cell division, Haldane says,
Now there is no evidence at all that each cell, in
growing and dividing in the one particular manner
which constitutes normal development, is not det¬
ermined by special physical and chemical stimuli
peculiar to its position relatively to the other
cells, and to the external environment. We do
not yet know what these stimuli are; but probably
no physiologist would doubt that they exist, and
will be discovered when our methods are fine
enough. Hence Driesch's argument for an indepen¬
dent vital force breaks down entirely.-^qq
Here we actually have two objections to vitalism. First,
it must assume that no activity is innate to matter; thus
rejecting all the weighty evidence in favour of the dominate
concept of matter. Second, most vitalistic proofs are based
on the negative rather than the positive side of experimen¬
tation.
Finally Haldane says that all vitalism must contradict




criticism is directed primarily at Driesch's suggestion that
the vital force is non-energetic. However, says Haldane, any
guidance or direction coming from outside of the material
organism implies that energy is created.
Next Haldane moves to his objections to pure mechanism.
The first objection is parallel to his objection to vitalism;
namely, that mechanism is willing to make huge assumptions
with no real evidence. For example, physics in establishing
the laws of nature assumes the fact of cause and effect.
Physiology translates the concept of cause and effect into
that of stimulus and response. However, Haldane suggests that
there was not enough real evidence to state plainly that phy¬
sical or chemical cause and effect, and stimulus and response
are the exact same thing.
One reason that the above objection has some justifi¬
cation is that apparently the same stimulus may cause very
different and unpredictable responses in different organisms,
or even in the same organism. This clearly violates the usual
understanding of cause and effect. Returning to Driesch's
experiments, Haldane also admits that a usual understanding
of mechanism would not account for some of the results which
Driesch achieved.
Thus in place of either a theory of vitalism, or a theory
of mechanism as pure cause and effect, Haldane proposes his
own theory of "organism." Haldane points out that concepts
such as matter, energy, mass and organism are all theories
which attempt to give a unified conception of reality. In
101ibid. pp.31-32.
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particular Driesch's concept of organism is a model for rela¬
ting matter and energy.
Driesch, however, insisted that the concept of organism
be joined with a concept of a vital force — entelechy. This
entelechy was common to all aspects of life and matter, but
it was not the same as the matter-energy reality. In other
words, while he insisted that a concept of organism applied
to all reality, certain aspects of the matter-energy reality
were excluded from the vital force. Indeed he went on to say
that the concept of organism could be used as a proof for the
vital force. Haldane believed that a concept such as organism
should have been formulated in order to avoid the idea that
life can be described simply as so much energy passing through
so much matter; but, organism as a concept is for him no more than
a way of saying that matter and energy are an indivisible
10 2
whole. As a concept it does not point to a vital force.
Haldane suggests, therefore, that the concept of organism
in itself is much richer than either of the concepts of mech¬
anistic causality or vital force. The concept of organism is
able to include all of reality.10^
His suggestion that the concept of organism describes the
indivisibleness of matter and energy is an important intro¬
duction to Process thought. Clearly, as understood by Haldane,
it does away with many of the problems of dualism. And it
also suggests a new interpretation of evolution:
Evolution, therefore, takes on a very different
significance. In tracing life back and back to¬
wards what appears at first to be the inorganic
102., ncribid, p.95* ^"Q^ibid. pp.98-99.
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we are not seeking to reduce the organic to the
inorganic, but the inorganic to the organic.
Haldane also takes very seriously the suggestions of men
like Ward and Hocking who say that individual is a higher con¬
cept than organism. Therefore, after redefining organism,
Haldane goes ahead to say that "conscious organism" — person
— is a concept higher than organism. All reality is includ¬
ed under the term organism, but not all organisms are conscious.
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Haldane prefers the term "person" to individual. He says
that philosophy shows that the central factor of the universe
is a personality which includes within itself the whole uni¬
verse. We will fully discuss the term "personality" later.
However, at this point a brief distinction between individu¬
ality and personality in this context is necessary. Individu¬
ality is the unique character of an entity which exists
independently of any relationships. Personality is the aspect
of an entity which exists because of relationships. Therefore,
Haldane is suggesting that the essential principle of reality
is relatedness. In particular reality is a relatedness of
matter and energy.
Matter cannot exist apart from energy, and energy cannot
exist apart from matter. This position disagrees with vital¬
ism because it denies that a force directs matter, while
matter in no way determines the force. On the other hand it
denies pure mechanism, which holds that cause and effect is
1Qi+ibid. p. 100. ^°^ibid. p.106 and cf. p. 133*
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an adequate description of activity.
From the point of view of spiritualistic evolutionism
this position is mechanistic because of its acceptance of
matter as an aspect of the source of activity. From the
point of view of vitalism in general it is mechanistic because
it assumes that the ultimate nature of relationships between
matter and energy are predetermined. That is, it assumes
that the factor of universal personality depends upon specific
relationships. These relationships are not as simple as
either pure mechanism or vitalism suppose, but they can in
theory be spelled-out. Organism is the model to be used in
explicating these relationships.
Finally Haldane's position implies a meaning for the
term absolute. The term refers to the universal principle of
personality, which is a unity of specific relationships.
That is, the apparently independent activities of living or¬
ganisms are the result of laws of relationship inherently in
the organisms. Although these relationships are more complex
than the pure causal relationships of dead matter.
B. Bernardino Varisco's Concept Of Being
Varisco in his book The Great Problems says that this
is his first major work following his conversion from Positiv-
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ism to what he calls "Practical Philosophy." Initially
Varisco's metaphysical formulation sounds very much like
Bergson's. To begin with he divided the mind into two cate¬
gories similar to Bergson's intellect and intuition. In
10^
Varisco, Bernardino. The Great Problems. trans., R.C.
Lodge. (London: George Allen and Company, Ltd., 191^).
Introduction.
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place of intellect he uses the term consciousness, which is
composed of fragmentary perspectives. Instead of intuition
he uses the term subconsciousness, whose content is a complex
unity similar to Bergson's duration. Also like Bergson, Var-
isco says that this unity is a neutral potential of pure
activity. Of course activity is not itself conscious in the
sense of a person or a subject.
Prom this point forward Varisco takes quite a different
approach. Bergson says that the mechanistic laws are prod¬
ucts of the intellect alone, and that matter itself is entro-
pic. Varisco, however, believes that "spontaneous activity",
as he calls it, is characteristic of all reality.
Certainly Varisco does not ignore the special aspects of
life. Indeed he often uses life to illustrate his work. For
example, he uses life to show that activity demands the real¬
ity of diversity. He says that what he calls consciousness
in life is the product of activity meeting "interference."
This fact of interference demonstrates the reality of diver¬
sity. The details of this we will discuss when we take up
Varisco's epistemology.
For Varisco the laws of physics, or as he more often
says, the mathematical or logical formulations, are implicit
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in the very fact of "Being." Being for Varisco is the
unifying characteristic of all reality. What happens intel¬
lectually, according to him, is that the logic implicit in
Being becomes explicit. Therefore, the intellect does not
impose a false mathematical structure, but instead makes
107ibid. p.232.
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explicit an already existing structure.
However, even this is not an effort to deny true diver¬
sity. Varisco insists that the very nature of Being is
activity, and activity demands diversity. The necessary
diversity results from the fact that Being has divided itself
into "centers of spontaneity which operate indeterminately,
10 8
each for itself — the many, the monads."
Physics, he says, includes unity and diversity in its
formulations:
In physics, spontaneity only makes its value felt
in so far as it is presupposed by the observable
facts and their causal connections, never explic¬
itly. So also vigorous unity does not make its
value felt explicitly, but only as presupposed
by the mathematical laws and, jointly with spon¬
taneity, by the causal laws—physical in the
strict sense. Laws and facts given—physics has
need of nothing else.^Q^
For Varisco, any observable activity represents a center
of spontaneity. The most elementary center of activity is
what he calls an atom. Earlier in this paper we described
atomism as one of the mechanistic theories which vitalists
suggested could not be reconciled with life. Now Varisco is
going to show that this is not necessarily true.
Second, we must observe that from the point of view of
physics the influence of spontaneous centers within the uni¬
verse is totally negligible: the necessity within the universe
always being the same. Therefore, what makes for evolution in
one area will be absolutely balanced by devolution in another
part of the universe. This does not mean that variation is
1Q8ibid. p.239. 109ibid. pp.2*f3-2M+.
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mere appearance.However, it does mean that the necessity
which is the universe is a constant, and is so measured by
physics. It is an absolute constant.
To the vitalists1 position Varisco says that their argu¬
ments for the uniqueness of life are unfounded, if this
uniqueness is purported to negate the mathematical laws.
However, Varisco's position also criticises physics for its
formulation of the theory of entropy.
Varisco argues that the very necessity which, makes the
universe be, excludes the possibility of the universe tending
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towards an end. On the other hand, this certainly does not
suggest that our solar system or even life as we know it is
permanent. For Varisco would say, the dissolution of one
system is merely a condition of another being formed.
To summarise Varisco1s position thus far: Being is a
necessary given. Activity is the essential nature of Being.
This activity manifests itself in spontaneous centers of Be¬
ing, because activity must consist of unity and diversity.
However, the activity of the universe is absolute — a con¬
stant .
Physics for Varisco was quite correct, therefore, in its
discovery that reality is mechanistic. However, in formu¬
lating universal laws it tends to overlook the fact of qehters
of spontaneity. These centers must not be so neglected.
The above, however, does not represent a complete answer
to the vitalists1 position on entropy. Their point against
entropy centered on the fact that an organism appears to
11Qibid. pp. 2^3-2M+. "*""^ibid. p.2*+5*
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represent an increasing manifoldness. This would contradict
the theory of entropy understood as an increasing disorder.
To help answer this, Varisco points out that centers of
spontaneity form bodies. He says,
Every body is a system, bound together and con¬
stituted by causal nexuses, external and in¬
ternal. The difference between organised and
unorganised bodies must be referred to the
differences between the said causal nexuses.
In other words, as spontaneous centers are connected
causally, the connections produce variations in activity dif¬
ferent from the variations demonstrated by the original cen¬
ters. An organism illustrates the point. The centers which
compose it take on new variations in activity because the
activity is now partly determined by the centers interfering
with one anotherThus an organism is essentially mech¬
anistic. However, this mechanism remains quite consistent
with spontaneity.
Like Haldane, Varisco concludes that neither vitalism
nor pure mechanism is an adequate formulation of reality.
Vitalism does not account for the continuity of reality, and
mechanism ignores diversity. The reason is that vitalism is
"too" metaphysical, while materialism totally rejects meta¬
physics .
To attempt to explain activity without reference to
matter, as vitalism so often does, leads to dualism. On the
other hand, materialism gives rise to vitalism because it
neglects to recognise a clear fact; namely, that activity is
2ibid. p.2^-8. 113ibid. p.250.
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a necessary condition for reality and that activity demands
diversity. The "Being" of reality is not explained by mater¬
ialism, but is merely assumed. Here Varisco agrees with the
vitalists.
It is the fact of Being that is the common aspect of all
reality. This is unlike Haldane's principle of organism in
that organism assumes Being, but Being does not assume organ¬
ism. Therefore, Being is the more primordial formulation.
Being, says- Varisco, is the uncontested principle of unity in
the universe.
If one starts from the principle of Being, unity and
diversity may then be accounted for. The unity factor has
already been clarified. The factor of diversity results from
Being manifesting itself in centers of activity. These cen¬
ters are spontaneous in that they interfere with one another
in patterns that were not totally predetermined. That is, no
pattern of organisation is ultimate. However, each organis¬
ation in one area of the universe is balanced by a decrease
in the organisation of another area. Therefore, unlike Hal-
dane, Varisco does not hold that the particular matter/energy
relationships are predetermined. All that is predetermined
is that some relationships will occur. The unity of the
cosmos depends upon relationships, but any of the relation¬
ships which now are could equally well not have been.
To put this point in another way, no particular organi-
ULlsation is permanent. The permanance of an organisation
would imply that the content of Being changes ultimately.
lllfibid. p.267-
8>+
This is not the case. Being allows variations within itself,
but these variations do not effect the absolute content of
Being. The ultimate remains a total unity because changes do
not effect it as a unity. In this sense mechanism is right
in viewing reality as determined by the principle of unity.
And this unity is what physics describes in its absolute cos¬
mic laws. In Chapter XIV we will see how Varisco himself
deals more explicitly with the term absolute.
The problem with Varisco's system is that his understan¬
ding of the concept of Being continues to deny ultimate mean-
ingfulness to diversity. Whatever new organisations are
achieved, these ultimately make no difference to the cosmos.
Haldane and Varisco explain diversity, but then leave one with
the conclusion that diversity has no meaning. Man, on the
other hand, seeks both individual meaningfulness and perman¬
ence. Meaningless diversity is no better, from the human
point of view, than the total denial of diversity. Clearly
Varisco agrees that the mechanistic use of the term absolute
has no ontological basis, as no abstract physical principle
can account for the existence of activity. It is to vital¬
ism's credit that this point was made clear. On the other
hand, contrary to vitalism, both Haldane and Varisco suggest
that when rightly interpreted the source of all activity can
be seen as innate within reality. In particular what we know
as activity results from the irregular distribution of units
of energy throughout the universe. Furthermore, energy's
distribution can be analysed according to its organisation
into matter. Therefore, in any particular case the thorough
understanding of the organisation of matter can determine its
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necessary energy potential, i.e. the necessary nature of its
future activity. Yet this fact does not negate the principle
of spontaneity resulting from the irregular distribution of
matter/energy in the universe. However, should one have a
cosmic perspective, irregular distribution would in no way
change the absolute balance between matter and energy. Thus
we are once again at the point of stating that for Varisco,
and indeed for Haldane, diversity does not finally change
the universe as a whole, and thus diversity cannot be said
to have ultimate meaning.
CHAPTER VII: Emergent Evolutionism
C. Lloyd Morgan is the name most widely associated with
Emergent Evolution. The central principles of his thoughts
are found in his book Instinct And Experience published in
1913. However, in the two volumes of his Gifford Lectures
published in 1923, under the titles Emergent Evolution and
Life. Mind. And Spirit he considerably expands and clarifies
his thinking.
In part this clarification is the result of his response
to another development of emergence offered by S. Alexander in
his work Space. Time And Deity. Therefore it is helpful to
begin with Alexander's work.
A. S. Alexander's Space-Time
The reasoning behind the formulations made by neo-mechan¬
ism will be greatly clarified by the work of Samuel Alexander,
who, as we will see, shares many formulations with Varisco.
The reason for this is that involved for both is the desire
to find some factor which absolutely unifies all reality.
Otherwise, the argument that there is an ultimate difference
between the activity of matter and of life cannot be well re¬
futed.
We can say that Varisco's and Alexander's positions
generally represent the same basic assumption that activity
constitutes all of reality. However, Varisco did not consider
the point that bodies, which are complexes of activity,
appear to fall into characteristic categories. For example,
there are organisms that think, and organisms that do not
87
think. Varisco's system of spontaneous and ultimately imper¬
manent organisations does not explain why many organisations
appear to occur in regular and orderly fashions. The order of
evolution is an example of a pattern which Varisco's system
does not explain. Therefore, Alexander attempts to give a
new description of the common factor of reality, which will
explain why there are categories of bodies similar to one an¬
other in the variations that they show, and which will account
for why these variations are permanent.
We begin in Alexander with the assumption that change is
totally extra-material. Space-Time is for Alexander the neces¬
sary component of change, i.e. it is both unity and diversity.
Matter is not necessary to activity. Thus we could think of
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change with or without matter being involved. y In fact
Alexander says that it is correct to think of reality as com¬
posed of "events" rather than of "objects." "Thus Space-Time,"
says Alexander, "is a system of motions, and we might call
Space-Time by the name of Motion were it not that motion is in
common speech merely the general name for particular motions,
whereas Space easily and Time less easily is readily seen to
be a whole of which spaces and times are fragments."
The particular events in Space-Time Alexander calls
"point-instants." A given point-instant may be thought of as
being an event with relative space (small * s') and relative
time (small 111). Thus he would answer Bradley's question of
"'"■'■^Alexander, S. Space, Time And Deity. (London: Macmil-
lan And Co., Limited, 1920). Vol. I. pp.^-^*
•^1^ibid. p.61.
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what relates by saying Space-Time. Nevertheless, this does
not exclude the fact of spatiotemporal relationships.
Therefore, what we call matter is merely composed of
various modes of Space-Time. At no point does any additional
factor such as a vital force appear. What we know as cate¬
gories of reality, for example, are merely factors in the
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determinations of the space-times themselves.
Thus Alexander says, "For it is clear that Space-Time
takes for us the place of what is called the Absolute in idea-
11s
listic systems." It is the common factor which unifies all
of reality.
Second, Alexander goes on to show how the particular cate¬
gories or "levels" of reality come about. For example, he
explains how men;,appear to be composed of body and mind by
saying that this corresponds to a configuration of Space-Time
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in which Time is the Mind of Space-Time.
For Alexander the levels of existence are: Space-Time,
matter, life, mind and God. Having already looked at Space-
Time, we will move to a consideration of the level "matter."
Alexander believes that at a certain level of complexity
of motions what we call "matter" emerges. Here it is appro¬
priate to point back to Variseo's term nexus, which was des¬
cribed as a complexity of interfaces which produce variations
by interference. At this one point Varisco is clearer than
Alexander, because Alexander never really says much about the
^''ibid. p. 190. "^"^ibid. p.3^6.
11^Alexander. Space. Time And Deity. Vol. II. p.Mf.
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internal workings of the various complexities. He instead only
describes them externally. Of course, he does say that the
levels correspond to various configurations of Space-Time, but
the implications of this are not at all clear.
As matter emerges from Space-Time at a given level of
complexity, so at a still greater level of complexity life
emerges from matter, and finally when the complexity is suf¬
ficient mind emerges in life. Thus each of these levels is a
new order of complexity. Finally, Alexander attempts to
account for the permanence of these organisations.
Both Bergson with his elan and Driesch with his entelechy
suppose anunique factor within life — a factor over which the
laws of physics do not hold. Alexander's position does away
with the necessity for such a principle. He says, "Instead of
straightway postulating an entelechy to act as a guide, it
would seem to me more reasonable to note that a given stage of
material complexity is characterised by such and such special
features...
For example, to the so-called special feature demonstra¬
ted by life Alexander gives the name "plasticity." Likewise
the unique feature of mind he calls "consciousness." Beyond
mind the next emergent level is God. God for Alexander has
the empirical quality of "Deity" in the sense that life has
plasticity and mind has consciousness.
Each of these special factors is the element of perman¬
ence within the respective level of emergence. For example,
once the organisation of Space-Time has achieved the level
"^^ibid. p.65«
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of life, the characteristic of plasticity is a factor which
is permanent in spite of the fact that specific entities hav¬
ing this characteristic are not themselves permanent. Any
such factor of permanence is called by Alexander a "nisus."
A nisus continually draws Space-Time into configurations which
represent the emergent levels.
A nisus prevents the regression from a given level of
complexity, once that level has been achieved. However, it
does not prevent the development of still greater complexi¬
ties, some having their own nisus. According to Alexander,
the nisus of the greater complexity will include the nisus of
any organisation less complex than itself.
Therefore, nisus is also that which draws lesser levels
of complexity toward its own higher level. The nisus which at
present directs the whole universe is Deity.
It is important to understand that the nisus of each emer¬
gent level is the common factor in which all the entities on
that level participate. The exception to this is Deity in
which only God presently participates. This is not surprising,
as each level of organisation has increasingly fewer members.
The Space-Time of the universe is absolute — constant.
Therefore, a greater organisation does not',produce more Space-
Time; it merely organises it into more complex configurations.
If this was not the case, Alexander's system would violate the
Law of the Conservation of Energy. However, while one might
accept the fact that consciousness is a factor which is not
exhausted by any given mind, one usually tends to think of
God exhausting the factor of Deity. Therefore, it is necessary
to develop Alexander's point about the emergence of Deity more
fully.
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According to Alexander the nisus Deity is characterised
by an organisation which includes any lesser nisus, even con¬
sciousness. The hisus consciousness, for example, does not
change in quality, but it allows changes among the entities
on its level as more entities are drawn to the level of con¬
sciousness. That is, the entities within consciousness reflect
the aspect of change, while consciousness qua consciousness
remains changeless. Thus a given nisus does not prevent change
even among the entities on a particular level. Likewise, God,
the single entity on the level of ieity, reflects the fact of
change on that level. In other words God changes as the enti¬
ties on all other levels change; yet Deity as a principle of
unity, which includes every other nisus, does not change.
Thus God does not include the nisus Deity beeause as an entity
he is not changeless.
The entities on each level maintain the fact of diversity,
while the nisus maintains the principle of unity. Thus perman¬
ence is assured for man because of the nisus consciousness,
and permanence is assured for God because of the nisus of Deity.
Consciousness is of course influenced by Deity which draws
consciousness towards itself.
On the one hand, a nisus creates diversity, as the nisus
brings new entities to its respective level of emergence. On
the other hand, the entities on a given level create their
nisus, as the nisus does not exist apart from the entities
which compose it.
The latter two facts being considered, one is brought to
the conclusion that activity requires both unity and diversity.
Thus we can establish Alexander as a Process thinker.
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His position is mechanistic because he associates Space-
Time with the term absolute, and argues that Space-Time is
itself changeless. For Alexander this means that the levels
of emergence are predetermined. It is the nature of Space-
Time itself that it allows only certain configurations. Ulti¬
mately, according to Alexander, all of Space-Time is included
in God. By this he means that God is the highest emergent
level; He is the level of emergence having only one member.
Of course, as we saw, God does change in the sense that He
acquires new configurations into himself, but the principle or
nisus Deity, i.e. the necessity of acquiring all realised con¬
figurations of Space-Time, does not change.
The nisus Deity, like any other nisus, is primordial in
that it results from the very nature of Space-Time, but the
God which presently exists has emerged as have all other enti¬
ties. Man can therefore know the levels of emergence; however,
he cannot predict the future content of any level.
Clearly the use of the term absolute continues to raise
the problem of the real significance of individuality. Each
entity does contribute to the cosmos in the sense that some
entities are needed in order for each level of emergence to
be established. .Thus man, for example, contributes to con¬
sciousness, and beyond this to the universe by also making
the level of Deity a reality. On the other hand, the contri¬
bution of one man is ultimately no different from that of any
other. Men as men contribute to consciousness, but the value
of all contributions is the same. It makes no difference to
the absoluteness of Space-Time what a man does. Space-Time is
quite impassible to any particular human action. The indi¬
vidual's contribution is therefore totally predetermined in
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Alexander's system.
B. C. Lloyd Morgan's Materialistic Emergence
Alexander regularly insists that he is doing metaphysics.
Morgan in his earlier works on emergence avoids that term;
indeed he rejects it. For Morgan the term metaphysics always
implies that something is imposed on nature ab extra. He
goes so far as to suggest that to be metaphysical is to be
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vitalistic in one's position.
Alexander's Nisus, Berkeley's Eternal Spirit, Kant's
Transcendental Ego, Driesch's Entelechy and Bergson's Elan
would all, according to Morgan, fall into the category of
something which determines the organism. Morgan says,
The point of my contention is that the progress
of inorganic evolution is replete with events
which are unforeseeable on the basis of the ful¬
lest possible experience prior to the actual
occurrence of such events. All that we can do,
in science, is to correlate the new with the
old*122
This position is clarified in Morgan's later work Emer¬
gent Evolution, where he considers Alexander's Space, Time
And Deity. There are many careful and specific objections to
Alexander's work; however, we will look at only the key issue.
Morgan wants to use material-events as the starting point
1 PI
Morgan, C.Lloyd. Instinct And Experience. (London:
Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1913Second Edition, p.viii. The word
vitalistic as I have used it in this case should be read in
view of Haldane's objections to vitalism; namely, that vita¬
lism is unsuccessful in allowing true individuality.
122
ibid, p.151- Varisco said that to add permanence to
pure change would demand that activity or Being should be
endowed with forms. Consistent with this opinion we now see
that Morgan calls Alexander's nisus just such an endowment.
9^
for speculations. 'To speak of the metaphysical "source" of
activity seems to him quite impossible. For example, he says
that he can find no evidence that spatiotemporal events take
123
place apart from material reality. J
On the other hand, Morgan is prepared to develop a system
of emergence that is grounded fully in our experience of mat¬
erial-events. In particular Morgan says that what is meant by
levels of emergence is the emergence of different kinds of
relatedness within material-events. "On our view liquidity,
solidity, life and mind are, one and all, names that we give
to the specific kind of relatedness that obtains in this or
12b
that entity under consideration." The common characteris¬
tics of the levels of emergence are not, as Alexander suggests,
principles of unity outside of the entities, in which the
entities participate.
Morgan's levels of emergence are matter, life and mind.
To the relatedness of each level he gives a name. For example,
the relatedness of the mind is called "proficient reference."
Later we will see that by the term "proficient reference"
Morgan suggests that the way in which the mind refers proper¬
ties to particular stimuli can be accounted for physiologi¬
cally. Thus, to explain the workings of the mind one need
not go beyond material-events within the conscious entity.
The purpose of Alexander's concept of nisus was to account
for the relative permanence observed within levels of emergence.
12^
^Morgan, C.Lloyd. Emergent Evolution. (London: Williams
And Norgate, 1923). p.2*K
"*"'^+ibid. p.66.
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Morgan, having rejected this concept, must either give an
alternative explanation for permanence or return to a position
similar to Varisco's.
To account for permanence Morgan assumes something which
he calls a Plan. On each level of emergence this plan appears
in a different form. In matter the plan is known as physical
laws. In organic life the plan is best called heredity. On
the conscious level the plan is composed of a scheme of values.
The concept of plan does not, however, eliminate individuality.
In the case of man, for example, at the basis of value or
worth there are many conscious minds. Nevertheless, the gener¬
al plan of value does provide a unity because all minds par-
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ticipate within this same realm of reality.
That is, a plan is the scheme of a given level of emer¬
gence, that has been shaped and created by the entities which
compose it. This implies that the particular levels of emer¬
gence were not predetermined, but are themselves the result
of emergence. Diversity and unity develop at the same time.
Unity does not merely leave room for diversity. Alexander,
of course, said that the levels were predetermined and simply
allowed for individual entities within themselves.
It is Morgan's plan which replaces Alexander's nisus.
The great advantage of Morgan's position is that a more firm
concept of individuality is allowed. In the case of man, as
with other entities, the specific actions of each individual
affect the plan. Thus for man a concept of value is supposed,
as the actions of individuals have ultimately different
12^MorgaxL, C.Lloyd. Life. Mind And Spirit. (London: Wil¬
liams And Norgate, Ltd., 1923).~p.273•
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effects.
Next Morgan must explain how unity and diversity can
develop at the same time. Thus far he has merely argued that
his formulation is the best description of the evidence avail¬
able. To finally support his formulations Morgan introduces
a specific doctrine of God.
Of course he admits that theism is not subject to rigor¬
ous proof. However, he argues that to accept theism makes his
system complete. That is, it makes his system complete by
showing that ultimately both unity and diversity must emerge
alongside one another.
Morgan's doctrine of God's nature must be understood in
terms of individuality and personality as God's two "poles."
The former pole is the pole of absolute uniqueness, the latter
is the pole of the universal features of the given levels of
emergence. "Bi-polarity" is also what constitutes the "per¬
sonal . "
Morgan goes on to say that all reality is personal; or
that the plan of reality follows the model of the personal;
or, for one of religious awareness, reality follows God's
nature. That is, reality is bi-polar, as God has an absolute
or individual pole, and a relative pole of personality.
Both Morgan's bi-polar God and Alexander's Space-Time
harmonise unity and diversity. However, according to Morgan
there is a significant difference. Alexander has no diffi¬
culty with calling Space-Time absolute. Morgan prefers not
to call God absolute, even though God and Space-Time appear
to have the same function, for an understandable reason.
The term absolute when applied to God is easily interpreted
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to mean that God has no relationships.
In Morgan's system the absolute pole has retained the
function of providing unity. However, in order to account
for his understanding of emergence Morgan has qualified the
concept absolute in two very important ways. First, the rela¬
tive pole has been made ultimately equal to the absolute pole.
That is, unity and diversity are understood as ultimately
complementary. Second, the absolute pole and the relative
pole are made equal aspects or poles of God.
By this formulation, Morgan has suggested a way to over¬
come one of the greatest problems for Process thought. As we
have said, all Process thinkers agree that activity can be
explained only if there is unity and diversity. That is, acti¬
vity is understood to be a process, i.e. an interaction between
unity and diversity. However, if unity is absolute, which we
have shown to be the general opinion, then Process has not
been able to explain why there should be activity at all.
Process up to now has no more explained why the cosmos is not
presently in a unified state, than physics has explained why
the cosmos is not in an entropic state, if entropy is indeed
being rightly interpreted. Strictly speaking, Process has
not explained why there is any process rather than no process.
It is this problem which Morgan has attempted to solve.
His solution is that process in the cosmos reflects the ulti¬
mate nature of God. The Absolute is not something greater
than God, but less than God. Creation is as it is, because
it reflects the nature of the Creator. An Absolute, such as
Alexander's Space-Time, cannot be the creator of a process.
Logically Alexander's formulation suggests that the Absolute
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(Space-Time) creates something which is contrary to its own
absolute nature.
Morgan does not attempt to work out the metaphysical im¬
plications of his position. For example, he does not explain
what is the concrete content of the absolute pole, as it is
not all of reality. However, his work clearly implies that
absoluteness has both a functional and a concrete reference,
which must be seen in terms of a bi-polar universe. Therefore,
in this regard, Morgan is our first example of a Process
thinker who begins to accept the full implications of the Pro¬
cess position. Of course, there remains the problem of why he
should be classed with mechanists. An explanation of this is
given in William MeDougall's discussion of neo-mechanism.
C. William McDougall's Critique Of Materialistic Emergence
In his book Modern Materialism And Emergent Evolution
McDougall makes a distinction among vitalists, animists and
mechanists. Briefly these distinctions are: (l) Vitalists
believe that the living body must be explained in terms of
both mechanistic and teleological principles; (2) Animists
identify teleology as guidance by a purposeful spirit; (3)
1 26
Mechanism rejects all teleology.
Having earlier discussed McDougall's general objections
to materialism, we can look briefly at his special reasons
for calling emergence mechanistic. McDougall's chief explan¬
ation is that matter and mind cannot be combined as the
-| p^C.
X£i0McDougall, William. Modern Materialism And Emergent
Evolution. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,193^)• Second Ed¬
ition. p. 32.
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emergent evolutionists suppose. He says of their efforts,
"I suggest that it is not valid; that the words are used to
denote two types of synthesis that are fundamentally differ¬
ent and distinct; and that by the use of the words 'configu¬
ration' (Gestalt) and 'emergence' it is falsely made to seem
that creative synthesis (which undeniably occurs in the
1 p*7
mental sphere; occurs also in the physical."
He further points out that the emergent evolutionists
never really give any examples of instances of emergent qual¬
ities within the physical world. Indeed physical reality, as
in the case of Morgan's plan of the physical laws, appears
totally predictable. The quality of individuality or diver¬
sity comes only on the level of mind.
Certainly McDougall's arguments are interesting, but they
are also what one would expect from an animist. Nevertheless,
it is important to observe that emergence was often consid¬
ered a mechanistic philosophy, and it was able to win over
very few Mtalists.
127
ibid, p.120. McDougall places the origin of Emergent
Evolution or Emergent Vitalism with J.S. Mill's concept of
mental-chemistry. (p.118).
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CHAPTER VIII: Teilhard de Chardin As A Process Thinker
The Process thinkers thus far studied bring us to the
Process philosophies whose influences are most strongly felt
today. These are the writings of Teilhard de Chardin and
Alfred North Whitehead.
The great majority of Teilhard1s works were published
after his death in 1955* However, many of them were written
during the same period in which Whitehead produced his major
philosophical writings, and both men demonstrate that common
influences apply to their thinking.
Even though Teilhard's works became available much later
than 'Whitehead's, we will begin with his writings. The reason
for this is that Teilhard represents a development of the
emergent evolutionism, which we have been discussing. White¬
head, on the other hand, does not accept certain of the for¬
mulations within emergence.
We shall begin by pointing out something in common
between Teilhard and Morgan; namely, Teilhard like Morgan regu-
1 oQ
larly insists that he is not doing metaphysics. Likewise,
both have similar reasons for this position. Morgan, we may
recall, suggests that if one is to remain grounded in experi¬
ence — an experience made up of material-events — it is not
possible for science to talk about true metaphysics. Teilhard
says that he grounds his work in experience of the phenomenal
world, and therefore finds it impossible to explore the
-j QQx Teilhard de Chardin. The Phenomenon Of Man, trans.




essence of being, apart from the entities themselves.
In matters such as this very little evidence can be
found to suggest that Teilhard was directly influenced by
Morgan. Rather one is on safer ground in observing that both
of them are responding to the situation that vitalism, with
all its merits, persists in ending with a dualism between
mind and matter.
However, we know that both men were influenced by
Bergson, and that they see themselves somewhat speaking to
his results. At one point Teilhard says, "We have had good
reason to smile at Bergson's 'elan vital'. But have we not
at the same time thrown it overboard too lightly?"1^0
With Emergent Evolution in general Teilhard shares the
attempt to reconcile matter and life. With Morgan in parti¬
cular he shares a grounding in material events, and a belief
that pure mechanism does not explain why there is activity
rather than no activity. We will illustrate briefly the two
former contentions, and give the latter one greater emphasis.
Teilhard shares with the emergent evolutionists the con¬
cepts of levels within evolution. For example, he speaks of
the movement from the atom to the cell, to the thinking
129ibid. p.31.
1^°Teilhard de Chardin. Appearance Of Man. (London:
Collins, 1965). p.261. Madeleine Barth&lemy-Madaule has
made a complete study of Teilhard's response to the Berg-
sonian dualism. She sums up this response by writing, "Et
de cette vocation spirituelle de la matiere, decoule la
resolution du dualisme, il n'y a plus deux routes, mais
"deux sens sur une meme route", deux mouvements inverses,
mais ils ne se partagent point le monde comme chez Bergson,
qui oppose la matiere a la vie." Bergson et Teilhard de
Chardin. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963). p.605.
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animal. Usually Teilhard speaks of the level of life as
the "biosphere" and the level of the thinking animal as the
"noosphere." The level beyond the noosphere is called
"Omega", and we shall discuss Omega more fully shortly.
Life, according to Teilhard, emerges from matter. He
says, "If matter is left to itself, in a sufficient mass and
for a sufficient length of time, and in suitable conditions
of temperature and pressure, it always in the end, through
the effect of chance and large numbers, becomes vitalized..."
1^2J In other words he accepts the general point of view,
consistent with emergence, that the various levels are the
result of an increased complexity or organisation. Likewise,
for Teilhard, at a certain level of organisation, life
loo
becomes conscious. J
To be conscious according to Teilhard is to be reflec¬
tive. Teilhard believes that the reflective capacity has
become man's chief problem. In particular it is reflection
that has led man to make a distinction between matter and
lol+
life. J This of course is very similar to Bergson's position
that the intellect creates the material laws. Furthermore,
characteristic of Bergson, Teilhard says that the greatest
dilemma for modern man is the opposite currents of matter and
life.13^
-*-3^Teilhard. Phenomenon Of Man, p.188.
■^^Teilhard de Chardin. The Activation Of Energy, trans.,
Rene Hague. (London: Collins, 1970). p.208.
133ibid. p.156. 13S.bid. p.23.
13^Teilhard de Chardin. Christianity And Evolution,
trans., Rene Hague. (London: Collins, 1971). p.109.
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For Teilhard matter is essentially a multiplicity.
Spirit is a unity. Consistent with Process thought, Teilhard
holds that activity demands both a unity and a multiplicity.
However, within the multiplicity which we call matter
there is a potency for unity. This "potency" for unity is not
realised until the development or emergence of consciousness.
137 Therefore, as Bergson points out, matter qua matter
appears to be entropic. On the other hand, the idea of the
spiritual being potentially within matter solves for Teilhard
the spirit-matter dualism. "If matter and spirit are regarded
as synonyms, the former of multiplicity and the latter of un¬
ity, then they are not two heterogeneous or antagonistic things,
coupled together by accident or force. Matter is multipli¬
city with the potential for unity, and mind or consciousness
is unity that has been actualised in the material world.
Matter is generally thought of as being unified by virtue
of absolute physical laws. Life or spirit, on the other hand,
is used to prove the fact of individuality. So the usual for¬
mulation would be to say that life proves individuality. On
the contrary Teilhard sees the spiritual as a unity, a complex
organisation. The reality of this organisation depends upon
a previous material multiplicity. Teilhard goes so far as to
say, "No spirit (not even God within the limits of our experi¬
ence) exists, nor could structurally exist without an
"^Teilhard. Activation Of Energy, p.257*
"'"-^Teilhard. Christianity And Evolution, pp.30-31.




Therefore, we must understand what Teilhard means by-
saying that matter is a multiplicity, and that spirit alone
provides a unity. He says that the first two laws of thermo¬
dynamics are inadequate to explain the present organisation
of the universe. Taken together they suggest that greater
organisation is impossible without an increase in energy, and
that there is no possible material source for the energy
required for organisation. Thus matter is inherently disor¬
ganised. It is a multiplicity. Alone material laws cannot
explain unity or organisation at all. Here we are reminded
of Bradley's arguments that materialism could not account for
what relates.
In order to account for unity Teilhard suggests a third
1^+0 1*+1
law, the law of the organisation or reflection of energy.
Keeping in mind the necessity of avoiding contradiction with
the laws of conservation and entropy, Teilhard says, "To think
'the world' (as physics is beginning to realise) is not merely
to register it but to confer upon it a form of unity it would
1 ILO
otherwise (i.e. without being thought) be without." This
unity is spiritual or conscious, and while not being separated
from matter, it creates an organisation which counters
entropy.
"'"-^Teilhard de Chardin. Human Energy, trans., J.M. Cohen
(London: Collins, 1969). p.57.
1 i+o
Teilhard. Activation Of Energy, pp.132-133*
1 L-i 1L-?
ibid, p.337. Teilhard. Phenomenon Of Man. p.27l+n.
"''^Teilhard. Activation Of Energy, p.325* Here Teilhard
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Consciousness represents an organisation beyond entropy.
Consciousness through reflection is capable of intellectually
embracing the world. The achievement of the level of con¬
sciousness, says Teilhard, must be the basic movement within
evolution.
Another name which Teilhard uses for his third law of the
1 L.C
organisation of energy is involution. y To illustrate invo¬
lution Teilhard uses the model of person. His use of person
is quite like the use of that term by Morgan, i.e. to become
personal is to find unity through individualisation.
However, Teilhard prefers to speak of becoming centered,
rather than individualised. Thus Teilhard says that the out¬
come of involution is the "Center." The Center is that which
represents a complex-unity of all consciousness.
The one name commonly used for the Center is Omega.
"Omega, in the form that the evolutionary structure of the
world demands for it, is much more than the 'real' image which
states his positive use of the reflective aspect of
consciousness, over against Bergson's negative feeling of
how consciousness through the intellect "thinks the world."
Teilhard's very poetic statements about spirit, while not
essential to our paper at this point, should be illustrated:
"Let others, fulfilling a function more august than mine,
proclaim your splendours as pure Spirit; as for me, domina¬
ted as I am by a vocation which springs from the inmost
fibers of my being, I have no desire, I have no ability, to
proclaim anything except the innumerable prolongations of
your incarnate Being in the world of matter; I can preach
only the mystery of your flesh, you the Soul shining forth
through all that surrounds us." Hvmn Of The Universe. (Lon¬





is destined to take shape in the future at the focus point
1L6
of the convergent universe."
In other words, reflection of energy is the bringing
together of all diversity into a complex unity. The new law
of energy is manifested within human consciousness, which
itself is a unity of a multiplicity of factors. Both the mul¬
tiplicity and the unity are already present within reality,
but they are being brought together into a total complex-unity
— a center.
It is this third law which answers the question of why
1 1+7
there is organisation rather than disorganisation. That
is, the fact of unity and diversity reflects the nature of
the ultimate source of activity — the conscious center.
As we might expect, Teilhard speaks of Omega as being
personal. The term absolute applies to it in the sense that
it ultimately holds all consciousness within itself. Further¬
more, Teilhard says that Omega already has as a concrete
content the level of consciousness organisation already ach¬
ieved.
Teilhard makes God, or Omega, bi-polar. One pole or part
of Omega he says is transcendent; that is, independent of
evolution. The other aspect of Omega has always been emerging.
I*f8
In other words, Teilhard feels that by his very nature
God has always been able to ultimately unite all diversity.
^^ibid. p.112. ^^Teilhard. Human Energy. p.¥+.
11+8
Teilhard. Activation Of Energy, pp.112-113•
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The degree of diversity does not change this ability. There¬
fore, in terms of the ability to unite God is transcendent.
In this aspect God determines reality, but it is a determin¬
ation which does not preclude diversity. Therefore, God is
also immanent, i.e. he participates in relationships. Only
within this understanding, according to Teilhard, can one
account for conscious activity.
In general Teilhard agrees with Morgan's formulation that
ll+o
activity must have its source in a bi-polar God. However,
Teilhard goes much further than Morgan in the description of
the pole of unity. It is absolute in the abstract sense that
by inner necessity it is always a principle of unity. However,
it also has a concrete content, namely, it is a unity of all
the reality that has reached the level of consciousness. No
true organisation exists outside of the absolute pole, but dis¬
organised matter, having only the potential for unity, may
exist outside of it without contradictions
Furthermore we must recall that unity has been defined as
an increase in organisation. Organically speaking, organi¬
sation intensifies individuality and in turn is developed
through this intensification. Thus the above understanding of
the absolute pole can be reached only in company with the
bi-polar concept of the universe.
"^•^We have said that Teilhard generally appears to pres¬
ent a concept of God close to Morgan's. However, in the
following quotation we can see an exception to this: "For
such a Christian, exactly as for the modern philosopher, the
universe has no complete reality except in the movement which
causes all elements to converge upon a number of higher cen¬
ters of cohesion (in other words, which spiritualizes them);
nothing holds together absolutely except through the Whole;
and the Whole itself holds together only through its future
fulfillment." Christianity And Evolution, p.71.
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So far Teilhard's use of the term absolute is completely-
consistent with the Process understanding of the role of the
absolute outlined in our Introduction. However, for Teilhard
the absolute pole is one aspect of God, who is the ultimate
source of activity. Activity, as we have said, is character¬
ised by organisation. Indeed matter, multiplicity, demon¬
strates no activity other than organisation. Therefore,
absoluteness in reference to God, the source of activity,
must mean an ultimate organisation of all multiplicity, which
in fact Teilhard sees occurring at Point Omega — somewhere in
the future. Whenever absoluteness refers directly to some
aspect of the source of activity, the nature of that source
must be realised through activity. Because, within such a
formulation consistency is maintained only when the "source's"
absolute aspect determines activity in the same sense that
mechanism's absolute physical principle determines activity.
In Teilhard's system true multiplicity is gradually ex¬
hausted, as all reality becomes centered. Of course Teilhard
argues that unity has a complex nature, and thus does not elim¬
inate diversity. Nevertheless, it is clear from our study
that the disorganised matter outside of consciousness, and the
spiritualised individuals are not the same. Furthermore, in
order to include disorganised matter in his system Teilhard
has made it an essential factor in activity. How activity
can continue after all reality has been spiritualised remains
an unanswered question. Indeed, Teilhard offers no arguments
that show that point Omega will be anything else than an
entropic state. Depending upon how one looks at the matter,
the entropic state may be viewed as absolute disorganisation
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or as an absolutely uniform field.
Exactly how Teilhard envisaged the internal nature of
the universe at point Omega is not completely clear. However,
if at that point true diversity is eliminated, which as we
have shown is a possible conclusion, then one might conclude
further that diversity could not be said to be an ultimate
aspect of God's nature, and therefore the source of activity
is not finally explained.
However problematic Teilhard's account of activity may
be on a purely metaphysical level, there remains little ques¬
tion of the importance of his description of the nature of
activity in the phenomenal world; namely, that activity is an
organisation — a process — rather than pure cause and effect.
The working out of a clearer metaphysical account of process
is achieved for us in the writings of Whitehead to whose
thought we now turn.
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CHAPTER IX: A.N. Whitehead's Concept Of Dipolarity
Teilhard was concerned with the dualistic problem faced
by vitalism. Therefore, he adopted an emergent position.
However, emergence, as McDougall points out, is a form of
materialism. Teilhard speaks about the spiritual, but it is
a sort of pantheistic spiritualism.
Whitehead is sympathetic to much that emergent evolution
has to say. Like the emergent evolutionists in general he
believes that both unity and diversity are inherently within
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creation. But he is most like Alexander in suggesting that
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"events" rather than "objects" constitute the real world.
For example he says,
My own view is a belief in the relational theory
both of space and time, and of disbelief in the
current form of the relational theory of space
which exhibits bits of matter as the relata for
spatial relations. The true relata are events.^
Finally he speaks of the division of nature into appearance
15^
and reality as "Bifurcation," rejecting this idea in com¬
pany with Alexander, Morgan and Teilhard.
However, Whitehead's conception of an emergent complexity
is unique. While like Alexander he sees pure events rather
than material-events at the basis of reality, he is unlike
even Alexander in the way in which the events relate. For
■*"-^Whitehead, Alfred North. The Concept Of Nature.
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1920). pp.12-13.
l5libid. pp.1^-15. 1^2lbid. p.2>+. 1?3ibid. pp.30-31.
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Alexander the events interact with each other, but for White¬
head the events extend over each other, so that every succes¬
sive event includes all of the events which led up to it.
Furthermore, Whitehead does not hold that the events are com¬
posed of Space-Time.
It is interesting, however, that Morgan in his reading of
"Whitehead's The Concept Of Nature saw Whitehead as suggesting
something which is totally opposite to the emergent view.
Morgan says, "For Mr. Whitehead, as I gather, mind is an order
icdi.
of being wholly disparate from 'nature'..." y
Morgan's view, if it is a correct interpretation, would
tend to place Whitehead in the category of animists. Indeed,
McDougall, a leading exponent of animism, agreeing with Morgan,
tends not to place Whitehead in the class of Modern Material¬
ists. Rather, he says that on certain points Whitehead's view
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is consistent with his own.
In The Concept Of Nature there is considerable justifi¬
cation for understanding Whitehead as seeing mind wholly dis¬
parate from nature. For example, he says that objects situated
156
in events are intellectual abstractions. That is to say,
objects are the result of the mind working on nature.
Sections of Religion In The Making tend to confirm what
has just been said. Whitehead speaks of the physical and
1-^Morgan. Emergent Evolution, p.236.
l^McDougall. Modern Materialism, pp.lllf.
^Whitehead. The Concept Of Nature, p.125*
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spiritual worlds. He says that the concrete fact is al-
158
ways "dipolar", i.e. having a physical and a mental pole.
In other parts of the book he speaks of the world as two
sided. One side is matter of fact; the other side is ideals.
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However, McDougall is concerned about Whitehead's decision
to use a concept of "organism." He says, "And with due defer¬
ence to those philosophers who like Whitehead tell us that the
whole of nature consists of organisms, I venture to question
whether the word 'organism' can properly be applied to inor¬
ganic things that are not the products of design or of teleo-
logical causation.
The first philosophy of organism which we considered,
that of Hans Driesch, was vitalistic and was so recognised.
Next we considered Haldane's theory of organism, which was
mechanistic, and which like Whitehead's system proposed to in¬
clude the inorganic. It is small wonder, therefore, that
McDougall was suspicious of the term.
In view of the above, it would be helpful to examine
whether Whitehead is chiefly an emergent evolutionist, or an
animist, or if in fact he is producing something different
from either of these positions. The place to begin is with
a more careful look at Whitehead's use of the concept "organ¬
ism. "
1 ^Whitehead, Alfred N. Religion In The Making. (Cam¬
bridge: The University Press, 1926). pp.102-103.
1^8ibid. p.118. 1?9ibid. p.99.
-^^McDougall. Modern Materialism, p. 130.
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The concept of organism as a model for his philosophy-
arises from the problem which life presents to science.
Whitehead says,
The status of life in Nature is the standing prob¬
lem of philosophy and of science. Indeed, it is
the central meeting point of all the strains of
systematic thought, humanistic, naturalistic,
philosophic.
The concept of organism begins for Whitehead with the
Process emphasis upon activity being composed of unity and
diversity. The principle of activity is at the basis of all
organisms, and a single organism or event is a center of in¬
tensity within the field of activity. All single events are
organisms, but an organism may also be composed of a society
of events. This being the case, it is appropriate to say that
more complex organisms emerge out of antecedent states of less
162
complex organisms. Thus as reality is made up of events,
and as events are defined as organic, we can call "reality"
organic.
Whitehead suggests that those organisms which contain
only a single event are known to us as molecules or electrons.
Organisms composed of a society of events are known to us as
living., ,self -conscious beings. However, there are a great
confusion of structures which are not organismsThat is,
there are groups of single event organisms, which, as groups,
1^Whitehead. Alfred N. Nature And Life. (Cambridge: The
University Press, 193*+) • P»53; and Modes Of Thought. (Cam¬
bridge: The University Press, 1938)* p.202.
-^-^^Whitehead, Alfred N. Science And The Modern World.
(Cambridge5 The University Press, 1925). p.152.
1^3j_bid. p. 156.
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do not have a complexity greater than the single events which
compose them. Therefore, while all structures are composed
of organisms, not all structures are themselves organisms.
Whitehead noted that the electron is possibly the basic
event of pure activity. It provides unity because it is the
same within or without a living body. Outside of the living
body, however, the electron runs blindly. Within the body it
runs according to the plan of the body. This plan is essen-
l6lf
tially the mental state of the body.
According to this view, previous philosophies of organ¬
ism were quite right in saying that activity was ultimately
organic. However, they were wrong when they suggested that
"all" structures are organisms. Many structures are merely
increasing concentrations of organisms. The emergent levels
of matter and non-self-conscious life, if life of this sort
actually exists, are examples of non-organic structures.
Therefore, the study of matter and life is nothing but the
study of the organisation of electrons. Physics' claim that
matter and life show no essential difference in structure is
true. For example, life is not more organised than matter,
though it may be more concentrated. As regards the matter/
life issue, Whitehead is on the side of physics and is against
vitalism and emergence.
On the other hand, Whitehead agrees with Morgan and
Teilhard that physics does not answer the question of why
there is activity at all, and he agrees with vitalism and




self-conscious organisms. First of all we must remember that,
according to Whitehead, each electron is spontaneous in itself.
That is, it has no predetermined purpose. The so called plan
of the body is a coordination of these spontaneities. Within
a living body the organisation of electrons produces purpose,
but the living body is spontaneous just as the electron.
Whitehead calls such an organisation a "society", and says
16*)
that it is personal. '
Here "personal" is used much the same as in emergent evo¬
lutionism. The person is an increased individual made possible
by an increased unity. In fact Whitehead at one point defines
being alive as: "Whenever there is a region of nature which is
itself the primary field of the expressions issuing from each
of its parts, that region is alive.Whitehead says that
in a case such as this, atom and individual would mean the
same thing; for both have an absolute reality which their com-
i hn
ponents lack.
We must note that Whitehead is very carefultto maintain
a vague line between life and mind, i.e. self-conscious life.
The point at which life arrives at the quality of mind is
important for an emergent position. However, Whitehead's sys¬
tem need only recognise the mental factor within some life
forms.
Electron events and mind are always the two essential
l^Whitehead, Alfred W. Adventures Of Ideas. (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1933p.267-
l-^Whitehead. Modes Of Thought. p.31 •
-'-^Whitehead. Adventures Of Ideas. p.227.
116
elements of activity. Matter is not essential, nor is any
other special level of emergence. Nature is pure activity,
■J / O
and mind (life) gives content to this activity. However,
the one cannot exist apart from the other. Whitehead says,
"The doctrine that I am maintaining is that neither physical
Nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them to¬
gether as essential factors in the composition of 'really
real'..."169
Morgan was right in observing that Whitehead made mind
primordial. It is not a factor which emerges, but it is an
essential aspect of reality. However, Morgan misses the point
that by this Whitehead is not denying the equal reality of
the physical, nor does he deny spontaneity. Furthermore, Mc-
Dougall is quite wrong to even consider that Whitehead is an
animist. Whitehead does not say that mind animates nature.
Mind for Whitehead is only one of the two factors necessary
for activity. Likewise, McDougall's comment that Whitehead
applies the term organism to inorganic things is a misconcep¬
tion. Whitehead actually says that things which are not
themselves organisms are made up of organisms.
We have suggested that electrons are the necessary div¬
ersity, and that mind is the necessary unity, which together
account for activity. However, as electrons and self-
conscious beings are organisms, electrons must be understood
as having unity within themselves, and self-consciousness
l^Whitehead. Modes Of Thought. pp.228-229.
-^Whitehead. Nature And Life, p.57.
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must be understood to contain diversity. Therefore, we have
not quite clarified the meaning of the "plan" by which White¬
head says organisms form organic societies.
The point of positing organic societies is the need to
account for permanence. Varisco's spontaneous centers of
activity are quite like Whitehead's electrons. However, Var-
isco had to admit that they always came together in a random
fashion, and that the resulting patterns had no element of
permanence. Whitehead, on the other hand, does want to allow
permanence in terms of organic societies.
In order to do this, "Whitehead, like Teilhard and Morgan,
must introduce the concept of God. It is God who provides
the permanence of unity. Unlike Teilhard and Morgan, White¬
head' s position implies two understandings of unity. The
first is a principle of unity which exists within events or
entities, and the second is a "nexsus" or unity of an organic
society of events. This second understanding of unity is
also called the "mental pole", and it is absolute when under¬
stood as the mental pole of God. The mental pole of God is
complemented by a physical or relative pole. Thus Whitehead
agrees with Teilhard and Morgan that the existence of any¬
thing rather than nothing depends upon the fact that God is
"dipolar", and that the term absolute refers to one pole of
God.170
Permanence is made possible by the absolute pole, because
"'"'^Whitehead, Alfred N. Process And Reality. "An Essay
In Cosmology." (Cambridge: The University Press, 1929). p.M-2.
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any unity formed among events is retained by it. Thus in
terms of the absolute pole there is an increasing organis¬
ation. However, this organisation does not change the fact
that events have a unity within themselves that is not effec¬
ted by their organisation. Morgan and Teilhard, on the other
hand, suggested that unity depended entirely upon organis¬
ation. Thfeir formulations meant that entities were ultimately
determined by the absolute pole, as the organisation of that
pole implied a decrease in multiplicity. Whitehead says that
the organisation of the absolute pole does not decrease multi¬
plicity. On the contrary, organisation intensifies multipli¬
city. Another way of presenting this point is to say that
God is an event which participates in all organic societies.
Thus God is ultimately related. The absolute or mental pole
of God, therefore, becomes a unity of all the relationships
in which God participates.
If multiplicity is a given, Whitehead argues, unity must
be seen in terms of "true" multiplicity; otherwise one ends
up by suggesting that what has emerged is different from what
was given, i.e. the "given" multiplicity emerges into a unity.
The contradictory nature of such a formulation Whitehead calls
171
the "ontological principle." ' In other words, any organi-
172
sation must have continuity with the less organised states.
This continuity is what emergence lacks. Its formulation
suggests that process eliminates diversity. The elimination
171ibid. p.55.
7^Whitehead. Adventures Of Ideas. p.238.
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of diversity can hardly be seen as Implicit in the fact of
diversity as a given. Thus for Whitehead a "plan" allows for
permanance, without determining the cosmos or eliminating
the individuality of entities.
In the following quotation concerning human social
structure Whitehead illustrates his point that organisation
intensifies rather than reduces individuality:
Indeed, one general end is that these variously
co-ordinated groups should contribute to the
complex pattern of community life, each in vir¬
tue of its own peculiarity. In this way indivi¬
duality gains the effectiveness which issues
from co-ordination, and freedom obtains power
necessary for its perfection.
In summary, Whitehead's point is that the principle of
unity is not limited to the absolute as a pole of God. The
principle of unity is one aspect of the process in which all
entities,including God, participate. "Creativity" is the name
that Whitehead gives to the ultimate principle of process.
The principle of creativity will be fully discussed in Chap¬
ters XIX and XX. At the moment, however, we are more inter¬
ested in the fact that the term absolute is not applied to
the principle of creativity.
In its abstract aspect the absolute pole is a unity or
organisation of all relationships brought about by God, as
an actual entity, participating in each relationship. The
concrete content of the absolute pole is the unity of all
those relationships which have led to the present level of
organisation. Outside of the unity of all past relationships,
~*"^ibid. p.86.
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which is the absolute pole of God, exists the multiplicity of
entities, each having independent unity in terms of its own
present. That is, in one aspect all entities have an inner
necessity by which they are the same from instant to instant.
However, in a dipolar context this unity does not prevent
entities relating.
Thus every entity has an abstract aspect, but this aspect
is absolute only in the entity of God; for only in God is the
concrete content of the absolute pole made up of all past
relationships. Not only is the absolute pole less than God,
but it is also less than the ultimate principle of unity.
The ultimate principle of unity, which is an aspect of crea¬
tivity, has no concrete content. Therefore, one has no reason
to suggest that in order for the term absolute to be applied
to one aspect of God that aspect must have as its concrete
content all of reality. The Whiteheadian universe is not
heading toward an ultimate concrete unity. If the latter were
the case, then the use of the term absolute would have deter¬
ministic implications. Therefore, one factor unique to
Whiteheadian Process thought is the effort to eliminate deter¬
ministic implications from the term absolute. Nevertheless
Whitehead attempts to retain reference to the concept of unity
supplied by the term absolute, which is not captured by any
other term. As Kant says, "The word 'absolute1 is one of the
few words which in their original meaning were adapted to a
concept that no other word in the same language exactly suits."
17b
^Scant1 s Critique Of Pure Reason. p.317.
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Whiteheadian Process thought Is consistent with mechanism
in two respects. First it agrees that cosmic activity is in¬
nate within reality. Second, it agrees that a continuity
exists within what we call matter, life and mind. For White¬
head this continuity is an organic continuum-characterised by
atomic structure. In other words, all reality can be analysed
as built up from atomic units.
The second point disagrees with a vitalism which argues
for the total uniqueness of life's activity or for a dualism
between matter and life (mind). On the other hand, Whitehead
agrees with vitalists that life demonstrates that the source
of activity is not accounted for by mechanism's abstract
physical principle.
Whitehead concludes with Morgan and Teilhard that the
existence of activity along with permanence depends upon a
God whose dipolar nature is characteristic of reality. All
three agree that one pole of God is absolute and the other
relative. However, Morgan and Teilhard differ from Whitehead
by being unable to understand reality as ultimately maintain¬
ing God's primordial nature. That is, the former two emergent
thinkers seem to suggest that multiplicity within reality
becomes more and more organised until a single complex-unity
is achieved.
On the other hand, Whitehead suggests that organisation
eternally intensifies diversity. This is possible because
electrons are themselves composed of unity and diversity,
i.e. activity, even though they represent a single event.
The point that single events are organic is a new one.
Physics would have agreed that electrons were the simplest
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units of energy, but it assumed electrons without accounting
for the cause of their organisation. Emergence, and other
philosophies of organism assumed that an organism must always
be a unity of simple objects or events. Thus most organic
theories see unity emerging out of a primordial multiplicity.
Whitehead argues that this is a violation of the ontological
principle. Such a position would mean that what emerged was
different from what was given. Furthermore, the emergent
view leads to determinism, because the unity must be some¬
thing imposed upon the given diversity.
Given the organic nature of single events, Whitehead
says that they can form organic societies. These organic
societies become self-conscious, because a society intensi¬
fies the organic nature, i.e. the unity and diversity, of the
events composing it. In following Chapters we will give
attention to the development of this formulation.
Whitehead's formulations do not deny the Law of the Con¬
servation of Energy. He is not proposing that the organis¬
ation into a society requires a new form of energy, e.g. elan,
entelechy. The society is made up only of the elements which
compose it. His system does, of course, refute the present
interpretation of entropy; but, as we have already pointed
out, the concept of entropy itself says nothing about the
source of activity.
In many ways Whitehead's formulation agrees with Varis-
co's point that the activity of the universe divides itself
into spontaneous centers. However, as the centers are spon¬
taneous Varisco saw no way to account for permanence. It is
the absolute pole in Whitehead's system that accounts for
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the required permanence.
The term absolute refers to the pole of unity or the
mental pole of God. God's mental pole is a unity of all
organic relatedness. The mental pole of God is complete
within itself as is a single event or entity. However, God
is an entity which participates in all organic societies,
and in this regard his mental pole has two functions for the
societies. First, it assures the permanence of the society
by retaining the organisation achieved. Second it is the
source of energy for the organisation of the society.
In Teilhard's system, for example, the organisation of
events appeared to be created by the individual events giving
up their "true" individuality in order to create a unity.
Thus the individual was subordinated to the unity. Whitehead,
however, says that because God is an entity which is a member
of all societies, his absolute pole allows for organic-social-
unity without the necessity of the events losing their
individuality.
We have not yet justified Whitehead's conclusion that
God is an entity who participates in all relationships. Such
a discsssion must be delayed until Chapter XIX, when we take
up the issue of creativity. However, the point is that the
absolute pole provides for the organic-social-unities which
we call self-conscious organisms. It does not, as Teilhard
and Morgan imply, account for all unity. In Whiteheadian
thought unity is present as a factor in single events quite
apart from God's absolute pole.
What the point about unity finally means is that in
Whitehead's system diversity continues to exist along with
12*f
unity. Therefore, process continues everlastingly. To
understand an end to process, according to Whitehead, is to
give up all possibility of accounting for the fact of
activity.
Thus we now see how Whiteheadian thought fits into the
context of scientific issues which influenced the rise of
Process thinking. We have also demonstrated why the study
of the understanding of the term absolute helps to accomplish
this analysis. Now we must attempt to show how an under¬
standing of the term absolute allows us to fit Process into
a philosophical context. The foregoing Chapters leave many
aspects of Process unclarified. This is because Process can
be clearly presented only after both the scientific and
philosophical issues have been spelled out.
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PART II: THE TERM ABSOLUTE IN PROCESS EPISTEMOLOGY
CHAPTER X: Prom Metaphysics To Epistemology
Scientific mechanism held that a clear distinction could
be made between conclusions reached upon experimental data
and purely philosophical speculations. Consistency with the
absolute physical laws was the boundary beyond which knowable
"facts" became speculations. Prom the viewpoint of material¬
ism all metaphysics was speculative.
However, beginning with the rise of neo-vitalism some
scientists and philosophers were convinced that the physical
laws could not account for documented "facts" about life in
general and self-conscious life, i.e. mind, in particular.
In the foregoing Chapters we looked at the evidence which
supported this conclusion. Of course many of the earlier neo-
vitalistic formulations were rejected by later Process
thinkers. Nevertheless other vitalistic conclusions contri¬
buted to a radical re-thinking of cosmology, that culminated
in such things as Whitehead's development of a dipolar universe.
Of particular concern to us was the fact that the various
understandings of the term absolute served to guide us through
the stages of development that occurred in the formulation of
what is today called Process. On the one hand, respective tb
scientific thought, the various understandings of the term
absolute were tied to the scientific concept that the activity
in the universe could only be explained in terms of comple¬
mentary aspects of true unity and true diversity. For
example, the activities of organisms could not be explained
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if activity is innate to matter and organised solely accord¬
ing to physical structures.
On the other hand, the new understandings of the term
absolute meant that data, which mechanism would have called
speculative were included in the category of knowable
"facts." It is to the consideration of this point that we
now turn. In particular we are concerned to see how the use
of the term absolute sets the new limits of knowledge accepted
as such by the men whose positions we have been considering.
As a preliminary definition we will say that "knowing"
is one activity of "mind", and that epistemology is chiefly
the study of that activity. Mechanism would have argued that
the study of mental activity was merely a specialised form of
the analysis of the activity of material particles; as all
activity was absolutely determined by physical laws. Of
course, if the physical laws are not absolute, then mental
activity may not be subject to simple physical analysis. In¬
deed as Bergson, Ward, Teilhard and Whitehead, etc., suggested,
conscious mental activity should serve as a model for activ¬
ity in general. Of course, they widely disagreed as to what
participated in this activity. The reason for the emphasis
upon mind was that conscious mental activity alone appeared
to illustrate true unity and true diversity. Furthermore,
it was possible to develop a metaphysics using conscious
mental activity as a model for universal activity.
However, there are many types of conscious mental activ¬
ity, e.g. remembering, dreaming, learning, thinking, etc.
All of these activities produce "knowable" data, but the data
is clearly of different kinds. Therefore, a problem arises
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as to how to evaluate mental data. The solution demands a
theory of knowing — an epistemology.
It Is at the point of establishing a basis for the eval¬
uation of mental data that the understanding of the term
absolute becomes important. Unless activity is chaotic, there
must be some principle whereby activity is organised. If the
principle of organisation is absolute, as in the case of
mebhanism, then activity is determined by that absolute physi¬
cal principle. Likewise, if mental activity is seen as
ordered, there must be some principle which accounts for this
organisation. If the principle of mental organisation is
absolute, then knowing is predetermined. Of course, determin¬
ism is the very thing which Process argues cannot accompany
activity. The move to a model of mind as the analogy for
activity was an attempt to deny determinism. However, demon¬
strating that physical laws do not account for mental activity
is not the same as proving that mental activity escapes deter¬
minism.
The point that knowledge of reality must be understood
in terms of how the mind functions was a firmly established
philosophical concept throughout the period of modern mechan¬
ism' s development. Idealism, for example, had long held that
knowledge of material order exists because mind exists.
Therefore, to assume that material order would be unchanged
in the absence of mind -- materialism's position — cannot
be supported from idealism's viewpoint.
Whitehead indicates that philosophy's emphasis upon mind
had been a key factor in the separation of philosophy from
modern science. He says,
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The three centuries, which from the epoch of
modern science, have revolved round the ideas
of God, mind, matter, and also of space and
time in their characters of expressing simple
location for matter. Philosophy has on the
whole emphasised mind, and has thus been out
of touch with science during the two latter
centuries. But it is creeping back into its
old-importance owing to the rise of psychol¬
ogy and its alliance with physiology'175
Until the rise of psychology and physiology, the pro¬
cedures for the study of the mind had not been formulated in
a way which the experimental sciences could accept as valid
research methods. Of course, it is not unheard of for philos¬
ophy to have arrived at valid conclusions long before the
techniques were developed to demonstrate the experimental
validity of its conclusions. For example, atomic theories
existed long before the empirical evidence for atoms was gen¬
erally accepted by science. Likewise, as the study of the
mind began its modern development, certain previous philos¬
ophical speculations began to find support.
As we have seen already the development of Process
thought was closely tied up with the rise of the new sciences.
Therefore, the connections which the new sciences established
between the modern study of the mind and philosophical specu¬
lations on epistemology were of great interest to Process
thinkers. In this regard, one tendency among early Process
thinkers, that becomes obvious almost at once, is the attempt
to take a traditional epistemology and use modern data about
the mind to prove it.
11^Whitehead. Science And The Modern World, p.277.
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As Process thinking develops the above procedure becomes
less and less workable. While it is true that Process found
traditional epistemological formulations valuable, one serious
problem for Process was the use that some traditional episte-
mologies made of the concept absolute.
In view of what has been said, we can give a summary
account of how epistemology fits in with the general topic of
this paper. As the rise of the new sciences reopened links
between science and philosophy, the scientific and philosophi¬
cal influences on the development of Process thought must both
receive consideration. However, the decision of Process that
true unity and true diversity are essential to activity, which
therefore cannot occur in a deterministic system, underlies
the response made by Process to epistemological systems. In
other words, how the term absolute is used by various systems
is critical to Process. Nevertheless, the understandings of
the term absolute in various epistemologies did aid Process
in shaping its own use of the term. The use of the term abso¬
lute by mechanism was not acceptable to Process, but the
rejection of this usage did not immediately suggest an alter¬
native. Therefore, in Chapters XI through XIX we will show
how the understanding of the role of the absolute in Process
philosophies developed not only in response to scientific
data, but also in response to epistemology.
A. Idealism And Realism
At the beginning of the rise of modern Process thought,
Idealism was the dominatt^ philosophical alternative to a
materialistic position. R.B. Perry describes the situation
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by saying,
Positivism is philosophy driven into the camp of
science by loyalty to the standards of exact
research; romanticism is philosophy merged into
religion through its interest in the same ulti¬
mate questions. These two tendencies determined
the course of philosophy in the nineteenth cen¬
tury; and they are represented today by natural¬
ism and idealism respectively*275
Therefore, it is not surprising that a renewed emphasis
on mind encouraged a re-examination of idealism. Watson
gives a helpful insight into late nineteenth century idealism
when he remarks,
I presume it will be admitted that the origin¬
ator of the philosophical doctrine of Idealism
was Plato, and that Plato conceived of the first
principle of all things as reason (Nous) also
maintaining that it is in virtueaof reason, as
distinguished from sensible perception, that
man obtains knowledge of that principle. Now
modern Idealism, as I understand it, agrees
with Plato on these two points, and therefore
claim to the name does not seem either
arrogant or unreasonable.^77
For the sake of accuracy one should point out that in
Watson's day there were two primary forms of idealism: Subjec¬
tive and Objective. Subjective Idealism is traditionally
represented by positions such as Berkeley's or Leibniz's, in
178
which being depends upon the Individual consciousness.
X76' Perry, Ralph Barton. Present Philosophical Tendencies.
"A Critical Survey Of Naturalism Idealism Pragmatism And
Realism With A Survey Of The Philosophy Of William James."
(New York: Longmans, Green, And Co., 1912). p.38.
^^Watson, John. Christianity And Idealism. "The Chris¬
tian Ideal Of Life In Its Relations To The Greek And Jewish
Ideals And To Modern Philosophy." (Glasgow: James MacLehose
And Sons, 1897). p.xxiii.
"^^Broad, C.D. The Mind And Its Place In Nature. (London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1923). p.7.
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The classic problem for this form of idealism is the diffi¬
culty in accounting for unity, or in accounting for how one
mind is able to know another mind.
Objective Idealism is represented by Hegel and F.H. Brad¬
ley. "The central conception of objective idealism, in other
words, is the conception of a super-personal, or impersonal
179
logical consciousness." This form of idealism certainly
solves the problem of the unity of consciousness, but it
leaves one with the dilemma of how to account for true diver¬
sity.
Of course, part of our purpose will be to explain what
we mean by suggesting that the chief forms of idealism did
not account for both true unity and true diversity. However,
once this assertion is established, it will not be difficult
to see that Process, owing to its understanding of activity,
could not accept idealism.
Broad describee something of the Process concern about
idealisms bf the late nineteenth century when he says,
The plain fact is that if the world be too much
or too little of a unity there is not the least
chance of our ever being able to understand it.
If it were as pluralistic as Leibniz thought or
as monistic as Mr. Bradley seems to have bel¬
ieved, I do not see how knowledge would be
possible.-^qq
The difficulty of reconciling the Process metaphysical
assumption of the necessity of true unity and true diversity
for the existence of activity with idealism, suggested that
an alternative to idealistic epistemology was needed in order
179
"Perry. Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.135-
-i On
Broad. The Mind And Its Place In Nature, p.7.
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to describe mental activity. As we will see, certain Process
thinkers, therefore, began to investigate the possibilities
of adopting some form of Realism. In essence Traditional
Realism demanded that there be universals within nature,
which are not effected absolutely by perception.
In particular realism seemed to be a necessary comple¬
ment to objective idealism. If the mind is the seat of unity
and organisation, as objective idealism suggests, perhaps
the diversity required for activity exists outside of the
mind in nature. Unfortunately traditional realism had not
been formulated to complement idealism, but rather to refute
it. And in this refutation, as we will see, it ended by
establishing diversity at the cost of unity.
The point to be made here is that, in dealing with the
issue of the mind, Process sought an epistemology that allowed
for both unity and diversity as complementary aspects of con¬
scious mental activity. At this point there would be some
Justification for the suggestion that in establishing meta¬
physics Process had assumed an epistemology. This id undoub¬
tedly true. However, it was through working with the data
coming out of science that for Process the importance of the
mind, and in turn of epistemology, became apparent. There¬
fore, in considering an aspect of the development of Process
thought one is better off to begin with scientific issues and
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B. Requirements For A Process Epistemology
In this Chapter we have implicitly suggested two require¬
ments that an epistemology must meet, in order to satisfy the
metaphysical formulations that come out of the development of
Process thought. First there must be a principle of limita¬
tion which provides a standard of evaluation for mental data.
Second mental activity must be composed of true unity and
true diversity.
Before getting into considerations of the positions of
various thinkers as regards epistemology, it will be helpful
if we establish a provisional connection between these two
requirements. Mechanism, for example, says that knowledge is
limited to our understanding the structure and organisation
of the absolute physical laws. Idealism has another principle
of limitation. Perry describes this principle by saying,
"Idealism is a form of spiritualism in which man, the finite
individual, is regarded as a microcosmic representation of
God, the Absolute Individual.
In either case, the term absolute refers to the factor
which determines the organisation of activity. Therefore, a
correct understanding of the organisation of activity must be
consistent with the predetermined nature of activity.
In the foregoing Chapters we suggested that the term
absolute, used in the wider sense, referred to either an abs¬
tract physical principle, or to a "Given" the concrete content
of which was a unity of all reality. Several times we have
i Op
Perry. Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.113.
13^
pointed out that a concept of absolute unity, whether physical
or spiritual, suggests a static condition within the universe.
Both physics' understanding of entropy and spiritualism's
concept of a "final" unity were implicit admissions that an
absolutely unified state was devoid of activity. Neverthe¬
less, both materialism and spiritualism assumed that at
present activity occurs.
Prom a Process metaphysical viewpoint, the two traditio¬
nal understandings of the wider meaning of the term absolute
are inconsistent with activity. However, if one does not see
this metaphysical problem, the term absolute used in either
way implies a limitation imposed upon activity and not a
denial of activity. Absolutely free activity is chaotic.
Therefore, in order for there to be any organisation within
activity, whether it be the organisation of physical activity
into Laws or of mental activity into Ideals, the freedom of
activity must have limits.
It is not difficult to see that unity, in the sense of
wholeness, and limitation are associated concepts. "Limited,"
as used here, describes the present dynamic dondition of the
universe for a system whose use of the term absolute suggests
ultimate predetermination.1^
Thus just as Process accepts unity, it also, as we will
see, accepts a principle of limitation. That is, it accepts
a present dynamic condition of the universe that is also not
chaotic. However, as Process has found it necessary to refor¬
mulate the term absolute, in order to allow for both true
"^^Kant's Critique Of Pure Reason. p.ll6.
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unity and true diversity, so the concept of limitation must
also be evaluated by new standards.
Remembering that this discussion is merely provisional,
we will conclude by making a connection between the concept
of limitation and epistemology. Limitation is the category
through which the quality of unity, i.e. totality, is known
to the conscious mind. While materialism held the physical
laws to be absolute and spiritualism made an ultimate unity
absolute, knowledge of the precise nature of the physical
laws or1 of the absolute unity was not available to conscious¬
ness at any present instant. What could be known was a
reference to absoluteness in terms of limitation. This point
is best clarified through the illustrations that appear in
the following Chapters.
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CHAPTER XI: F.H. Bradley's Objective Idealism
Objective idealism is ultimately spiritualistic rather
than materialistic. That Bradlgy holds such a position is
made clear by the following:
Both nature and my body exist necessarily with and
for one another. And both, on examination, turn out
to be nothing apart from their relation. We find in
each no essence which is not infected by appearance
to the other.
And with this we are brought to an unavoidable
result. The physical world is an appearance; it is
phenomenal throughout. It is the relation of two
unknowns, which, because they are unknown, we can¬
not have any right to regard as really two, or as
related at all.^g^.
In keeping with a spiritualistic conception Bradley uses
the term absolute to refer to a concrete unity of all reality.
For me the Absolute is there to see that nothing in
the world is lost. That effort which for our vision
is wasted, passes over beyond our vision into real¬
ity and is crowned with success. Of all foolish
criticisms (and they are many) which have been dir¬
ected at the Absolute, the most foolish of all per¬
haps is that it is useless. And this does not mean
that, whatever I do, it is all one to the Absolute.
The Absolute is there to secure that everywhere the
highest counts most and the lowest counts least.
For it is at once the active criterion and the
supreme power.
We introduced the above quotation not only to demonstrate
Bradley's use of the term absolute, but also to pick up the
point that he refers to the "Absolute" as "the active criter¬
ion and the supreme power." In particular the Absolute is
IgL.
Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.265.
'^-'Bradley. Essays On Truth And Reality, p.3^-8.
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the active criterion and supreme power of conscious activity
— sentient experience. Bradley says,
Our conclusion so far, will be this, that the
Absolute is one system, and that its contents
are nothing but sentient experience. It will
hence be a single and all-inclusive experience,
which embraces every partial diversity' in
concord.
Therefore, Bradley appears to have found the first re¬
quirement for a Process epistemology in objective idealism.
The Absolute, i.e. unity , serves as a principle of limitation
for the evaluation of conscious mental data. This point is
made clearer! when Bradley says,
The end of truth is to be and to possess reality
in an ideal form. This means first that truth must
include without residue the entirety of what is in
any sense given, and it means next that truth is
bound to include this intelligibly... 1g^
At this point we become especially interested in seeing
how Bradley attempts to find the requirements for a Process
epistemology within objective idealism. Therefore, we must
see if Bradley meets the second requirement, by understanding
conscious activity to be composed of true unity and true
diversity. That he has some concept of activity has already
been suggested through his reference to the Absolute as the
"active criterion and supreme power."
Both by explicit testimony and also by implicit structur¬
al similarities, Bradley demonstrates that Hegel greatly
1 88
influenced his own formulations. What we will consider in
1^Bradley. Appearance And Reality, pp. l>+6 -lk7 •
"^^Bradley. Essays On Truth And Reality, p.11*+.
1 88
For example. Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.552.
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the following pages is that Bradley adopts something like a
Hegelian view about consciousness as being composed of unity
and diversity. However, Bradley sees that there are certain
problems in establishing the precise significance of the
diversity which objective idealism discusses. Therefore,
while Bradley persists in rejecting any alternative to ideal¬
ism, his awareness of its weakness has two important results
for our study. First Bradley's view functions as an example
of why objective idealism cannot serve Process as an episte-
mology. This point is important because, as we will see,
objective idealism comes very close to agreeing with Process.
Second, the rather subtle weakness, which Bradley uncovers,
helps to pin-point idealism's understanding of the Absolute as
one reason for idealism being ultimately unacceptable to Pro¬
cess. The place at which to begin is a brief summary of the
relevant points of Hegelian thought.
It is quite generally agreed that one of Hegel's chief
contributions to philosophy was his so called "dialectic."
With regard to Bradley's work we are especially interested
that the dialectic occurs between unity and diversity, and is
also what Hegel calls "Force."
In The Phenomenology Hegel says,
In other words, the elements set up as indepen¬
dent pass directly over into their unity, and
their unity directly into its explicit diver¬
sity, and the latter back once again into the
reduction to unity. This process is what is
called 'Force'*289
Hegel goes on to call force the essential law of reality.
"^-^Hegel, G.W.F. The Phenomenology Of Mind, trans., J.B.
Baillie. (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1910).
Vol. I. p.128.
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The law is thereby present in a twofold form.
In one case it is there as law in which the
differences are expressed as independent mom¬
ents; in the other, it is in the form of a
simple withdrawal into itself, which again
can be called Force, but in the sense not of
repressed force, but force in general, or the
concept of force, an abstraction which absorbs
the distinctions involved in what attracts and
is attracted.
For Hegel Force is not a physical principle, rather it
191
is the organisation of Geist. i.e. mind or spirit.
Finally, and of particular interest to us is the fact that
192
spiritual reality for Hegel is consciousness.
Therefore, consciousness appears to have the very char¬
acteristics of force. Hegel says,
Reason is the conscious certainty of being all
reality. This is how Idealism announces its prin¬
ciple. Just as consciousness assuming the form
of reason immediately and inherently contains
that certainty within it, in the same way ideal¬
ism also directly proclaims and expresses that
certainty.^3
Clearly Hegel suggests that conscious activity is com¬
posed of unity and diversity. The reason for this conclusion
is briefly stated in the following:
In this way, just as formerly ultimate Reality
19°ibid. p.lM-5-
"*"91Hegel. The Phenomenology. Vol. II. p.*+36. It is per¬
haps important to make mention of the translator's note:
"The term 'Spirit' seems better to render the word 'Geist'
used here, than the word 'mind' would do. Up to this stage
(referring to Vol. I) of experience the word 'mind' is
sufficient to convey the meaning. But spirit is mind at a
much higher level of existence." p.*+92.
192ibid. p.b9b.
"^9^Hegel. Phenomenology. Vol. I. p.22^.
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was expressed as unity of thought and extension,
it would here be interpreted as unity of thought
and time. But distinction left to itself, un¬
resting, unhalting time, really collapses upon
itself; it is the objective quiescence, the
stable continuity of extension; while this lat¬
ter is pure identity with self — is Ego.-^L,.
However, the diversity in conscious activity is not that
of a number of independent "consciousnesses" united by some
further principle. Instead Hegel understands that a single
universal consciousness divides itself. "God is Himself con¬
sciousness, He distinguishes Himself from Himself within Him¬
self, and as consciousness He gives Himself as object for
195
what we call the side of consciousness." y
In spite of his belief in a single consciousness, Hegel
holds that the principle of "Freedom" allows for the "self-
conscious" awareness of individual minds. Of Freedom Hegel
says, "Freedom considered abstractly means that the mind is
related to something objective which is not regarded as
foreign to its nature, its essential character is the same
as that of truth, only that in the case of freedom the nega¬
tion of the difference of Otherness has been done away with
and absorbed in something higher, and thus it appears in the
196
form of Reconciliation." And in explaining the concept
of reconciliation he says, "All that we mean by reconciliation,
truth, freedom, represents a universal process, and cannot
19L.
Hegel. Phenomenology. Vol. II. p.8l6.
"^-'Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures On The Philosophy Of Religion,
trans., E.B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson.[London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, Triibner, & Co., Ltd., 1895)* Vol. II. p.329.
196ibid. p.316.
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therefore be expressed in a single proposition without
197
becoming one-sided." '
Therefore, the content of self-consciousness is none
198
other than consciousness itself. The process of unity be¬
coming diversity and diversity reconciling itself to unity is
the twofold form of Force and the two-sided proposition of
universal process.
In turning again to Bradley we may quickly establish
three very important similarities between his formulations
and those of Hegel. First reality for Bradley is dynamic
199
rather than static. It is active — made up of events.
Second active reality must, according to Bradley, be made up
of unity and diversity. "We have to take reality as many,
and to take it as one, and to avoid contradiction.1,200
Third consciousness must be likewise made up of unity and
diversity as it is reality. "Being and reality are, in
brief, one thing with sentience, they can neither be opposed
to, nor even in the end, distinguished from it."20"*"
Indeed, Bradley's writings go on to suggest that, along
with Hegel, he accepts that God (Bradley would also use the
term Absolute) divides to produce diversity. "We do not
know," says Bradley, "why or how the Absolute divides itself
into centers, or the way in which, so divided, it still
197ibid. p.3^7.
19^Hegel. Lectures On The Philosophy Of Religion. Vol.
III. p.lib.
199Bradley. Essavs On Truth And Reality, p.30.




remains one." And, similar to Hegel's view, Bradley-
understands that the diversity is absorbed back into the
unity.203
Bradley observes that during the dialectical process of
universal activity individual conscious minds are a more de¬
cisive diversity than the above formulation appears to allow.
He says,
The plurality of presentations is a fact, and it,
therefore, makes a difference to our Absolute.
It exists in, and it, therefore must qualify the
whole. And the universe is richer, we may be sure,
for all dividedness and variety. Certainly in
detail we do not know how the separation is over¬
come, and we cannot point to the product which is
gained, in each case, by the resolution. But our
ignorance here is no ground for rational opposi¬
tion. 20I+
The particular point is that no explanation is available
for the positive "gain" made in the universe because of the
dialectical process taking place. The observation may be made
that the division of the unity into diversity appears point¬
less unless this somehow enriches the universe. For unity to
divide itself, and return to itself, does not immediately
suggest that the overall process has achieved anything. While
Bradley believes that a rational understanding of the universe
must be formulated in terms of such a process, he nevertheless
is concerned because this formulation leaves man ignorant of
any final gain.
2Q2ibid. p.527. 2°3ibid. ppA80-*f8l.
20lfibid. p.226.
l*+3
Of course, one is sometimes free to argue for a limit
to man's metaphysical understandings. However, on the issue
of the significance of diversity ignorance raises an episte-
mologieal problem as Bradley points out:
Unless the Reality itself enters into the process
of events, unless it itself is what it becomes
there, unless it itself discovers itself to itself
and us, and takes on a change from that discovery
— the Reality remains outside of knowledge, and
itself is unreal. On the other hand if that which
is discovered is not found, if that which appears
is not revealed —if in short the thing, which we
get to see, was not really there— then reality
and knowledge once more areiillusory. But we are
unable to combine these partial truths so as to
understand in detail how both of them go to make
the Universe.20^
In other words, the knowledge content of individual
minds seems to be so ultimately diverse, that it is difficult
to document that all minds share an underlying consciousness.
In that case reality appears to remain outside of knowledge.
However, the very point of Idealism is that reality is mental.
"The identity of truth, knowledge and reality, whatever diffi¬
culty that may bring, must be taken as necessary and funda¬
mental."206
There is, of course, the option of suggesting that what
seems to be the case does in fact occur, namely, that the
process of individual events of knowing somehow qualifies
consciousness as a whole. However, the understanding of the
term absolute, as referring to a unity of all reality, pro¬
hibits this conclusion. Bradley says,
20^Bradley. Essays On Truth And Reality, p.337.
206ibid. p.113.
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God, whether a 'person' or not is, on the one
hand, a finite being and an object to man. On
the other hand, the consummation, sought by the
religious consciousness, is the perfect unity
of these terms. And, if so, nothing would in
the end fall outside God. But to take God as
the ceaseless oscillation and changing movement
of the process is out of the question.2qj
As might be expected, Bradley's decision to adopt ideal¬
ism, in spite of the difficulty just outlined, grows out of
his effort to use it to meet the issues surrounding diversity.
In particular he suggests that while rational formulations of
reality demonstrate a diversity which cannot be reconciled to
a unity of consciousness, knowledge of the human experience
of "feeling" comes far closer to establishing that the dia¬
lectical truth of reality is one with knowledge.
At first the adoption of a model of experience may appear
to be a move away from idealism's traditional position; Perry
points out that this is not so:
Reality is defined in terms of an absolute cogni¬
tive consciousness, that is both prior to things
known in the idealistic sense, and also a maximum
or ideal, in the absolutist sense. The Absolute
Good of Plato, and the Infinite Substance of Spin¬
oza, are thus replaced by the 'Absolute Ideal' of
Hegel; and by such contemporary conceptions as
Professor Royce's 'absolutely organised experience
inclusive of all possible experience' or 'the abso¬
lute self-fulfillment, absolutely self-contained
significance of the 'one and only one' ideal
experience' described by Mr. Joachim.
Concerning feeling Bradley says,
By feeling, in short, I understand, and, I believe,
always have understood, an awareness which, though
non-rational may comprise simply in itself an in¬
definite amount of difference. There are no distinc¬
tions in the proper sense, and yet there is a many
2<^Bradley. Appearance And Reality. p.M+6.
2(^Perry. Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 175.
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felt in one. We may thus verify even here what
we may call, if we please, an undeveloped iden¬
tity. And, not only this, but such a whole admits
in itself a conflict and struggle of elements,
not of course experienced as struggle but as
discomfort, unrest and uneasiness.
Feeling he argues is complete; it is total. There is
nothing that is of any significance to life which is outside
of feeling. Feeling is experienced as a whole, and it is also
experienced in any number of distinctions. While it is true
that one has not experienced all of the distinctions possible
within feeling, there is never anything outside of the experi¬
ence of feeling in general. To feel is to experience all of
reality.
It is true, admits Bradley, that we talk of being aware
of a particular feeling, which is immediate. However, con¬
cerning this idea he says,
It escapes from all attempts to exhibit it by
analysis as one or more elements in a relational
scheme, or as the scheme itself, or as a relation
or relations, or as the sum or collection of any
of these abstractions. And immediate experience
not only escapes, but it serves as the basis on
which the analysis is made^o
In summary, knowledge, which is the truth about reality,
is reached through the experience of feeling. What we know
are feelings about objects rather than the objects themselves.
This, as Perry pointed out, is not in principle different
from saying that "ideals" are the content of knowledge.
The unity of feeling, for Bradley, continues to be the




absolute whole of reality. Thus he does not demonstrate
a new usage of the term absolute. However, he sees the prob¬
lems involved with the term, and his introduction of the
concept of feeling is clearly an effort to provide a model
for epistemology, which includes an experiential basis for
individual knowledge of absolute reality. Reason, alone, as
we saw Bradley argue, cannot formulate how individual know¬
ledge of absolute reality is possible.
Therefore, Bradley's work shows that in principle ob¬
jective idealism is sympathetic to the Process requirements
for epistemology. Indeed, it is fair to say that Bradley's
obvious tendencies toward Process may, in part, account for
his adoption of idealism. However, Bradley is more aware of
the full implications of the concept that conscious activity
must include both unity and diversity, than are idealists
such as Hegel. Bradley even admits that his concept of ab¬
soluteness cannot be reconciled with this requirement. His
efforts to modify this problem are not finally successful
from the viewpoint of Process thinkers. However, his works
are important in bringing into focus how the traditional




CHAPTER XII: Neo-Vitalism's Epistemology
Certain discoveries in biology, most of which were care¬
fully discussed in the earlier Chapters, led men such as
Bergson and Driesch to conclude that mechanism's concept of
physical laws was quite inadequate to account for life's
activity. Because of this, they found themselves rejecting
physical activity in favour of some alternative metaphysical
source of activity. Thus they held that the activity of life,
especially self-conscious life, was not limited by the struc¬
ture of matter, and that conscious activity required both
unity and diversity, supplied by some vital force.
From the viewpoint of episteraology the problem for vital¬
ism is to establish some principle of limitation, which will
keep conscious activity from being seen as chaotic, and at the
same time allow for diversity. On the issue of limitation
objective idealism mid mechanism were really quite similar.
Both held that activity, whether spiritual or physical, was
ultimately determined. However, as we saw in Bradley's pres¬
entation, the ultimate determination of activity presents a
problem for the significance of diversity.
Therefore, to avoid determinism and establish true diver¬
sity Bergson not only rejected the absoluteness of physical
laws, but also adopted an "intuitional" epistemology, that
had elements contradictory to idealism's understanding of the
term absolute. Likewise Driesch, seeing grounds for why a
principle of limitation is necessary for conscious activity,
1W
but wishing to avoid some of the usual implications of the
concept of absoluteness, had some important insights about
the topic of epistemology.
A. Henri Bergson's Intuitionalism
Bergson holds that intuition, rather than intellect, is
the more important aspect of consciousness. According to
Bergson, rational analysis, which is the product of the in¬
tellect, divides reality into a series of unrelated points.
In short, the world the mathematician deals with
is a world that dies and is reborn at every in¬
stant — the world which Descartes was thinking
of when he speaks of continued creation. But, in
time thus conceived, how could evolution, which
is the very essence of life, ever take place?
Evolution implies a real persistence of the past
in the present, a duration which is, as it were,
a hyphen, a connecting link.g^
Some have objected that Bergson is an example of someone
who has totally mis-understood analysis. The misunderstanding
of analysis is one of the criticisms made by the "New Realism"
against intuitionalism. Spaulding for example says of Berg¬
son's attack on analysis, "Any party making this specific
attack invalidates his own attack and tacitly accepts the
validity of conceptual analysis by talking about evolution,
21^
process, and change."
The following serves us as Bergson's response to an ob¬
servation such as Spaulding's:
PI P
Bergson. Creative Evolution. pp.23-21*.
21^Spaulding, Edward Gleason. "A Defense Of Analysis."
The New Realism. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912).
P.23^r
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On this point we are bound to be either vague
or arbitrary so long as we see in the intellect
a faculty intended for pure speculation. We are
then reduced to taking the general frames of
the understanding for something absolute, irre¬
ducible and inexplicable. The understanding must
have fallen from heaven with its form, as each
of us is born with his face. This form may be
defined, of course, but that is all; there is
no asking why it is what it is rather than any¬
thing else. Thus it will be said that the
function of the intellect is essentially uni¬
fication, that the common object of all its
operations is to introduce a certain unity into
the diversity of phenomena, and so forth. 21^
In view of his position, what Bergson attempts to do is
to show that while a factor of limitation is necessary in
order to avoid the conclusion that conscious activity lacks
order, this factor does not interfere with the reality of
diversity.
For Bergson, the limitation necessary for meaningful
activity does not have to be static. He says, "While the
ancient conception of scientific knowledge ended in making
time a degradation, and change the diminution of a form given
from all eternity — on the contrary, by following the new
conception to the end, we should come to see in time a progres¬
sive growth of the absolute, and in the evolution of things a
215
continual Invention of forms ever new."
"Becoming" is the name of the movement which, for Berg¬
son, allows for the change in the 'absolute,' i.e. the
principle of limitation. Bradley, we may recall, said that
pil+




"the plurality of presentations must qualify the whole;"
and Bergson argues further that the 'absolute' is actually
changed. Bergson's most characteristic illustration of be¬
coming is duration, which in the individual consciousness
217
appears as intuition.
Bergson regularly uses biocentric illustrations of indi¬
vidual consciousnesses functioning as intuition. Some of his
clearest examples center around a discussion of the nature
of the intensity of a feeling. He says, "To say that love,
hatred, desire, increase in violence is to assert that they
are projected outwards, that they radiate to the surface, that
peripheral sensations are substituted for inner states: but
superficial or deep-seated, violent or reflective, the inten¬
sity of these feelings always consists in the multiplicity of
218
simple states which consciousness dimly discerns in them."
In other words, Bergson is suggesting that feeling illu¬
strates that the intuitive or durational aspect of conscious¬
ness is additive. Intensity, for example, is a new factor
created by the addition of sensation to sensation. However,
the addition does not result in a series of isolated feelings
— intensity is a single feeling. "Continuity of change,
preservation of the past in the present, real duration —
the living being seems, then, to share these attributes with
219
consciousness."
^-^Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.226.
^^Bergson. Creative Evolution, p.52.
21®Bergson. Time And Free Will. p.31«
219gergson. Creative Evolution. p.2*f.
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Furthermore, as we discussed before, the addition,
illustrated by intensity, could not have been predetermined.
The particular unity produced could only have come about when
it happened. Otherwise one would be forced to suggest that
the feeling existed before it was felt, and that Bergson sug¬
gests is impossible. This should help us grasp the full
implications of Bergson's statements
Let us seek, in the depths of experience, the
point where we feel ourselves most intimately
within our own life. It is into pure duration
that we then plunge back, a duration in which
the past, always moving on, is swelling un¬
ceasingly with a present that is absolutely
new.220
The point is that the unity of the past serves as a
limitation of present conscious activity, without absolutely
determining that activity. New events are included in the
durational past, which nevertheless retains the inner neces¬
sity of being a present unity of all that is past. Both
because of its inner necessity, and because it serves as a
principle of limitation for conscious activity, the term
absolute may be applied to duration. However, used in this
reference the term absolute does not preclude diversity.
Thus for Bergson the concept of absoluteness is retained
as being necessary to account for meaningful conscious acti¬
vity. However, Bergson insists that activity also depends
upon real diversity. And to prove that real diversity does
in fact take place, Bergson points to life. Indeed, as we
said earlier, Bergson associates activity only with life and
22Qibid. p.210.
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not with the material world. If one considered only the
material world, there would be no grounds for suggesting the
reality of diversity, and idealism and mechanism would be
justified.
Later Process thought will continue to agree with Berg-
son that idealism did not provide for real diversity — and
it therefore could not account for activity. However, as we
will see shortly, not all Process philosophers accepted the
idea that real activity could only be discovered in life; or
to be more specific, that real activity could only be found
in life as Bergson understood it.
B. Hans Driesch's "Windows Into The Absolute"
Hans Driesch served us as our chief example of a pure
vitalist. Of Driesch's epistemology Broad says,
If the hypothesis of an entelechy is to explain
anything, we must suppose that an entelechy is a
very superior mind or the superior part of the
mind which animates the organism. The theory in¬
sinuates itself into our confidence by pretending
that the entelechy is so lowly a mind as scarcely
to deserve the name; but it can explain the facts
only if it supposes the enteleohy to be so exal¬
ted a mind as to deserve the name of a 'god.'22^
It is too soon to comment generally on Broad's opinion.
However, it is true that Driesch sees entelechy, i.e. the
activity of life, as functioning within certain limits. This
is especially true of conscious activity. To what degree
this limiting aspect of activity functions as an all-control¬
ling 'god' can best be discovered by looking at what Driesch
PP1
Broad. The Mind And Its Place In Nature, p.86.
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calls "three windows into the absolute." The three windows
are observations about reality, which to Driesch demonstrate
that some principle of limitation is necessary, in order to
account for the fact that organisms act independently only
within certain bounds.
Morality is the first window. "For morality towards
phenomena or amongst phenomena which are merely 'phenomena'
to my Ego exclusively would be absurd. Morality therefore
implies absoluteness, independence of the Ego — though this
independence is absolutely unintelligible to me in any
detail.»222
In other words Driesch suggests that what we call moral¬
ity cannot have developed among organisms by sheer chance.
Some principle must limit the activity of independent organ¬
isms toward a moral order. However, as a biologist Driesch
cannot observe any such principle. He sees that in one sense
both Darwinism and Lamarckism are correct in understanding
organic forms as forma accidentalis.22^ All of human history,
says Driesch, attests to the dilemma that one should be able
to show the single limiting principle behind evolution, and
yet such a principle does not seem to operate. Driesch points
out, "Human history, on the other hand — that is, the only
historical process concerned with life that is actually known
to have occurred — could not teach us anything of an elemen¬
tal character, since human history, at present at least, did
222Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. II. p.361.
22^Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. I. p.293*
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not appear to us as a true evolution, but only as a sum of
cumulations, and the singularities of this history, taken by
themselves, could only be of practical or emotional interest."
22k
We can next look at Driesch's second window into the
absolute.
The second 'window into the absolute' is constitu¬
ted by the fact, already mentioned on a former
occasion, that there is such a thing as the unity
of subjective experience in general and of memory
in particular; in other words, the fact that not
only self-consciousness itself endures, but also
something is presented to consciousness. This
tends to prove the absolute existence of an un¬
conscious or super-conscious basis of the con¬
scious ego.225
In agreement with idealism, Driesch seems to say that
"categories", in the Kantian sense, are necessary in order to
oo(\
allow consciousness to make order out of chaos. "Categor¬
ies," says Driesch, "are brought to consciousness by only a
limited amount of acquaintance with Givenness, but, as soon
as they are brought to consciousness, they direct conscious¬
ness in all future experiences of Givenness; the systematis-
ation of nature by means of categories thus becomes a 'prob¬
lem'."227
Driesch does not deny that a particular stimulus may be
necessary in order to excite memory. However, the memory
excited appears always to be totally out of proportion to the
22lfibid. pp.323-32*+.
22^Driesch. Philosophy Of Organism. Vol. II. pp.361-362.
226ibid. p.307. 227lbid.
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stimulus given. Thus there must be forms that are unconscious
or super-conscious.
Finally Driesch describes the third window into the
absolute:
Therefore, to put it briefly, the contingency of
the immediately given phenomena, as far as their
non-aprioristic part, that is to say, as far as
•sensations' or 'presentations' come into account,
combined with the immanent coherence of this con¬
tingency in itself, tends to prove absoluteness
with regard to the 'It'. 'It' is now here and now
there, now one thing and now another. This is all
with respect to the Ego, it is true; but not by or
from the Ego.
The second window suggests that there are mental cate¬
gories, and the third window, on the other hand, suggests
that there are universals or forms.
According to Driesch the conscious activity of organisms
appears to be limited by a moral principle, categories and
universals. Yet biological evidence suggests that the evolu¬
tion of organisms occurred by chance. The two observations
are clearly contradictory. The first suggests that entelechy
functions as an absolute principle of organisation for con¬
scious activity. The second suggests that the activity of
life demonstrates true diversity. Broad appears to have
believed that Driesch ultimately puts greater weight on the
first understanding of entelechy. However, it is more accur¬
ate to see Driesch as alternating between the two views,
without reaching a final resolution.
Both Bergson and Driesch agree that conscious activity
2*^ibid. p.363.
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requires a principle of limitation. Driesch's three windows
into the absolute are very helpful in explaining why this is
true. However, in terms of meeting the demand for such a
principle, and at the same time accounting for the diversity
which neo-vitalism accepts as essential to activity, Bergson
alone arrives at a well developed formulation. He concludes
that duration can serve as a principle of limitation, and
nevertheless participate in the universal process of events.
Bergson's use of the concept absolute does not suggest
an abstract physical principle nor a given unity whose con¬
crete content is all of reality. His use of the concept
absolute has both an abstract and a concrete aspect. The
fact that the unity of the past moves into the present is an
abstraction. On the other hand, the past itself is a concrete
unity.
As the abstract principle is a spiritual one, and as the
unity is not of all reality, Bergson uses the term absolute
in a new way, not unlike Whitehead's metaphysical use of the
term discussed in Chapter IX. However, Bergson is here deve¬
loping an epistemology not a metaphysics. Therefore, what
he says applies only to conscious activity. Behind this
epistemology lies, as we have seen, a metaphysical dualism
which is not acceptable to Process. However, the point of
greatest interest to us is that, unless the principle of
limitation participates in the process of events, i.e. is
changed by finite events, diversity is not real.
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CHAPTER XIII: Spiritual Evolutionism's Epistemology
Ward and Hocking agree with Bergson that the principle
of limitation must participate in the process of events, but
they give a somewhat different account of this participation.
Bradley said that we have no idea as to the outcome of the
process by which the absolute whole is enriched by a plur¬
ality of conscious presentations, although he assured us that
the variety of human experience must have some meaning.
Bosanquet makes it clear that the significance of diversity
is an important issue for Critical Idealism. He says, "The
general formula of the Absolute, I repeat, the transmutation
and rearrangement of particular experiences, and also of the
contents of particular finite minds, by inclusion in a com¬
pleter whole of experience, is a matter of everyday verifi¬
cation. ,,229
Ward and Hocking, in keeping with the position of
critical Idealism, introduce the concept of "individualisa-
tion" in order to give meaning to finite activity and thereby
establish diversity. Driesch, as we saw in our last Chapter,
accepted the necessity of diversity, but believed that con¬
scious activity — entelechy — required a principle of
limitation, somehow inconsistent with participation in free
events. Ward suggests that this problem does not arise if
universal conscious activity is understood to be the activity
22^Bosanquet, B. The Principle Of Individuality And
Value. (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1912). p«373»
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of a single organism. Driesch, of course, thought of universal
activity as a mere force.
The activity of any organism, as vitalism demonstrated,
depends in part upon diversity. Therefore, if universal con¬
scious activity is the activity of a single organism, a
diversity within that organism would be required for its
activity. Furthermore, if the universe is a single organism,
whose activity is what we call consciousness, matter is not
excluded from consciousness as Bergson supposed.
A. James Ward's Understanding Of The Individual
Ward was greatly influenced by Bradley and the Hegelian
tradition. He stood with them as a general critic of mater¬
ialism. His particular objection to materialism was the fact
that it allowed no place for the meaningfulness of finite
conscious activity. "A science," he says, "that can only
offer us as its ultimate scheme of the universe the inconceiv¬
able ideal of continuous motion in an unvarying plenum, is
surely as incompetent as arithmetic or geometry to furnish a
2^0
concrete presentment of a real and living world." J
Ward's anti-materialism does not mean a total rejection
of all mechanistic insights about activity. He merely argues
that material laws are not the source of conscious activity.
Bosanquet expresses what Ward would agree are the valid in¬
sights about mechanism:
2^°Ward, James. Naturalism And Agnosticism. (London:
Adam And Charles Black, 1906). Third Edition. Vol. I. p.151.
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With the externality of nature is bound up the
conception of Mechanism. The essence of it is
that the world consists of elements, complete
in themselves, and yet determined in relation
to elements beyond them. If not complete in
themselves the elements would be at the mercy
of the whole, and their claims to be self-
sufficient components would be gone. If not
determined by others, the elements would not
manifest even the appearance of entering into
and constituting an orderly world.
With this suggestion in mind we may look at Ward's
epistemology. The chief point in his epistemology is that
finite conscious activity is meaningful because the universal
consciousness is organic.232 On the highest level this
implies an organic relation between God and nature, spirit
and matter.
The basis of Ward's argument for the organic nature of
universal consciousness is his analysis of human experience.
He says,
We cannot, of course, recall the beginning of our
own experience, nor can we, either by observation
or inference, attain to any conception of an ex¬
perience which should be the simplest possible.
But all that we know, directly or indirectly,
warrants the statement that all experience is
process; not merely change, not merely 'felt
change', but felt interchange. Broadly speaking
every objective change, every change of per¬
ception, entails a subjective change; and every
subjective change, an objective change.233
Ward is speaking of the knowing experience as an organic
unity. That is, the subject and the object form a unity in
which diversity has meaning. The new relation between subject
2^If
and object is a new knowing experience. J Thus by calling
231Bosanquet. Individuality And Value. p.73«
232Ward. Naturalism And Agnosticism. Vol. II. pp.Ill-112.
233ibid. p.130. 23l+ibid. pp.111-112.
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the universal consciousness organic, Ward is suggesting that
it provides a unity in which individual finite consciousnesses
have significance. N.O. Lossky also speaks of consciousness
as organic, and he describes this subject-object interaction
by saying:
Such consciousness of the object is not due to the
causal action of the object upon the subject's
body and upon his mental life, for if it were, the
subject could know only his own mental states
produced in him by the object. Consciousness of
the object is the result of a peculiar non-
causal relation between the conscious subject,
and the object of which he is conscious; given
this relation, the subject contemplates the
object immediately, has it actually 'in view'.^^
Not only does an ultimate organic unity allow meaningful
diversity, but it actually promotes it. Self-conscious indi¬
viduality begins by the finite organism establishing itself
as independent, within the unity of its environment. For
example, history, says Ward, is made up of the unique acts
and deeds of individual centers of experience. "Further, it
is not the intrinsic nature of objects but their value for
the particular individual that immediately determines each
one's attitude towards them; and as the individuals vary, so
do their interests and pursuits."2-^
Lossky describes his own similar position by saying,
If the direction of material processes changes
under the influence of an entity's strivings
and purposes, it means that under the influence
of the mental factor matter acquires a high
degree of plasticity. Even the most general
3-^Lossky, N.O. The World As An Organic Whole, trans..
Natalie A. Duddington"^ COxford: The University Press, 1928)
p. 10.
2-^Ward. The Realm Of Ends, p.18.
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laws of material things such, e.g., as the law
of entropy, may prove to be inapplicable to
animate matter; it may be that life is an
ectropic process.
However, the conscious individuality of the entity (re¬
calling our analysis of consciousness) is in fact the unity
of the subject and the object. Thus with the greater degree
of individuality, there is a corresponding increase of unity.
Individuality is an increase in relations.
The movement towards unity through individualisation is
the limitation which organises finite conscious activity as
a whole, and allows its contribution to the universe. But
the particular unity of a given self-conscious entity is in¬
deed something new. On one side this agrees with idealism,
because the formation of unity is impossible without an abso¬
lute principle of unity. "This unity of the eosmos compels
us to recognise a super-cosmic principle, the Absolute, the
source of a plurality of substances which form a unity more
intimate than the abstract unity of the world, and neverthe¬
less remain free in their activity. 1,238
On the other side, this view is intended to satisfy
pluralism. Ward says,
The standpoint of pluralism in our day is, as we
have seen, fundamentally historical. It is a
philosophy of becoming rather than being. It
holds — as has been said of the philosophy of
Aristotle -- that 'the ultimate metaphysical
explanation of existence must be sought not so
much in a prius out of which things emerge as
23^Lossky. The World As An Organic Whole, p.151*
238ibid. p.73.
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in the goal towards which they move'.239
The goal of Ward's process is an ultimate organic unity
of meaningful individuals, within the single universal organ¬
ism. Furthermore, this formulation goes ahead to speak of
the development toward organic unity as spiritual. An entity
which reaches a high level of individual isation may realise
that relations are, in fact, internal to the cosmic organism.
Such an entity would no longer need to depend on establishing
its individuality through the setting up of independent pur¬
poses and goals, directed outside of that organism.
Lossky clearly describes his interpretation of such an
entity,
Imagine an entity attaining such a degree of
spiritual development that it realises the use-
lessness of the selfish strivings of the king¬
dom of enmity and renounces every kind of
disharmonious manifestation in relation to all
other beings. Such an entity would have no
occasion to engage in the elementary processes
of attraction and repulsion which create an
impenetrable, i.e., a material body. With the
cessation of these processes the material body
of the entity would disappear; it would acquire
a new transfigured body, not material in char¬
acter, and enter the highest realm of being,
the kingdom of the Spirit.2^0
It is the felt interchange between subject and object
which makes conscious activity possible. The individual
subjects are the real diversity, proven by the fact that in
consciousness they are ablfe to establish new relations.
23^Ward. The Realm Of Ends, p.138.
pi+o
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However, the object of these relations always enters into
the unity, and is not known outside of a unity. This unity
between subject and object is in fact the unity of the abso¬
lute consciousness itself. Thus in all conscious experience,
one experiences the Absolute. Now we can more fully under¬
stand what Bosanquet means when he says,
We all of us experience the Absolute, because the
Absolute is in everything. And as it is: in every¬
thing we do or suffer, we may even say that we
experience it more fully than we experience any¬
thing else, especially as one profound charac¬
teristic runs through the whole.2lfl
The above should also be read as a criticism of idealism,
of the Kantian type, for example. Ward, speaking along the
same lines as Bosanquet, objects to the Kantian categories,
saying that they are merely an idea of our reason, not of our
experience. The Absolute, says Ward, was the object of our
experience long before reason developed the category of whole¬
ness — "... man had lived long and thought deeply that this
2b2
idea of the One or the Absolute first dawned."
According to Ward the term absolute refers to an organic
unity and not to a simple unity. Therefore, finite conscious
activity, made up of unity and diversity, reflects the inner
nature of the absolute consciousness. Certainly this formu¬
lation provides a principle of limitation, but it is not so
clear that the principle of limitation becomes consistent
with true diversity, by participating in the process of events.
^^"Bosanquet. The Principle Of Individuality And Value.
p.27.
^^Ward. The Realm Of Ends. pA32.
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It is true that if one considers the evolution of organ¬
isms, the more complex an organism becomes the more specialised
(individualised) become its parts. Furthermore, a highly
complex organism with many very specialised parts is more
unified, in that the existence of the whole organism depends
upon the proper functioning of all its parts.
In these two respects there does appear to be some analogy
between the activity of a single universal organism and finite
concsious activity. Up to a point the number of elements
making up the consciousness of an individual entity seem to
increase that entity's awareness of himself as an individual.
On the other hand, in the process of becoming an individual,
an entity must become Increasingly aware of his relatedness
to other elements in his environment.
However, Ward argues that at some point the finite entity
becomes aware that its individuality is merely an aspect of a
single universal consciousness. With this awareness the entity
no longer has need of separate individuality, but it discovers
its true identity in union with the absolute whole. This out¬
come is completely determined, and Ward merely says that the
stages in its realisation are not determined.
The above must lead us to conclude that finite conscious
activity is merely a temporary state in the universe. If
finite consciousness is a temporary state, it is difficult
to understand how it can be considered a model for absolute
consciousness. Indeed, in Ward's formulation the Absolute or
principle of limitation does not seem to participate in finite
conscious activity at all, because ultimately it is not effec¬
ted by finite consciousness. The ultimate unity will be
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achieved quite apart from the activity of any particular
diversity. Hocking, to whom we turn next, speaks to this
problem.
B. W.E. Hocking's The Element Of Mysticism
The factor to be considered here is that the absolute
unity, of which Ward spoke, is not merely a future state.
Thus far we have discussed the spiritual development as a
process toward wholeness. However, wholeness, according to
Hocking, cannot be understood as a process. What is demanded
for "worship" is something present in the now.
Such a demand is met in the experience of consciousness
itself. Bosanquet, agreeing with Hocking, says,
We have seen that Finite Consciousnesses cannot be
the ultimate directions or constituents of the
universe. They and their subjective teleology are
appearances at a certain stage; they rest on arr¬
angements below them; they indicate in every
feature fuller forms of totality above them.
Finite consciousness whether animal or human,
did not make its body, and does not set the
greater purposes to its world. Something greater
and more inclusive than itself both operates
through it and reveals itself to it. oi^
Thus, it is argued, the concept and meaning of wholeness
is within consciousness. It is a logical consequence of all
experience. In ipmractical terms Hocking therefore describes
how this experience of wholeness is treated in an act of
worship:
^^Hocking. The Meaning Of God In Human Experience, p.31*
o) i) i
Bosanquet. The Principle Of Individuality And Value.
p.221.
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All good things do doubtless belong together;
but each good thing, we recognise, is to be
pursued separately. The difficulty lies in in¬
ferring from the parts to the whole: that is to
say, in seeing that the alternation which is
obviously necessary as between one particular
object and another is also necessary as between
all particular objects and the whole. But just
this, I think, is what worship means: that the
whole must become a separate object of pursuit,
taking its turn as if it also were a part, as
if it were another among the many goods of
practical occupation.2^5
Of course, within Hocking's system, the object, which is
first established as separate from the subject, in the act of
experience, unites with the subject. Just such a unification
with the whole is the essence, according to Hocking, of the
mystical experience.
The contemplation of the whole also takes place within
consciousness.
It is precisely the immediate contemplation of it
which enables us to know that it is different from
all the elements of the world. But if we want to
give a positive designation of the object of our
contemplation, we must have recourse to a proper
name. Hitherto mankind has not yet succeeded in
finding for the Absolute a proper name that would
satisfy everyone.2^5
In the above sense the absolute whole becomes our immediate
object of experience, and thus participates in finite con¬
sciousness.
As we said at the conclusion of our discussion on Ward,
according to his formulation, the achievement of final unity
through process must represent change within the absolute
21+c>
yHocking. The Meaning Of God In Human Experience. p.m-05.
^°Lossky. The World As An Organic Whole, p.66.
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consciousness, If it participates in that process. However,
Ward, having rejected the idea of the absolute consciousness
changing, did not clearly establish how it could therefore
participate in events. Hocking argues that for human con¬
sciousness the whole already exists as a possible object of
contemplation at each instant. Therefore, the absolute whole,
as object, does participate in finite conscious?; activity
without itself changing.
We can best summarise our discussion of Ward and Hocking
by drawing some connections between their positions and Berg-
son's position. Bergson argued that the principle of limi¬
tation participated in the temporal series of events. Its
concrete content was different from instant to instant.
Ward and Hocking cannot accept Bergson's point. For them
time does not change the absolute consciousness. Its concrete
content always remains a unity of all reality. Therefore,
their positions, taken together, suggest that the Absolute
participates only spatially in events, as new organisations
of its contents occur.
Of course, adopting their understanding of spirit or
consciousness, as ultimate reality, puts one in the rather
unusual position of thinking of space being filled with "bits
of consciousness." Yet, unlike Bergson, they do not deny
absolute extension; therefore, we have no alternative but to
think of them as speaking of changing arrangements of con-
ciousness in space. And clearly it could only be in such
changing arrangements that the absolute consciousness par¬
ticipates .
So long as one is willing to accept the meaning of
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participation as limited to either temporal or spatial par¬
ticipation, both Bergson, and Ward and Hocking, taken
together, give a satisfactory explanation of how the diver¬
sity necessary for conscious activity, and the equally
necessary principle of limitation,, can be explained. Later
we will encounter thinkers who will accept neither of the
above qualifications on participation. However, at the
moment we merely re-affirm the insight that conscious activity
depends upon the participation of the principle of limitation
in the process of events.
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CHAPTER XIV: Bernardino Varisco's Neo-Mechanistic Epistemology
As we just noted, the diversity necessary for conscious
activity depends upon the principle of limitation partici¬
pating in the process of events. Thus far, attempts to arrive
at a formulation of consciousness, which allow for the above
concept, have not been completely successful. With the
exception of Bergson's, the epistemologies that we have con¬
sidered have suggested that the activities of individual minds
are limited by their being understood as aspects of a single
consciousness. Thus it would be more accurate to say that
individual consciousnesses participate in the principle of
limitation, rather than that the principle of limitation
participates in the process of events. Such an understanding,
Broad points out, hardly agrees with the real demand for
diversity. He says,
The essential point is that relations within a
mind and between its states seem to be differ¬
ent in kind from the relations between several
minds and within a society, and that no society
is at once all-inclusive and very highly uni¬
fied. I therefore can see no good ground for
believing in a single mental substance of which
all finite minds could be regarded as states or
modifications. 2^
Furthermore these essentially idealistic formulations
reinforce the idea that diversity is not ultimately real, by
suggesting that a "final" unity within the single mental
substance will be achieved. Thus the principle of limitation
^"^Broad. The Mind And Its Place In Nature, p.33•
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is seen as ultimately determining activity. However, as we
have also explained, there is no way to account for activity
in a deterministic system.
Varisco in his epistemology will argue that a single
consciousness may not be the principle of limitation, and
that limitation does not lead to determinism. That is, it
does not eliminate the ultimate spontaneity of individual
consciousness. Thus activity is established as real, because
it is consistent with the nature of the principle of limita¬
tion.
Up to this point it has been necessary to maintain a
distinction between the principle of limitation and the con¬
cept absolute. The principle of limitation organises the
present activity of consciousness, which reaches an absolutely
determined organisation at some future instant. In theory
the principle of limitation and the ultimate unity are the
same. However, if the nature of the former allows for
activity, while the nature of the latter represents the al¬
ready determined end of activity, the two concepts appear
contradictory. Varisco, as we will see, attempts to overcome
any such contradiction.
Varisco begins by establishing his firm belief that the
activity of consciousness depends upon a real diversity. He
says, "Be it observed that I do not say -- a body is a pheno¬
menon of myself in so far as I feel it, and therefore is
nothing but a phenomenon of myself; I say — my assertion
that a body is more than a phenomenon of myself, is an
assertion that extended experience, my own and that of others,
172
pl+ft
is ordered in a certain way."
According to Sarisco reality is composed of multiple
centers of relatedness, called by him centers of spontaneity.
2b9
They are united because they all share the common ele-
250
ment of Being. y A center of spontaneity, which has reached
the level of consciousness, is aware of these two factors,
because these factors are inherently within it.
The true conclusion is this: I have no means and
no right to assert anything which is not implicit
in me. In other words, nothing exists which is
not implicit in me: I am a center of the uni¬
verse. 251
Varisco's chief conclusion from the analysis of conscious¬
ness is that consciousness is a relational process of organi-
252
sation. He feels that consciousness demands relations.
An entity becomes conscious only in relation to other centers
of spontaneity. "Facts are therefore to be ascribed to the
activities of primitive unities, which evolve because of their
spontaneity, and in their evolution interfere with one another
because they form a system, a higher unity. "2^
Assuming that we begin with various centers, containing
within themselves an aspect of unity, the relation of one
center to another can account for the unity and diversity of
conscious activity — absolute "ideals", used to account for
unity by idealism, are unnecessary. Of course some wider
2*+8
Varisco, Bernardino. Know Thyself, trans., Gughilmo
Salvadori. (London: George Allen And Unwin, Limited, 1915)*
p .xi.
2^+9 ?50
ibid, p.xiii. J ibid, pp.xviii-xix.
2^ibid. pp.xxi-xxii. 2^2ibid. pAl. 2^ibid. p.82.
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principle of unity must connect these centers, and this unity
is provided by the fact that each center is capable of recog¬
nising Being; because each center itself has Being.
There is nothing of which I must not say that
it is a Being. Of nothing can I say anything,
unless I say first of it: it is a Being. I
know only determinations of Being.
Again this argument is consistent with the requirements
for conscious activity. Activity depends upon unity and div¬
ersity. Relations between centers also depend upon unity and
diversity. "It is now clear," says Varisco, "that the neces¬
sity of relations completely solves the problem of reconciling
unity and multiplicity — of making us understand how unity
and multiplicity imply each other, so that the one is impos-
sible without the other exists only in the other." "
Finally, relations are the constituents of knowledge, quite
apart from ideals.
Being serves as a principle of limitation for conscious¬
ness, as consciousness is able to distinguish objects which
contain Being from conceivable objects which do not. How¬
ever, Being does not stand outside of conscious activity, but
it enters into the relations between spontaneous centers.
That is, it cannot exist totally apart from its recognition
by minds — it also depends upon relations. Varisco says,
And therefore, the Absolute cannot be reduced to
Being as such. According to the doctrine expoun¬
ded (as to which we are inquiring, whether it
needs or admits of any modifications) the Abso¬
lute is the universe in the unity of its forms,
which implies necessity, but at the same time
^^"ibid. p. 120. 2~^ibid. p.l^*
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in the multiplicity of its matter and of its
secondary forms — a multiplicity, which im¬
plies accidentality. To sum up, the Absolute
is the phenomenal universe — one indeed, but
at the same time manifold also.g^
In other words Being is a principle of limitation req¬
uired for conscious activity, but it is not free from relat-
edness as the term absolute applied to it would suggest. A
particular finite subject, therefore, need only experience
certain relations of Being in order to have consciousness.
The degree of unity necessary for finite consciousness is
the recognition of Being in all of those centers of spon¬
taneity with which the particular subject interferes.
Certainly there are many centers of spontaneity with which a
given subject does not interfere — though should interfer¬
ence take place, Being would be recognised immediately.
As interference produces consciousness, we may state the
above by saying that the unity needed for consciousness
remains available, even though some phenomena are inside and
some outside of what we know as human consciousness. Ideal¬
ism, on the other hand, would insist that while something
may exist outside of a particular consciousness, it has no
existence outside of consciousness in general. To be outside
of consciousness in general would, according to idealism,
destroy unity. That is, idealism would argue that in Varis-
co's system Being as a whole must be recognised by a single
consciousness, if it is to exist.
2^6ibid. p.209.
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To help clarify these last two statements: Idealism,
while it would admit that not everything is known by a given
consciousness, would argue that the individuality of the
object depends upon its being known by some consciousness.
In other words ideas alone allow us to isolate an object —
to individualise it from out of the chaos of sensual im¬
pressions .
Varisco's formulation questions the possibility of a
knowing subject whose concrete knowledge is all present
instants of Being. Varisco says,
No phenomenon is possible outside the universal
unity; if we admit that the universal unity is
the consciousness of the universal Subject, no
phenomenon is possible outside of the conscious¬
ness of the universal Subject. Just for this
reason it must be concluded that a phenomenon
of mine is the same, both as my phenomenon, and
as a phenomenon of the Universal Subject...
Since a consciousness which is only theoreti¬
cal, is nothing but an abstraction, it is clear
that if the universal consciousness were the
unity of the phenomenal universe, it would be
also its cause; that is to say, it would be not
only cognitive, but at the same time creative
too • OC7
He goes on to say, "The difference between a particular sub¬
ject and the universal Subject can be reduced, with reference
to our present problem, to this that the first is clearly
conscious of some phenomena, and the second is clearly con¬
scious of all."2''8
In other words, he maintains that a universal conscious¬
ness would be the determinate cause of all finite conscious
2^7ibid. pp.227-229. 2^8ibid. p.232.
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activity. However, if finite conscious activity is under¬
stood as determined, its existence cannot be explained,
because it depends upon the activity of individual centers
of spontaneity.
Therefore Varisco concludes that the concept of a total
concrete unity of consciousness is the result of logical
abstraction, and not of the concrete unity of idealism's
supreme subject. In particular, the concept of ultimate
concrete unity is a logical consequence of the concept of a
universe. "We may say, in a certain sense, that the universe
is the result of a logical process intrinsic to Being, — of
a process by which Being becomes conscious of itself."
Varisco's explanation for this abstraction is that its
establishment is the result of a logical process innate within
Being Itself. Logically the fact that we are conscious of
the establishment of finite unities, leads us to the possi¬
bility of infinite unity. Moreover, the fact that being
itself is a constant supports the truth of this logical con¬
clusion.
However, Being, while constant, enters into the process
of events because of its nature, i.e. it relates.
Since the course of events has had no beginning,
it cannot tend towards an ultimate end. For the
end would be already attained ab aeterno. It
follows that, although the universe is always
changing in each of its parts however limited,
nevertheless, or rather for this reason, it
remains always as a whole in the same general
conditions.
Varisco also says:
2^9ibid. p.2lfl. 260ibid. p.2*f8.
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We shall never arrive, we do not say at the
cessation of happening, but not even at a
condition of equilibrium in motion, which we
might compare with that at which our solar
system, approximately, and not for ever, has
arrived.
In fact a variation which lasts for ever
cannot tend towards a definite goal, be it
rest or equilibrium in motion. It cannot be
tending towards it, because, if the goal
were realisable, it would have been realised
years ago... That same necessity which makes
the universe be, excludes the possibility of
the universe, as wholly one, tending towards
an end.2^2
In Idealism the term absolute, referring to a concrete
unity, implied a goal — an end. However, this raises the
question of whether conscious activity could be ultimately
consistent with idealism's Absolute, as conscious activity
requires diversity. If activity is not consistent with the
absolute nature of the cosmos, Varisco does not see how acti¬
vity can be explained. Thus the ultimate concrete -unity must
be an abstraction.
Varisco is not a theologian. However, he does present
what he considers an important theological problem developing
out of his work. The problem is whether the metaphysical
aspect of his work should be understood "theistically" or
"pantheistically."
Theists, according to Varisco, are those who feel that
no reason for the existence of God is necessary, and the
pantheists are those who find that we must have a reason in
order to allow God's existence. Varisco says,
The principle of ordered activity, immanent or
intrinsic in the world, is reason — say the
^^Varisco. The Great Problems, p. 2*+5»
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Immanentists or Monists or Pantheists — and
therefore it is nonsense for us to give a
reason for it. As the theists do not admit
that we should ask a reason for the existence
of God — 'Deus ultima ratio rerum' — they
ought to show that what was true of God was
not true of the said principle. This they have
not done.2^2
In other words, Varisco wants to know if there is any
meaning in talking about God, if that title refers to nothing
more than an immanent principle. Hocking's work is some
answer to Varisco. As we may recall, Hocking said that the
so called "immanent principle" is objectified for worship.
God is the title given to the object of worship. Furthermore,
Hocking said that worship is valuable because it produces
higher morality and art. Nevertheless, we will not answer
Varisco in detail here, as later Chapters address this theo¬
logical problem.
In Varisco's epistemology the ultimate unity of the
consciousness of the whole of Being is a logical abstraction.
However, this abstraction is grounded in the concrete reality
that the Being of the universe is a constant. We are able
to formulate this abstraction because of our awareness that
all objects have Being. Therefore, the abstraction is
arrived at through the encounter with a multiplicity of ob¬
jects. Unity need not be imposed upon multiplicity, but is
inherently recognisable within it. If unity is present both
in individual conscious events, and also in the universe as
a whole, then the whole must participate in the process of
events. Furthermore, as concrete unity is reached through
262ibid. p.357.
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multiplicity, both unity and diversity must be factors of
Being.
Therefore, according to Varisco, when one speaks of
"unity" the term has both a concrete and an abstract refer¬
ence. For consciousness concrete unity means the unity of
particular realised relations of Being, and the abstract
unity is the ideal of All relations of Being included in a
single consciousness.
Varisco's epistemology, as summarised above, is quite
different from idealism. To begin with idealistic episte-
mologies would not say that ultimate unity is an abstraction.
Indeed, for idealism ultimate unity is the concrete unity of
all reality. Through the activity of the individual conscious
mind the concept of ideal or abstract unity may be formulated,
but the activity involved in making this formulation is not
the same as the object of formulation. The abstract unity
involved in conscious activity, and the ultimate concrete
unity of consciousnesses are not the same. The former is the
principle of limitation used in epistemology to account for
the unity of finite consciousness; the latter is the "Abso¬
lute" used in some metaphysics to account for ultimate unity.
Varisco's point is that to suggest that there is a
metaphysically ultimate concrete unity — an Absolute — is
to deny the very possibility of finite conscious activity.
Therefore, one must say that the activity of consciousness
suggests that activity is characteristic of the universe as
a whole. One may apply the term absolute to universal act¬
ivity in the sense that universal activity includes all
reality. However, in this case the term absolute would have
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an abstract meaning as well as a concrete meaning. Abstractly
the term absolute would refer to the fact that Being, while
dynamic, remains a constant. The concrete reference of the
term absolute could only be the particular configurations of
the whole of Being at a given instant.
Therefore, Varisco's formulation would never use the
term absolute to refer only to a concrete unity. Just as
the concept of principle of limitation in epistemology must
allow for an abstract ideal of unity, so the use of the term
absolute in metaphysics must have an abstract reference —
and not only a concrete reference, as idealism would suggest.
On the other hand, as we have seen, Varisco does not deny that
the unity of consciousness has a concrete aspect, nor does he
deny a concrete reference for the term absolute. In other
words Varisco does not make the distinction, common to ideal¬
isms, between the principle of limitation and the "Absolute."
That is, Varisco's use of the term absolute would not make
it contradictory for a position that accepted true diversity.
Varisco's formulation, as we have seen, eliminates the
need for the above distinction between principle of limita¬
tion and the "Absolute." Activity is characteristic both of
individual consciousnesses and also of the universe as a
whole. Universal activity may be called "absolute" as it is
a constant which includes all of reality. However, one could
just as well speak of concrete absoluteness as the principle
of limitation. Meaning by that, that the universal fact of
Being, which permits the organisation or unity of conscious¬
ness, is itself dynamic. Bergson's epistemology, we may
recall, adopted such an understanding of the concept of limi¬
tation. Varisco, unlike Bergson, finds no reason to couple
his epistemology with a metaphysical dualism.
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CHAPTER XV: finergent Evolutionism's Epistemology
Varisco's explanation of how the principle of limitation
participates in the process of events eliminated the need for
making a distinction between the activity of individual con¬
sciousnesses, and the activity of the universe as a whole.
Knowing — one of the activities of consciousness —, he said,
was composed of relations of interference between unified
centers of spontaneity, implying that knowledge does not de¬
pend upon changeless ideals or forms. Likewise, the activity
of the universe as a whole is composed of relations between
Being as a constant, and the changing distributions of Being
in the centers. In other words, individual conscious activity
is not activity within the universal consciousness, but rather
is the activity of the universe.
The above means that when Varisco discusses the activity
of consciousness in his epistemology, he is also referring to
his conception of the universal activity. What this formu¬
lation accomplishes is the fulfilling of both requirements
for a Process epistemology. First, Being serves as a prin¬
ciple of limitation for the evaluation of mental data by
allowing a mind to recognise objects that have Being. Second,
Being provides unity by its presence in all relations, and
diversity by itself participating in those relations.
Alexander and Morgan, as we will see, agree with much
of what Varisco attempts in his formulations. That is, they
also see no reason for making a distinction between the act¬
ivity of consciousness and the organisation of the universe
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as a whole. Nevertheless, Varisco's suggestion that knowing
means relations of interference within Being and between cen¬
ters of Being is not the only possible way to analyse concsious
activity. What he meant by the term Being, for example, was
not completely clear. Alexander with equal success argued
that consciousness can be understood as relations of and with¬
in Space-Time. And Morgan, as we will see, offers still
another alternative.
A. S. Alexander's Concept Of Mind
Alexander from the beginning makes it clear that episte-
inology and metaphysics are not to be separated. "It follows,"
he says, "that for the empirical method the problem of know¬
ledge, the subject-matter of epistemology, is nothing but a
chapter, though an important one, in the wider science of
metaphysics, and not its indispensible foundation."2^
As we saw in Chapter 711, Alexander selected Space-Time,
which divides itself into point-instants of space-times, as
the common stuff of reality. According to Alexander, what in
epistemology would be called categories or ideals are not
applied to space-times, but develop out of them.
Now the clue to the understanding of our thesis
is that the categories are not applicable as it
were ab extra to spaces and times, but that they
are applicable to things (including minds) be¬
cause they flow from the nature of the space-
times which they occupy or which they are. App¬
licability to space-times has no meaning for
the categories, which are the features or
determinations of the space-times themselves.
2<^Alexander. sPaCe Time And Deity. Vol. I. p.7«
26Ifibid. p. 190.
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In other words, the categories used by the mind as a
principle of limitation for the organisation of conscious
activity do not exist outside of that activity, but arise
from within the activity itself. Another way of stating this
is to say that the principle of limitation participates in
the process of events. Conscious mental activity, therefore,
is an aspect of some universal activity, the organisation of
which is the principle of limitation. Alexander says, "Our
hypothesis is merely that alike in the matrix of finite things
and in all finite things there is something of which, on the
highest level we know of finite existents, mind is the coun-
265
terpart or correspondent."
Furthermore, Alexander understands that the participation
of the principle of limitation in the process of events acc¬
ounts for both unity and diversity.
It is because the mind selects (actively or pas¬
sively) from the total thing parts of it, which
it contains or of which it is the foundation,
that the objects of mind are thought to owe their
esse to their percipi. All that they owe to the
mind is their selection, that is their percipi.
But their esse, their existence and their quali¬
ties, they have as being finite existences in
Space-Time, and thus non-mental.255
The factor which unifies all entities, according to Alex¬
ander, is that they are all spatio-temporal configurations of
Space-Time. Yet as Space-Time is itself divided into space-
times, each entity has its own esse. In other words, diversity
is characteristic of the principle of limitation itself, i.e.
2f^Alexander. sPace Time And Deity. Vol. II. p.¥+.
266ibid. pp.9^-95.
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the universal organisation of the activity of Space-Time.
Therefore, the activity of consciousness, which requires both
unity and diversity, is the same as the nature of the uni¬
verse as a whole.
Having established that Alexander's system understands
that the requirements for conscious activity are a principle
of limitation, and the principle's participation in the pro¬
cess of events, which allows for unity and diversity, we must
now look at how he understands the nature of knowing. For
Varisco, we may recall, knowing was the recognition of Being
through the interferences between spontaneous centers. Alex¬
ander will argue that knowledge results from what he calls a
"selection" of objects by a mind.
As we may recall from Chapter VII, a mind for Alexander
is an extremely complex organisation of Space-Time having the
quality of consciousness. A living cell or an atom would be
illustrations of less complex configurations. Therefore,
Alexander is suggesting that the process of knowing requires
that at least the subject be a mind. He would not, for ex¬
ample, say that one atom "knows" another atom. In other words,
the activity to which we give the name "consciousness" does
not occur until a certain level of complexity has emerged
within the universal process.
Therefore, Alexander says,
Strictly speaking, it is this totality of knower
and known, of subject and object, which is true
or good or beautiful. The tertiary qualities are
not objective like the secondary ones, nor pecu¬
liar to mind and thus subjective like conscious¬
ness, nor are they like the primary qualities
common to both subjects and objects. They are
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subj ec t -obj ect determinations.
That is to say, the qualities of truth, goodness and
beauty can be experienced only in the cognitive act of unity
between subject and object. These qualities Alexander also
calls values, and they are mental.
But their dependence on the mind does not de¬
prive them of reality. On the contrary, they
are a new character of reality, not in the
proper sense qualities at all, but values,
which arise through the combination of mind
with its object. What experience of every kind
is often thought to be, namely, something in
which the mind and its objects can be distin¬
guished but cannot be separated, so that there
can be no space nor colour without an experi¬
encing mind, is true of values but nowhere
before.
Because of the very nature of reality, the complexity
of relations in Space-Time, on the level of human conscious¬
ness, have the special significance of creating values
through the combination of mind with its objects. Further¬
more, the development of values is a social action of the
unity among knowing subjects. For example, "Many minds are
needed then for truth, not because the many facets of reality
are visible only to a multiplicity of minds, but because in
the intercourse of minds the truth is created as truth, at
the guidance of reality, by mutual confirmation or exclusion
of beliefs."269
In other words, morality is produced by the interaction
between man as a society and his environment. "Accordingly
26^lbid. p.238. 266ibid. p.2¥+. 269ibid. p.26l.
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it is indifferent to say that morality is the adaptation of
human action to the environment under social conditions, or
that it is the system of actions approved by man under the
270
conditions set by the environment." Either way it is the
very nature of all reality to form a complex unity that leads
to morality.
Finally Alexander says,
The realities which the collective wills of
persons make into morality or moral insti¬
tutions are human nature under the external
conditions of its existence. There is hence
progress in morals, more perfect institutions
growing up as fresh opportunities arise for
adjustment of man first of all to his natural
surroundings and next to his fellow men.gr,^
Therefore, for Alexander knowledge is the recognition
of value through the interaction of a conscious subject with
its object. In a social setting value is called morality.
However, we must remember that while the recognition: of value
requires a conscious mind, values are recognised — just as
Varisco's Being is recognised -- and not "created" by the
mind. Alexander says,
For values imply in their simplest expression
something which does not depend on the living or
conscious character of the subject of value but
applies to any finite complex of space-time.
Things are relatively independent volumes of
space-time with a certain internal and external
configuration; into which the whole Space-Time
breaks up. Adaptation is the return of the com¬
plexes out of separation from the whole into
unity with it. Only point-instants which have
no complexity of structure are from the first
and always adapted to their surroundings.272
27°ibid. p.27b. 271ibid. p.282. 272ibid. p.311.
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Here, as In Varisco, the unity of the knowing process
is understood as having an abstract as well as a concrete
aspect. The concrete aspect is the particular value selected
by individual minds. On the other hand, the abstract aspect is
a logical concept of returning into unity, which Alexander
has just called "adaptation." The point of adaptation is
that if knowldege of certain concrete values is possible for
finite minds, and if the social unity of values leads to a
moral society, then it is abstractly possible to conceive a
single mind that knows all values and is moral to the highest
possible degree.
God is the entity whose perspective includes knowledge
27^
of all finite values, J and who is thus moral to the highest
possible degree. This abstract concept of God is another way
of describing the principle of limitation necessary for con¬
sciousness, because it suggests the ultimate organisation of
values. However, as the principle of limitation participates
in the process of events, God is effected by finite values.
Alexander illustrates this point in a remark about the First
World War:
The struggle for mastery between two ideals of
civilisation has been carried on before our eyes
at the cost of endless sacrifice of precious lives
which might we must think have made the world
better and accelerated knowledge. For those who
have lived in the midst of this disaster, however
much illumined on either side by the most exalted
and conflicting hopes, how is it possible to rest
content with the idea of a God who does not share
these vicissitudes of his creatures but suffers
them to exist? The case is changed if deity it¬
self is the outcome of the world's movement and
273ibid. p.388.
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in particular, to the extent of their value,
of the efforts of human beings. It is not God
then who allows the struggle, but the struggle
which is to determine, it may not be at once
but in the end, what deity is to bej which
ideal if either is on the side of the divine.
Finally we may add that error is not possible from the
perspective of Deity, because God always represents the best
possible morality. Alexander says,
Error and ugliness and wickedness are finite
relatives and remain as such,unvalues, in the
body of God. But perishing in that form they
are used up in a changed form for the purposes
of deity*2^^
We have now presented two systems — Varisco's and Alexan¬
der's — which appear to meet the requirements for a Process
epistemology. For our purposes, one great difficulty in
clarifying these systems has been the establishment of the
precise connection between metaphysical and epistemological
formulations. The solution that we have suggested centers
around their use of the term absolute.
The idealisms that we discussed in earlier Chapters
appeared to give the term absolute one reference in metaphy¬
sics and quite another in epistemology. In metaphysics the
term absolute referred to the ultimate concrete unity of all
reality. In epistemology, on the other hand, the term abso¬
lute referred to the principle of limitation which provided
organisation for conscious activity. In the former absolute¬
ness precluded diversity, while in the latter absoluteness
assumed diversity.
27Vbid. p.-ifQO. 275ibid- p.^19.
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In Varisco's and Alexander's systems the above distinction
is not used. They assume that the term absolute has only a
single reference for both metaphysics and epistemology. The
term absolute refers to an ultimate principle having two as¬
pects. The first aspect is a logically abstract aspect of
total unity. This aspect is abstract in the sense that a
final unity, which precludes diversity, is not realised.
However, the fact that ultimate concrete unity is an abstrac¬
tion does not make it meaningless. As we have seen, in spite
of its abstract nature absolute unity serves both metaphysics
and epistemology as a principle of limitation. Without it
activity would appear chaotic. In principle idealism's con¬
cept of limitation is the same as the concept of an abstract
understanding of an absolute unity. However, idealism also
realised that, unless the absolute concretely contains all
reality, change in the "Absolute" became possible, as it would
be subject to participation in the process of events. This
last point proves to be true because if the total unity is
abstract it does not preclude the concrete existence of lesser
unities.
Indeed the second aspect of the understanding of the term
absolute, as it is used by Varisco and Alexander, is that it
must be understood along with a concept of its division into
concrete unities, i.e. a multiplicity of entities. True div¬
ersity must mean that entities have an aspect of unity in
themselves. Otherwise they would be determined by some abso¬
lute principle of unity. However, as the unity of each entity
has its source out of the ultimate principle, one can equally
well think of the concrete aspect of unity as being the total
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concrete content of all entitles. Therefore, as the concrete
content of entities change, the unity participates in this
process. As yet we have discussed no thinker who denies that
conscious activity produces changes in entities.
The above paragraphs serve as a summary of the key points
of Varisco's and Alexander's thinking. However, they also
provide an introduction to Morgan, who reformulates and help¬
fully clarifies several of them.
B. C. Lloyd Morgan's Concept Of Reference
Morgan, as we saw in Chapter VII, singled out Alexander
as a primary target for attack. Both men were Emergent Evolu¬
tionists, and thus shared much in common, but some of Alexan¬
der's concepts seemed to Morgan to disagree with the data
coming from biology.
Morgan believes that biologically understood the activity
of the mind must be grounded in phenomena. He says, "I seek
in vain for evidence that spatio-temporal relatedness does
exist apart from physical events."27^
In other words, Morgan argues that all forms of knowing
are states within the mind's structure. "My doctrine is,"
he says, "that all that is minded is within us, and founded
primarily on the correlated outcome of receptor-patterns;
that there are physical things existent in their own right
outside us in a non-mental world; and that the properties
which render them objective in mind are proficiently referred
to these things."277
276
Morgan. Bknergent Evolution, p.23.
277ibid. p.50.
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"Proficient reference" is the special relatedness estab¬
lished between objects and the human subject, by way of the
physical structures composing the subject.2'7® In other words,
as an illustration of the necessity of structure, many of the
human mental activities depend upon the special form of the
human visual development.
What Morgan wants to know, for example, is how can one
say that the elements of consciousness are in all reality,
when consciousness, as we know it, seems intimately related
to the "chance" development of the human eye. Driesch, another
biologist, we may recall, pointed out that while conscious
activity demanded some principle of limitation which ordered
activity, organisms themselves appeared to have evolved
through a process of chance. Morgan reinforces these points
by suggesting that what we call consciousness could not exist
apart from the particular structures of conscious organisms.
Therefore, consciousness is the way certain organisms relate
to their environment. Consciousness is in no sense a charac¬
teristic of the environment itself apart from the structure of
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knowing minds.
Alexander, on the other hand, suggested that conscious¬
ness was a characteristic of a particular configuration of
Space-Time. And Morgan interprets Alexander as suggesting
that consciousness can be -understood apart from the physical
structure of the organisms. This position Morgan cannot
accept. Hd says,
278ibid. pp.113-115. 279ibid. pp. 183-18*+.
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If the idealist assert that colour lives only at
the top, in the mind, irrespective of physical
correlates in the organism; or if the realist
assert that it lives only at the bottom, in the
thing, irrespective of psychical correlates in
the organism; I respectfully submit that each
goes beyond the evidence. According to the evi¬
dence (if I do not misread it) colour lies in
the whole situation: in other words, it has
being in virtue of extrinsic relatedness of
person (body-mind) and thing... And if either
person or thing, which thus function as ex¬
trinsic terms, be absent there is no colour
(as Mr. Alexander admits there is no beauty)
in being.2g0
On the other hand Morgan admits that conscious activity
must have some principle of organisation. However, conscious
ness is peculiar to the mind's structure in the sense that
vision is peculiar to the eye. The structure of the eye
allows for vision, and the structure of the mind allows for
consciousness. Nevertheless, similar to Driesch, Morgan bel¬
ieves that the existence of "values" illustrates the need to
posit some plan of organisation for consciousness.
Morgan holds that awareness of this plan of conscious-
23l
ness is an instinctive aspect of heredity. He says,
We have reached the fully reflective epoch in
evolutionary advance when rational schemata
for the interpretation of events plays a lead¬
ing part in human affairs.2g2
Morgan goes on to say,
Objective values.as such, may be regarded as the
items of stuff which in our present context con-
280ibid. p.229.
28"*"Morgan, C. Lloyd. Life. Mind And Spirit. (London:
Williams And Norgate, Ltd., 1926). p.l1^.
282ibid. p.250.
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stitute a schema, or that which is schematised
in reflective thought. The substantial going
together in this distinctive manner of these
items of value within the schema is that which
gives it worth. 283
By the term "objective" Morgan is suggesting that values are
not limited to individual minds.
Values for Morgan are a special sort of relatedness pos¬
sible only for minds on the level of emergence called "ref¬
lective reference." These values are not predetermined
totally, but are conditioned by such factors as physical and
social environment, and the needs, structure and health of
the body.
In Morgan's analysis, as was true in Driesch's, we
appear to reach a point at which the organisation of conscious
activity, and the biological evidence for the chance nature
of evolution are contradictory. The fact that values form an
objective schema indicates that conscious activity is capable
of organisation. Nevertheless, evolutionary activity appears
to be random in its total effects. Therefore, Morgan next
gives his account for why random activity is found to be
organised within certain emergent levels — especially within
the conscious level. Morgan's resolution of this dilemma
stems from his introduction of a doctrine of God. According
to Morgan, God cannot be proven to exist, but God's existence
28*f
does make Morgan's system comprehensive.
Concerning a belief in God Morgan says,
283ibid. p.262. 28i+ibid. p.299.
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This implies the emergence of the religious
attitude, that is, a mental attitude, toward
the acknowledged reality of Divine Purpose. It
is this mental attitude that is in some persons
emergent... And in this sense the rational order
of the cosmos, no less than Divine Purpose, is
dependent on mind. But under acknowledgment we
believe, though we are unable to prove to the
satisfaction of those who do not believe, (l)
that the rational order has being independently
of the reflective mind that is evolved within
it, and (2) that Divine Purpose has being inde¬
pendently of the spiritual attitude through
which it is revealed in this or that indivi¬
dualised person.
In the above quotation Morgan begins by reinforcing his
point that no organisation of activity into what we call con¬
sciousness exists apart from the physical structure of minds.
However, he also feels that there is sufficient evidence to
support a "belief" that rational order has at least an aspect,
which is independent of the physical structure of minds. In
particular the fact that conscious minds share values indi¬
cates some order beyond that of individual minds. Thus he
says,
Now values are possessed by mind. Only as possessed
by mind have these specific forms of reality, exis¬
tence or substance. But possession by mind implies
for Mr. Alexander, 'combination of mind with its
object' or, in my phraseology, corpresence of en¬
joyment with reflective reference, ifinjoyment is
purely individual; and yet even this enjoyment in
presence of value is, as Mr. Alexander insists,
more than individual, it is communal. Reference
is no less individual; and yet it, too, is more
than individual; it is social and hence, as I
think, so far personal.
In order to understand the above we must look very close¬
ly at the distinction between individual and personal.
25^ibid, pp.303-30H-. 286 ibid, p.310.
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Individuality is admitted to be the characteristics of an
entity in itself. Personality is the character of an entity
achieved through its relation to other entities. Morgan says,
Individuality and personality, as limiting
concepts, are poles asunder. At one pole is
absolute uniqueness; at the other pole the
universal feature that characterises the
type. Each of us is bi-polar, swinging some¬
where between these extremes. To paraphrase
what Mr. Bertrand Russell has said of litera¬
ture. A person embodies what is general in
particular circumstances. The universal sig¬
nificance of his personality shines through
his unique individuality
In other words, Morgan suggests that conscious entities
have two aspects. On the one hand they are individual —
absolutely unique. This concept would clearly be consistent
with evolution by chance events, in which the probability of
even two organisms being the same is infinitely small. On
the other hand, conscious entities are personal — relative.
That is, entities on any level of emergence share universal
characteristics. These universal characteristics suggest
some cosmic plan — or, for those persons who have a religious
attitude, a "Divine Purpose."
Like individual entities the cosmic plan or Divine Pur¬
pose also has two aspects, On the one hand, as Morgan said,
"the Divine Purpose has being independently of the spiritual
attitude through which it is revealed in this or that indivi¬
dual person." On the other hand it is relative by its being
"dependent on Mind". Therefore, it, like mind, is bi-polar.




Of course, Morgan said that his conclusions in favour
of a divine purpose were not subject to rigorous proof.
Nevertheless, if they are "believed" the metaphysical impli¬
cations of Morgan's system would have marked similarities
with the metaphysical implications of Varisco's and Alexan-
pQO
der's systems.
We may here mention a few of these possible similarities.
First, the absolute pole on the level of mind and on the div¬
ine level allows relatedness. However, the absolute pole does
serve as a principle of limitation. On the human level it
permits the establishment of values, and on the divine level
universals. Values, we may recall, are the interpretation of
events relative to the individuality of the conscious entity's
structure. Therefore, values provide a standard by which
entities can evaluate events. On the level of God, we may
assume that universals are the divine evaluation of events.
Morgan, like Alexander, would certainly have to assume that
God enjoyed a wider perspective than any human consciousness.
Second, not only is the absolute pole a principle of lim¬
itation, but for Morgan it must also participate in the
process of events. According to Morgan the individuality of
the entity depends upon its relations with other entities.
Furthermore, we are told that the divine purpose depends upon
finite minds. Relations on the level of minds are possible
through reflective reference to universal characteristics.
Op P
Morgan insists that he does not wish to do metaphy¬
sics. cf., e.g. Instinct .And Experience * (London: Methnen &
Co.,ltd., 1913)- p.250.
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However, universal characteristics also depend for their emer¬
gence upon finite minds. In other words, relations between
unity and diversity, i.e. activity, which Morgan calls "univer
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sal from base to apex of the whole emergent pyramid,"
are the same on the level of mind and on the universal level.
From the viewpoint of metaphysics he might thus conclude with
Alexander that individual conscious minds represent a division
of a universal principle of consciousness. Moreover, this
division is a true diversity,as the universal consciousness
would then participate in the process of events.
Once again in Morgan's formulations we have observed the
essential requirements for a Process epistemology. However,
Morgan's epistemology demonstrates some differences from that
of Alexander's. The most important difference is Morgan's
grounding of consciousness in physical events. This was done,
as we saw, in order to incorporate data coming out of the
study of evolution.
Morgan's point has been that the particular nature of
consciousness could not have existed until the chance evolu¬
tion of the physical structure of the conscious organism. If
the human organism had not evolved, then consciousness would
not have existed. Morgan believes that Alexander's thinking
suggests that the nature of the universe itself predetermined
the necessary development of an organism like the human mind.
Of course Alexander did not suggest that particular minds
were predetermined, but it is true that he implies that some¬
thing like the human mind had to evolve.
289
Morgan. Emergent Evolution, p.209.
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In Chapter VII we saw that Alexander said that the levels
of emergence were determined, even though the particular enti¬
ties on each level were not. Morgan, on the other hand, rejec¬
ted even the determination of the levels. Therefore, from a
metaphysical viewpoint, Morgan's use of biological data est¬
ablishes the total participation of the principle of limita¬
tion in the process of events. According to what Morgan says
we must assume that the principle of limitation did not even
exist until physical events began to occur. At the outset
activity was totally free; it was "pure" potential to use
Bergson's words. The fact that events occurred as they did
was sheer chance, but once they began to occur the principle
of limitation developed.
Varisco and Alexander would agree that the principle of
limitation always existed abstractly, but that its concrete
content developed. Morgan, on the other hand, has suggested
that the principle of limitation could not have existed before
physical events. The absolute and relative poles must always
be found together.
According to Morgan the biological perspective demands
the conclusion that the fact that there is conscious activity
is sheer chance. As we saw in Chapter VII, Morgan's intro¬
duction of God is used as an argument in favour of the meta¬
physical view that some ultimate principle underlies the fact
that the universe is active rather than entropic. Morgan does
not say that sheer chance can finally explain why there is
activity rather than no activity. However, his point is that
every concrete form of activity — including conscious activ¬
ity — must be assumed to exist because of sheer chance; if
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one takes the biological evidence seriously. The above point
may be restated by saying: 'Anything which now is, might
equally well not have been.' The fact of consciousness is
the result of chance evolution.
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CHAPTER XVI: Teilhard de Chardin's Epistemology
The more man becomes man, the less will he be
prepared to move except towards that which is
interminably and indestructibly new. Some
'absolute1 is implied in the very play of his
operative activity.2^q
Grounded as he is in the sciences related to biology,
Teilhard, like Driesch and Morgan, sees that while some prin¬
ciple of limitation is needed in order to explain the organi¬
sation of activity, the process of evolution confronts the
scientist with what appear to be random events. This dilemma
applies to the activity of consciousness, of which Teilhard
says; "The consciousness of each of us is evolution looking
at itself and reflecting upon itself."'^
Teilhard says that he accepted the random nature of
evolutionary activity for a long time, before becoming aware
of any concept of overall organisation of evolutionary activ¬
ity. He tells us that his first thought of such organisation
came as a revelation:
As I listened to my friend my heart began to
burn within me and my mind awoke to a new and
higher vision of things. I began to realize
vaguely that the multiplicity of evolutions
into which the world-process seems to us to be
split up is in fact fundamentally the working
out of one single great mystery; and this
first glimpse of light caused me, I know not
why, to tremble in the depths of my soul.^2
^^Teilhard. The Phenomenon Of Man. p.255-
291ibid. p.2M+.
292Ieilhard de Chardin. Hymn Of The Universe. (London:
Collins, 1965)»
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This insight about activity certainly applies to con¬
scious activity, but not only to conscious activity, as many
idealists would maintain. "A mankind which proclaims that it
is alone, or in a special position, in the universe reminds
us of the philosopher who claims to reduce the whole of the
real to his own consciousness, so exclusively as to deny true
2Q7
existence to other men." J
The connection between Teilhard's new insight concerning
activity in general, and its application to conscious activity
is suggested in the following:
The most extraordinary thing about the phenomenon
of knowledge is not that each one of us can under¬
stand the world. The really amazing thing is that
the countless points of view represented by our
individual thoughts should have a point of coin¬
cidence; that, intellectually, we should all app¬
reciate one and the same pattern in the universe;
that we should understand one another. The reason
for the existence of this mutual understanding,
of this intellectual concurrence in our collective
penetration of the real, can be found only in the
existence of a principle which controls and unifies
individual perceptions. 2<^
In other words, conscious activity reinforces the demand
for some principle of organisation or limitation. Up to this
point in the argument Morgan and Teilhard would be in close
agreement. However, Morgan seemed to suggest that the prin¬
ciple of limitation, i.e. the dynamic organisation of the
universe, had no existence prior to physical events. The prob¬
lem which Morgan's concept presents is how to account for the
fact that activity began at all, if activity in part depends
Teilhard de Chardin. Christianity And Evolution.
trans., Ren6 Hague. (London: Collins, 1971)• pA3 •
^•^ibid. p.61.
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upon a principle of limitation, and yet there may have been
a time when that principle did not exist. Of course, Morgan
admits that activity suggests that some principle did always
exist, even if this point is beyond conclusive proof.
Teilhard, however, believes that the fact of activity is
itself conclusive proof for a primordial principle of limi¬
tation. He says,
To wake and nourish human energy, there must
have been at the very outset an inner attrac¬
tion towards a desired object. Things cannot
have happened otherwise... Now this funda¬
mental preference for being, without which the
world, as it attained thought, would logically
have returned to dust, necessarily implies
faith in some final completion of everything
around us. If being is by nature holy there is
no salvation except of everything that exists.
We act therefore, in the final analysis, in
obedience to a world, to incorporate ourselves
in ai world, to complete ourselves with the
world. A total and totalizing end: nothing
less could set the springs of our liberty in
motion and bend them to it.29^
In the above Teilhard expresses his total commitment
to the idea of a necessary principle of limitation which made
the beginning of organised activity possible. This concept
leads him to the further conclusion of the necessity of having
"faith in some final completion of everything around us."
Neither Driesch nor Morgan suggested such an idea. Therefore,
we would do well to investigate how it arose for Teilhard.
Teilhard believed that the biological evidence for evo¬
lution not only suggested a necessary principle of limitation,
but it also demonstrated the nature of that principle. He
295-jeilhard. Human Energy, p.139.
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says, "It is one in which the consistence of the elements and
their stability of balance lie in the direction not of matter
but of spirit; in such a universe, we must remember, that the
fundamental property of the cosmic mass is to concentrate upon
itself, within an ever-growing consciousness, as a result of
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attraction or synthesis."
Teilhard believed that each step in evolution, no matter
how random it may appear, had a factor in common with every
other step. Evolution as a whole represents a process of the
concentration of activity around centers of increasing syn¬
thesis. Consciousness, for example, illustrates an extreme
concentration of activity around a given point of reference.
This reference is described by Teilhard as the "morals" of
a particular conscious organism. We will say more about the
concept of morals in a moment.
The ultimate centralisation of universal activity, accor¬
ding to Teilhard, occurs at point "Omega". This belief In
the outcome of evolution does not, according to Teilhard,
contradict the random nature of evolutionary activity.
"Nevertheless, for all the control exercised by the polarizing
action of Omega, convergence is effected only by means of
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divergencies that allow life to try everything."
Therefore, Teilhard1s principle of limitation appears to
function at the beginning, during and at the end of the pro¬
cess of events. However, the principle does not prevent
diversity. The fact of diversity continues to be accepted
25%eilhard. Christianity And Evolution. p.87.
^^feilhard. Activation Of Energy, p.12*f.
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even when Teilhard associates the principle of limitation
with the concept of God.
The first condition is that He shall combine
in his singularity the evolutionary extension
of all the fibers of the world in movement: a
God of cosmic synthesis in whom we can be con¬
scious of advancing and joining together by
spiritual transformation of all the powers of
matter.
And the second condition is that this same
God shall act in the course of this synthesis
as a first nucleus of independent consciousness:
a supremely personal God, from whom we are the
more distinguishable the more we lose ourselves
in Him.2^3
Up to this point men who have met the requirements of
a Process epistemology have done so by suggesting that the
principle of limitation can allow diversity only if it par¬
ticipates in the process of events. Whether or not Teilhard
accepted such participation of the principle is not yet clear.
However, we will here point out a potential problem that the
Teilhardian system has for the establishment of such partici¬
pation by the principle.
If the goal of the process of events is determined by
the principle of limitation before the process even begins,
then it would seem impossible for any events to have sig¬
nificant effects upon the process. This, we may recall, was
the gist of the problem which Bradley had with the Hegelian
system. Clearly Teilhard sees the need for diversity. He
says,
Organisation not only presupposes but also
produces the complexity upon which its unity
flowers. This is a fact of universal experi¬
ence. 299
^^Teilhard. Human Ehergv. p.109.
2^Teilhard. Activation Of Energy, p.116.
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However, the problem for Teilhard is the establishment of the
nature of this diversity.
We here begin by looking at the nature of diversity in
conscious activity. According to Teilhard conscious minds
gain their individuality from a particular kind of social
relatedness. Teilhard calls this social relatedness "res¬
ponsibility" and says,
From this point of view, and as a rough initial
description, we may say that the evolution of
responsibility is simply one particular aspect
of cosmogenesis. Or to put it more exactly, it
is cosmogenesis itself observed and measured
not (as we customarily do) by the degree of
organic complexity or psychic change, but by
the degree of constantly increasing inter-
influence within a multitude which is progres¬
sively concentrated upon itself in a convergent
medium.^QQ
Again he says,
In other words Evolution, in rebounding reflec¬
tively upon itself, acquires morality for the
purpose of its further advance. In yet other
terms, and whatever anyone may say, above a
certain level, technical progress necessarily
and functionally adds moral progress to it-
Once evolution has reached the reflective level, i.e.
the level of consciousness, advances cease to be achieved by
the "degree of organic complexity or psychic change." In
other words, individual entities stop forming organic unit¬
ies, in which the nature of the unity is dominate over the
diversity that it includes. Instead individual conscious
entities "inter-influence" one another. That is, they relate
3°Qibid. p.209.
3^Teilhard de Chardin. The Future Of Man, trans., Norman
Denny. (London: Collins, 196*+). p. 20*+.
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to one another in a bond of mutual "responsibility" without
the loss of their individuality.
That is to say, for Teilhard morality represents the
unity of conscious individuals. Like the formation of the
organic unities on the lower levels of evolution, the moral
unity comes about only by trial and error. "Under whatever
particular form, it is considered, the physico-moral obeys
in its activity a double law, both essential and universal:
^02
to try everything — to its conclusion."
Evils are those unsuccessful attempts at morality. Such
attempts become "dead-ends" in the process of evolution.
They are unsuccessful "adaptations", to put it in Alexander's
terms.303
The "convergent medium," of which Teilhard spoke, is
also called by him the "noosphere." Of the noosphere he says,
In the first place,it is unique, and therefore
final. Unless we are to imagine (a thing that is
supremely improbable) that our noosphere may one
day come into contact with other sideral noo-
spheres, collectively reflective mankind con¬
fronts nothing but itself. In these circum¬
stances, it is impossible to conceive a further
complexification which would determine a higher
consciousness. Our law of recurrence automati¬
cally ceases to operate.
Teilhard's point is that until evolution reaches the
level of consciousness true diversity does not become appar¬
ent. At the outset the principle of limitation does prede¬
termine that the stages of evolution move towards an increasing
3°2Teilhard. Human Energy, p.126.
3°3Teilhard. Activation Of Energy. p.l08.f.
30L|"ibid. p. 1^4.
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organic unity. On the material level activity appears mechan¬
istic. Out of the mechanistic activity comes life, which hints
at the potential for the development of true diversity. How¬
ever, only on the level of consciousness do true individuals
finally emerge. "If indeed," Teilhard says, "as we have
assumed, the world culminates in a thinking reality, the org¬
anisation of personal human energies represents the supreme
stage of cosmic evolution on earth; and morality is conse¬
quently nothing less than the highest development of mechanics
and. biology. ^
Teilhard uses the term "love" to designate the final
unity of consciousness.^0^ Love is God.
God can only be defined as a center of centers. la
this complexity lies the perfection of His unity
— the only final goal logically attributable to
the developments of spirit-matter.
Teilhard was of the opinion that the type of unity illu¬
strated by the complexity of conscious individuals in the
noosphere is somehow superior to the unity of the cosmos which
existed prior to the emergence of consciousness. 'Therefore,
unity as a principle of limitation does participate to the
process of events to the' extent that it is •perfected* toy
these events.
Granted that 'leiUhard* s thought is often very difficult
to follow, the foregoing analysis does seem to indicate that
he attempted to meet the requirements for :,a.rPT©cess epist©-
mology. First, he clearly saw the need for a. principle off
TejLXiiard. Human Energy. p«105*
p .Sj -
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limitation. Second, his suggestion that the development of
conscious individuals perfected the principle of limitation
shows that Teilhard saw that diversity could only be real if
the principle of limitation participated in the process of
events.
Nevertheless, Teilhard, somewhat like Hegel, attempts to
adopt the two different understandings of the concept absolute.
On the level of epistemology he speaks in terms of a principle
of limitation which he called responsibility or morality.
This principle directs consciousness toward relationships, by
serving as the basis upon which conscious entities are united.
Clearly morals are not unlike Varisco's Being of Alexander's
values in their role as a principle of limitation for con¬
sciousness .
On the metaphysical level, however, the principle of
limitation is understood by Teilhard to be an absolute con¬
crete unity of all reality. This unity is clearly not the
same as the Hegelian Absolute. Hegel suggested that diver¬
sity ultimately vanishes in concrete unity. Teilhard said
that ultimate concrete unity remains a complexity of indivi¬
duals.
In support of Teilhard's position, it is true that, using
the model of an organism, we have often spoken of complex-
unities. However, these organic unities are never ultimate,
as the individual entities composing an organism continue to
produce changes in the organism as a whole. Furthermore, and
perhaps more important, Teilhard does not think of ultimate
unity as organic.
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Teilhard seemed to suggest in his discussion of the
nature of the noosphere that Omega — which is called ultimate
— should not he thought of as the point at which the uni¬
verse becomes a single cosmic organism. Indeed, taking his
description of the noosphere as something like a model for
Omega, we might think of:Omega as the perfect society in which
the individuality of each entity is determined totally by its
feelings of moral responsibility for all other entities.
This possible view of Omega is further supported by the fact
that evils, according to Teilhard, are unsuccessful attempts
at morality, and are dead-ends in evolution. If Omega is
the only possible successful outcome of evolution, it must be
free of evils, i.e. perfectly moral.
However, even Teilhard admits that diversity is the
result of trial and error. If errors cease to be made at
point Omega, it is difficult to understand the basis for a
diversity.
The understanding of Omega suggested above is merely one
of a number of possible explanations of what Teilhard envis¬
aged. However, our point is that references to Omega imply
that it is the ultimate determination of reality. In which
case it would be contradictory to true diversity, and its
formulation would represent a use of the term absolute that
is not acceptable to Process thinking.
Clearly much of what Teilhard says is completely consis¬
tent with Process thought. However, the problems we have had
with deciding whether or not to place Teilhard among those
who hold consistent Process epistemologies illustrate that a
writer's understanding of the term absolute is a fairly good
test for distinguishing how consistently he follows a Process
structure.
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CHAPTER XVII: A.N. Whitehead's Epistemology
A Process epistemology requires first of all a principle
of limitation for consciousness. Second it requires that
conscious activity — like all other activity — must be com¬
posed of true unity and true diversity. In all the episte-
mologies which we have considered, the principle of limitation
provides the unity or organisation necessary for conscious
activity.
As we have seen time and again, the concept of unity is
directly related to the concept of absoluteness. In idealis¬
tic philosophy the term Absolute generally refers to an
ultimate concrete unity of all reality. However, within an
ultimate concrete unity activity ceases because diversity is
no longer possible. For idealistic philosophies, that under¬
stand the Absolute to be an ultimate concrete unity, the
abstract unity provided for conscious activity by the principle
of limitation and the unity of the Absolute are different.
The former allows for diversity, but the latter does not.
Process philosophers have argued that these two under¬
standings of unity make the concept ambiguous. If unity
allows for diversity, this must be true both in the cosmos
as a whole and also in finite consciousnesses; for otherwise
the "source" of conscious activity cannot be explained. Of
course, if unity allows for diversity this means that its
concrete content cannot be a unity of "all" reality.
Therefore, one of the important tasks of Process episte-
mologies has been an attempt to discover the nature of the
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principle of limitation, if one rejects the concept that it
parallels an ultimate unity of all reality. The most common
solution has been the suggestion that the absolute unity div¬
ides itself into a multiplicity of entities. Therefore each
entity is both a unity in itself, and also a participant in
a common principle of unity shared by all other entities.
Consciousness is possible because one entity is able to "rec¬
ognise" another entity and at the same time maintain its own
individuality. Another way of putting this point is to say
that the absolute unity participates in the activity of con¬
sciousness.
In such epistemologies the term absolute has two refer¬
ences or aspects. Its abstract reference is an ideal about
a single consciousness that, •unlike any finite consciousness,
is always aware of the totality of conscious events. Its
concrete reference is a present unity composed of those
conscious events which have already occurred. As conscious
events continue to occur the concrete reference of the term
absolute changes, while the abstract reference remains the
same.
That events occur in consciousness is accepted by both
idealistic and Process philosophers. The former, however,
cannot account for the source of the conscious activity, as
the concrete content of their Absolute is a unity of all
reality. Process thinkers, on the other hand, have argued
that, because primordial unity has divided itself, the
activity which results from the factors of unity and diver¬
sity produces concrete changes within the cosmos.
Using the model of an organism for the cosmos, it can
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be argued that cosmic changes can be compared with changes
within a finite organism that are brought about by new rela¬
tions among its parts. These new relations change the
concrete nature of the organism, while abstractly the organism
remains the same.
However, in order for consciousness to occur, by the
Process model thus far presented, there must be objects for
consciousness, i.e. a diversity; and consciousness must both
be changed by its relations to objects and also remain ab¬
stractly the same. In other words, consciousness must be
composed of events — relations. The formulation that we
have now outlined, based upon the positions thus far intro¬
duced, continues to have a serious problem with its under¬
standing of the term absolute, as referring to the unity of
a cosmic conscious organism. If, as has been suggested, all
activity occurs within an organic unity, then there is nothing
outside of that unity. Therefore, an analogy between the
cosmic organism and a finite organism or consciousness has a
serious weakness. We know of no independent organism or free
consciousness, as understood by Process, whose inner activity
does not depend upon external objects. Indeed for Process
thought it is always directly or indirectly in response to
the external objects that internal activity originates. If
one is to maintain the organic or consciousness model of the
universe, one must consider the issue of the cosmic organism
relating to something external. Thus far we have only spoken
of the cosmic organism relating to its own internal structure.
On the other hand, if the cosmic organism has external
objects, it could not even be considered a unity of all
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reality abstractly, and diversity would have to be something
other than a division of the absolute unity itself.
Of course, what we are now discussing is a metaphysical
rather than a purely epistemological problem. However, as
we have seen, the Process system demands that the term abso¬
lute have the same reference whether it is used epistemo-
logically or metaphysically. Therefore, if finite conscious
activity requires external objects, the point should be
considered of whether this must not also be true for the
cosmic consciousness.
Whitehead is the most successful of all the Process
thinkers in establishing a single understanding of the concept
absolute which applies equally well to finite consciousnesses
and to a single universal consciousness. We begin our con¬
sideration of Whitehead by looking at his analysis of finite
consciousness. In Chapter XVIII we will move with him into
the field of metaphysics in order to show that his understand¬
ing of the principle of limitation, necessary for finite
conscious activity, has a corresponding reference on the
metaphysical level. Finally, in Chapter XIX we will come to
the problem of objects for the cosmic consciousness.
Whitehead's most concise analysis of finite consciousness
is to be found in his brief work Symbolism Its Meaning And
aQ
Effect. Here he describes conscious experience as composed
of two things — symbols and meanings. He says,
There are no components of experience which are
only symbols or only meanings... This statement
is the foundation of a thoroughgoing realism.
It does away with any mysterious element in our
experience which is merely meant, and thereby
-^^Whitehead, Alfred North. Symbolism Its Meaning And
Effect. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1928).
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behind the veil of direct perception. It pro¬
claims the principle that symbolic reference
holds between two components in a complex
experience, each intrinsically capable of
direct recognition. Any lack of such conscious
analytical recognition is the fault of the
defect in mentality on the part of a compara¬
tively low grade percipient*309
The above clearly demonstrates that Whitehead holds
conscious activity to be composed of unity and diversity.
Consciousness, he says, is a complex experience — a unity —
among components. Furthermore, he is suggesting that a
principle of limitation for the evaluation of conscious data
participates in the process of conscious events. In particu¬
lar, he says that each entity is "intrinsically" capable of
direct "recognition". That is, factors in a conscious event
are both related to each other and somehow independent.
The following illustrates Whitehead's point about unity
and diversity:
Our perception is not confined to universal
characters; we do not perceive disembodied
colour or disembodied extensiveness: we per¬
ceive the wall's colour and extensiveness...
This concrete relationship is a physical fact
which may be very unessential to the wall and
very essential to the percipient. The spatial
relationship is equally essential both to wall
and percipient; but the colour side of the
relationship is at that moment indifferent to
the wall, though it is part of the make-up of
the percipient. In this sense, and subject to
their spatial relationships, contemporary
events happen independently. I call this type
of experience 'presentational immediacy.' It
expresses how contemporary events are rele¬
vant to each other, and yet preserve a mutual
independence.
309ibid. pp.11-12. 310lbid. pp.17-19.
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There are several factors involved in the above illus¬
tration. These Whitehead outlines for us: "...(i) that the
sense-data involved depend on the percipient organism and
its spatial relations to the perceived organism; (ii) that
the contemporary world is exhibited as extended and as a
plenum of organisms; (iii) that presentational immediacy is
an important factor in the experience of only a few high-
grade organisms, and that for the others it is embryonic or
entirely negligible.1,311
To restate the above: First, the values of any specific
sense-data depend both upon the wall and the percipient as
being unique individuals. Second, extensiveness, required
for perception, depends upon neither the wall nor the perci¬
pient alone, but is common to both. Third, conscious activity
depends upon there being a mind participating in that activ¬
ity.
Having demonstrated that Whitehead holds that conscious
activity is composed of unity and diversity, we must now look
at how the principle of limitation functions for the conscious
mind. One factor of limitation has already been mentioned in
terms of the fact that all entities share extensiveness. The
other factor of limitation Whitehead says is temporal:
Time is known to us as the succession of our
acts of experience, and thence derivatively as
the succession of events objectively perceived
in those acts. But this succession is not pure
succession: it is the derivation of state from
state, with the later state exhibiting confor¬
mity to the antecedent. Time in the concrete is
the confirmation of state to state, the later
to the earlier; and the pure succession is an
311ibid. p.27.
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abstraction from the irreversible relationship
of settled past to derivative present.
In other words the consciousness of a finite mind is
limited by both the extensiveness of entities and the temporal
events of its own past. Time, like extensiveness, is a unity.
It is durational in the Bergsonian sense. Therefore, unity
exists within the conscious entity as well as between enti¬
ties. Whitehead's name for temporal unity is "causal-
efficacy." Again, like Bergson's "duration", it is limited
to high-grade, i.e. self-conscious, organisms. J
It is the particular past of an organism that causes it
to have its unique individual perceptions. Thus Whitehead
says,
But what is already given for experience can
only be derived from that natural potentiality
which shapes a particular experience in the
guise of causal efficacy. Causal efficacy is
the hand of the settled past in the formation
of the present. The sense-data must therefore
play a double role in perception. In the mode
of presentational immediacy they are projected
to exhibit the contemporary world in its
spatial relations. In the mode of causal effi¬
cacy they exhibit the .almost instantaneously
precedent bodily organs as imposing their
characters on the experience in question. - ^
Here Whitehead makes a point consistent with Morgan's
epissexology. The physical, structure of the conscious organ¬
ism has a direct role in perception. Indeed it is the
structure of the organism's own body that represents the unity
p.%1.
p. 59.
^ibid. p • 5$»
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between itself and the structure of its object. Whitehead
further says,
Thus in the intersection of the two modes, the
spatial and temporal relationships of the human
body, as causally apprehended, to the external
contemporary world, as immediately presented,
afford a fairly definite scheme of spatial and
temporal reference whereby we test the symbolic
use of sense-projection for the determination of
the positions of bodies controlling the cause of
nature. Ultimately all observation, scientific
or popular, consists in the determination of the
spatial relation of the bodily organs of the
observer to the location of 'projected' sense-
data.
Thus unity between subject and object is the limitation
imposed by the particular spatial relationships between the
structure of the subject and its object. On the other hand,
the unity within a subject is its particular temporal past.
Therefore, Whitehead's formulation suggests that the
concept of unity has two parts; both parts allowing for div¬
ersity. The spatial unity is divided into entities, each of
which have extensiveness. This suggests that the spatial
limitation divides itself into centers, and thus participates
in spatial events. On the other hand, there is temporal
unity which appears to be somehow different for eacn conscious
entity. It is a unity of the entity's past, and serves con¬
sciousness as a principle of limitation.
It would be quite easy to jump to the conclusion thai
for Whitehead, as for Alexander, the term absolute or concept
of principle of limitation refers to Space-Time. However,
p.66.
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there has been nonspecific suggestion that either space or
time is absolute. Each conscious entity has its own time
and its own space. While both space and time appear to serve
as principles of limitation for conscious activity, it is not
yet clear how any overall unity is achieved in the universe.
The temporal unity of the individual consciousnesses, which
certainly suggests that the principle of limitation partici¬
pates in events, does not explain the nature of the unity
between consciousnesses. Unless this latter sort of unity
is explained, the principle of limitation has not been fully
described.
We would expect Whitehead, as a Process thinker, to
understand that the principle of limitation has the same ref¬
erence both for consciousness and also for the universe as a
whole. Therefore, we should not be surprised that he moves
into the field of metaphysics in order to explain the prin¬
ciple more fully.
Our next step will be to look at Whitehead's explanation
for the principle of limitation. We will then be ready to
look at the issue of objects for the universal consciousness
mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter.
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CHAPTER XVIII: A.N. Whitehead's Explanation
Of The Principle Of Limitation
"It is the task of philosophic speculation," says White¬
head, "to conceive the happenings of the universe so as to
render understandable the outlook of physical science and to
combine this outlook with these direct persuasions represen¬
ting the basic facts upon which epistemology must build.
A significant portion of Whitehead's writings are devoted to
demonstrating why his analysis of conscious activity does in
fact agree with his metaphysical system: which metaphysic is
built up not only from the data of the special science of
epistemology, but also from data coming out of the other
special sciences, e.g. biology, physics, etc. In the Intro¬
duction to Process And Reality Whitehead says, "Indeed, if
this cosmology be deemed successful, it becomes natural at
this point to ask whether the type of thought involved be not
a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism
017
onto a realistic basis." This quotation helps to point
out how very central data coming from epistemology is for
Whiteheadian thought. Therefore, it is appropriate to look
at Whitehead's work at the end of our consideration of the
state of epistemology in his day.
The first Whiteheadian suggestion for us to consider is
that all reality must be understood as a single process.
-^^Whitehead. Modes Of Thought. p.223.
^^Whitehead. Process And Reality, p.vii.
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Whitehead says,
In other words, it is presupposed that no
entity can be conceived in complete abstrac¬
tion from the system of the universe, and
that it is the business of speculative phil¬
osophy to exhibit this truth. This character
is its coherence.
Both neo-mechanism and emergence argued for a single
process in the universe that is reflected in finite conscious
minds. This concept makes reality a whole without the neces¬
sary introduction of ideals or categories. Such a position
Whitehead sees as also compatible with physics. He says,
That the potentiality for being an element in a
real concrescence of many entities into one
actuality, is the one general metaphysical char¬
acter attaching to all entities, actual and
un-actual; and that every item in its universe
is involved in each concrescence. In other
words, it belongs to the nature of a 'being1
that it is a potential for every 'becoming'.
This is the 'principle of relativity.'
In accepting becoming as the chief metaphysical category,
the activity of consciousness is seen to reflect this prin¬
ciple by being a relationship between a subject and an object.
Whitehead says,
All- actual entities in the actual world, rela¬
tively to a given actual entity as 'subject',
are necessarily 'felt1 by that subject, though
in general vaguely. An actual entity as felt
is said to be 'objectified' for that subject.
Only a selection of eternal objects are 'felt'
by a given subject, and these eternal objects
are said to have 'ingression' in that subject.
But those eternal objects which are not felt
are not therefore negligible. -
iloibid. p.3. 31^ibld. p.30. 5'uiMd. p.56.
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In the above Whitehead admits the reality of objects,
which do not depend for their reality upon the subject.
Such objects may rightly be called 'eternal' as their inte¬
grity is maintained before and after their unity with the
subject. Furthermore, Whitehead says that all eternal ob¬
jects are available to the subject, as subjects and objects
share the same characteristic of being actual entities. He
uses the term 'felt' to describe the response of a subject
to the 'ingression' of an object. Alexander and Morgan ten¬
ded to say that a subject 'enjoyed' its object. Nevertheless,
the principle involved is the same.
Whitehead also suggests that the resulting unity of
subject and object produces novelty. In speaking to this
Whitehead says,
Thus the process of becoming is dipolar, (i) by
reason of its qualification by the determinate-
ness of the actual world, and (ii) by its con¬
ceptual prehensions of the indeterminateness
of eternal objects. This process is constituted
by the influx of eternal objects into a novel
determinateness of feeling which absorbs the
actual world into a novel actuality
This point he summarises by saying, "'Change' is the descrip¬
tion of the adventures of eternal objects in the evolving
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universe of actual things.
Therefore, according to Whitehead, the activity or pro¬
cess of the universe — becoming — is the principle of
limitation for consciousness. Because of its dipolar nature
this principle allows for both unity and diversity, and it
321ibid. p.62. 322ibid. p.81.
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participates in the process of events. Therefore, its unity-
is the determinateness of the actual world. That is, its
unity is the totality of relationships that make up the act¬
ual world at any given instant. Its diversity is the inde-
terminateness of feelings which produce novel actuality.
Having outlined what the principle of limitation is, we
must next consider how Whitehead understands this principle
functioning for consciousness. In other words, we must
clarify that becoming is the same as conscious activity.
First we will analyse becoming as the conscious activity of
a cosmic entity — God —, and second as the conscious activ¬
ity of finite conscious entities.
Universal conscious activity can be explained metaphysi¬
cally by the suggestion that God himself has three natures:
The 'primordial nature', by which God is understood as a
conceptual unity of all feelings and all eternal objects;
the 'consequent nature', by which God is understood as the
unity of all physical prehensions in the evolving universe;
and, the 'superjective nature', by which God is understood
as receiving specific satisfaction from novelty. J
Throughout this paper we have discussed that process must
be composed of interrelations of unity and diversity, which
form a self-perpetuating system. The unity and diversity in
their purest forms make up the primordial nature of God.
The diversity Whitehead calls eternal objects, and the unity
is God's conceptual analysis of all these objects as a unity.
323ibid. pp.121-122.
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On the level of pure potentials eternal objects can only
be understood as potentials for the process of becoming.
If the term 'eternal objects' is disliked, the
term 'potentials' would be suitable. The eter¬
nal objects are the pure potentials of the
universe; and the actual entities differ from
each other in their realization of potentials .^l,.
The primordial unity is God's conceptual prehension of
all eternal objects and feelings as a unity. Such a concep¬
tion is a 'mental' reality; thus the primordial unity is also
called the 'mental pole'. One can likewise speak of the
multiplicity of eternal objects as a physical pole.
Of the mental pole Whitehead says, "This is the concep¬
tion of God, according to which He is considered as the out¬
come of creativity, as the foundation of order, and as the
•3 25
goal towards novelty.The mental pole functions as a
plan; it is the plan that the multiplicity shall form a com¬
plex unity.
However, the multiplicity as pure potential and the
mental pole as a conceptual plan have no specific physical
content. This content must be supplied during the actual
process by which the eternal objects form complex unities.
The outcome of this process is God's 'consequent nature'.
Nevertheless, in both of these two natures, God remains
essentially the same. That is, God is everlastingly a unity
of all multiplicity.
Of course the question can be raised as to why there is
a process at all, if God is everlastingly the same. The
^^"ibid, p.208. ^2^ibid. p.122.
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answer to this depends upon God's third nature — His 'super-
jective nature'. God allows process because he enjoys the
novelty resulting from the process. God has feelings. Each
bit of novelty, which brings the universe to a greater unity,
results in a satisfaction for God. It is this third nature
which gives the reason for acting at all.
Thus for the universal consciousness, the unity of becom¬
ing is an abstract conception of the total unity of all rela¬
tionships. The concrete content of this unity is the totality
of relationships in the actual world. This is not the first
time that a thinker has conceived of unity as having an ab¬
stract and a concrete aspect in consciousness. On the other
hand, for Whitehead, diversity also has two aspects. Its
abstract aspect is the pure potential of the eternal objects,
and its concrete aspect is the novelty of new relationships
in the actual world. Here a new concept is introduced into
Process thought. Diversity, like unity, is given an abstract
content of its own in terms of eternal objects. In other
words, diversity is not merely a division of some primordial
unity, but is itself equally primordial. Alexander's sug¬
gestion of Space-Time dividing itself would not be consistent
with Whitehead's point.
As we will recall, the principle of limitation partici¬
pated in the process of events for Alexander and Varisco by
first dividing itself. Whitehead now suggests that the
principle of limitation applies to the universal conscious¬
ness, rather than being a universal consciousness.
Having made note of this new element introduced by White¬
head, we will next move to the second part of our stated
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purpose by seeing how the activity of finite consciousnesses
is the same as becoming.
Whitehead says, "Every actual entity has the capacity for
knowledge, and there is graduation in the intensity of various
items of knowledge; but, in general, knowledge seems to be
negligible apart from a peculiar complicity in the consti¬
tution of some actual occasion. 1,328 The word "consciousness"
Whitehead prefers to reserve for those actual entities in
■>27
which knowledge is primary rather than negligible. Thus
instead of saying that consciousness is a characteristic of
all reality, he speaks of feeling as that characteristic.
"In place of the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought,
the philosophy of organism finds a hierarchy of categories
of feeling."32^
Consciousness arises on the level of feelings when an
actual entity as subject forms a proposition concerning its
object — when propositions become part of feeling. A propo¬
sition is a judgment about the future, potential meaning of
an object to a subject. In other words, on the level of
consciousness, subjects not only receive data from the eternal
objects composing their object, but the subject also makes
judgments about the object.
The forming of propositions leads to the necessity of
making further judgments. These judgments may prove to be
valid or in error. However, in either case, the judgments
create a ftovel situation — one that could not have been pre¬
dicted.
326ibid. p.225. 327ibid. p.227- 328ibid. pp.232-233.
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There is another metaphysical implication associated
with the formulation of judgments. Judgments imply a theory
of "probability." Of probability Whitehead says, "This tacit
presupposition is that the particular future which is the
logical subject of the judgment, inductively justified, shall
include actualities which have close analogy to some contem¬
porary subject enjoying assigned experience; for example, an
analogy to the judging subject in question, or to some sort
of actuality presupposed as in the logical world which is the
129
logical subject of the inductive judgment."
The problem is to understand the way in which probability
arises. It arises Meaiiise, first, the subject has learned in
previous experience that all actual occasions arise out of a
particular environment. Second, the particular elements in¬
volved in a given actual occasion have been abstracted from
that environment. Third, to make a judgment about these
elements is also to say something about the environment.
And fourth, since in the future elements will continue to
exist in a very similar environment, one has grounds for jud¬
ging with high probability the future position of those
110
elements in their environment. J
In other words probability arises from the fact that
reality is a single process. Reality has novelty, but it is
not chaotic.
Still another implication, associated with the formu¬
lation of judgments, is that they assume a unity of all
329ibid. pp.288-289. 33°ibid. pp.292-293-
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elements. That is, a judgment is based on the conceptual
'ideal' of a total unity based on the experience of a certain
level of complex unity. In one sense a judgment is based
on a vision — it is religious. Whitehead says, regarding
this topic: "Religion is the vision of something which
stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immed¬
iate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be
realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet
the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning
to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something
whose possession is the final goal, and yet is beyond all
reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hope-
•3 01
less quest.
The level of judgments is the level of feeling which has
332
God as its felt object, — God being understood as the
complex unity of all things. Above the electron, the only
level of emergence significant to Whitehead is the emergence
of the mental pole — the conceptual unity of feelings and
eternal objects. The feelings on the level of a mental pole
333
are also called 'intellectual feelings.'
Such intellectual feelings are normally believed to exist
only in some men. However, Whitehead points out,
We have no means of testing this assumption in
any crucial way. It is however the assumption
usually made; and therefore it may be presumed
that there is some evidence which persuades
3-^Whitehead, A.N. Science And The Modern World. (Cam¬
bridge: The University Press, 1925)• pp.267-268.
332whitehead. Process And Reality, p.3^9.
-^ibid. p.386.
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people to embrace the doctrine. But in fact
no evidence, one way or the other has even
been produced.^1+
Therefore, while consciousness may be, as panpsychism tends
to think, an element of all reality, the statement cannot be
critically validated, and therefore it is not to be applied
metaphysically.
Therefore, for finite consciousnesses, as for the cosmic
consciousness, activity requires both unity and diversity.
Moreover, for finite consciousnesses as for the cosmic con¬
sciousness, both unity and diversity have a concrete and an
abstract aspect. The concrete aspect of diversity for finite
consciousnesses is the object of consciousness, and the ab¬
stract aspect is a judgment about the object based on proba¬
bility. The concrete aspect of unity for finite conscious¬
nesses is the present knowledge of the subject, and the
abstract aspect is an 'ideal' of a total unity having God as
its felt object. Thus we may conclude that the principle of
limitation functions the same for finite consciousnesses and
for the cosmic consciousness.
However, as limitation for Whitehead has two abstract
apsects, it is not adequate to say, along with the pre- White-
headians, that its abstract aspect is only that of an 'ideal'
total unity. As we may recall, the term absolute is usually
applied by Process thinkers to the abstract aspect of unity,
which in turn is the full abstract aspect of limitation.
-^S.bid. p.390.
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Interestingly, Whitehead himself uses the term absolute to
refer to the abstract aspect 6f unity, but, as we have seen,
for Whitehead unity does not exhaust limitation; diversity
also has an abstract aspect. We must therefore investigate
how Whitehead further alters the use of the term absolute.
In order to make this investigation, we must consider White¬
head's concept of 'Creativity'.
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CHAPTER XIX: A.N. Whitehead"s Principle Of Creativity
According to Whitehead all entities contain the principle
of "creativity". For example he says,
God is in the world, or nowhere, creating contin¬
ually in us and around us. This creative principle
is everywhere, in animate and so-called inanimate
matter, in the ether, water, earth, human hearts.
But this creation is a continuing process and 'the
process is itself the actuality," since no sooner
do you arrive than you start on a fresh journey.
In so far as man partakes of this creative pro¬
cess does he partake of the divine, of God, and
that participation is his immortality, reducing
the question of whether his individuality sur¬
vives death of the body to the state of an irrele¬
vancy. His true destiny as co-creator in the
universe is his dignity and his grandeur.^5
At first sight the above seems to be unclear or confused.
On the one hand we are told that to participate in the creative
process is to "partake of the divine". On the other hand
Whitehead calls man a "co-creator in the universe." If God
and creativity are rightly equated, it makes some sense to
say that to partake of the process is to partake of God.
However, such a position would surely imply that ultimately
God alone is the creator, thus making the statement that man
is co-creator rather unintelligible.
Looked at from the other side, if man is a co-creator,
one must assume that he partakes of creativity in his own
right. Furthermore, if he partakes of creativity in his own
right, it would make rather good sense to say that creativity
^^Dialogues Of Alfred North Whitehead, recorded by
Lucien Price. (London: Max Reinhardt, 195^)» p.3^6.
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must be a metaphysical principle in which entities including
God participate, but each of these entities including God is
subordinate to or not inclusive of creativity. If all enti¬
ties contain the principle of creativity, and if no entity,
including God, totally incorporates this principle, then it
might seem that creativity is an abstract ideal of that which
unifies all reality.
However, a concept, such as process or the principle of
creativity, according to Whitehead, requires a physical ob¬
ject. He says,
The objectification of God in a temporal subject
is effected by the hybrid feelings with God's
conceptual feelings as data. Those of God's
feelings which are positively prehended are those
with some compatability of contrast, or of iden¬
tity, with physical feelings transmitted from the
temporal world. But when we take God into account,
then we can assert without any qualification
Hume's principle, that all conceptual feelings
are derived from physical feelings.
Certainly the above is not the only place where White¬
head insists that conceptual knowledge requires an object.
In Adventures Of Ideas he goes on to say, "All knowledge is
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conscious discrimination of objects experienced."
As we said earlier, knowing is a process of interaction
between subject and object. A significant aspect of knowing
an object is a process of limitation, whereby the subject's
and object's particular interests and values emphasise only
certain relations while pushing others into the background;
^^^whitehead. Process And Reality, p.3*+9.
^^-^itehead. Adventures Of Ideas, p.227.
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therefore making knowing possible. In a relative universe,
in which everything participates in every other thing, a
principle of limitation is always needed to make any knowledge
possible.
We may well be prepared to accept these two concepts
concerning the possibility of knowledge, namely: (1) that all
knowledge depends upon an object, or that physical feelings
always precede conceptual feelings; and, (2) that knowledge
of an object is possible in a relative universe only by a
principle of limitation. However, by accepting these premises
we must be reminded that they both presuppose our knowledge
about knowledge, and our knowledge of a principle of limita¬
tion. In other words, we must answer the questions, What is
the object of our concept of knowledge? and, What is the
object of our concept of the principle of limitation?
Whitehead's answer to both of these questions is God.
If we reject this alternative behind the scenes,
we must provide a ground for limitation which
stands among the attributes of the substantial
activity. This attribute provides the limitation
for which no reason can be given; for all reason
flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation,
and His existence is the ultimate irrationality.
For no reason can be given for just that limi¬
tation which it stands in His nature to impose.
God is not concrete, but He is the ground for
concrete actuality. No reason can be given for
the nature of God, because that nature is the
ground of rationality.
God is the ultimate limit of reason, because he is the
objectification of the ultimate principle of creativity. He
3^Whitehead. Science And The Modern World, pp. 2^-9-250.
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is the object of our concept of how rationality is possible.
Furthermore, he is the limit to which all concrete reference
is made. Whitehead elaborates on this last statement in the
following:
Finally, there is Deity, which is the factor in
the universe whereby there is importance, value,
and the ideal beyond the actual. It is by refer-
erence of the spatial immediacies to the ideals
of Deity that the sense of worth beyond our¬
selves arises. The unity of a transcendent uni¬
verse, and the multiplicity of realised
actualities, both enter into our experience by
this sense of Deity.
In other words, God reveals to us creativity as infinite
possibilities, but makes such a concept available by also
limiting the infinity of possibilities for those already rea¬
lised. Or as Whitehead would put it,
The limitation whereby there is a perspective
relegation of eternal objects to the background
is the characteristic of decision. Transcendent
decision includes God's decision. He is the
actual entity in virtue of which the entire
multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its
graded relevance to each stage of concrescence.
At this point it is clearly possible to re-introduce a
specific reference to the term absolute. The term absolute
refers to the particular unity of realised possibilities ob¬
jectified as the absolute pole of God. This is how we have
defined the reference of the term absolute many times in our
discussions of Process. It is a unity peculiar to a given
present, which serves as the necessary object of physical
feelings and a principle of limitation, and which allows for
339-^i-tehead. Modes Of Thought. p.l^fO.
^^Whitehead. Process And Reality, p.229.
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our knowledge of the totally undetermined unity of the prin¬
ciple of creativity.
This is at once the doctrine of the unity of
nature, and of the unity of each human life.
The conclusion follows that our consciousness
of the self-identity pervading our life-thread
of occasions is nothing other than knowledge of
a special strand of unity within the general
unity of nature. It is a locus within the whole,
marked out by its own peculiarities, but other¬
wise exhibiting the general principle which
guides the constitution of the whole.
God is the objectification of creativity in the double
sense of being an object for physical feelings and a principle
of limitation. The two poles of God, the absolute and the
relative, are the objectifications of the ultimate categories
"many" and "one".
Therefore, to partake of creativity man partakes in the
divine, since only through and by God is creativity known.
He is the lure for feelings, the eternal urge of
desire. His particular relevance to each creative
act, as it arises from its own conditional stand¬
point in the world, constitutes Him the initial
•object of desire' establishing the initial phase
of each subjective aim.^2
The absolute pole must necessarily be understood as a
particular unity. It is the unity of all realised possibili¬
ties, i.e. the unity of the past of the cosmos. Of course,
even understood as a particular unity the absolute pole may
quite rightly be called abstract. As it stands at the very
limits of man's reason, it may be only a vague background
^"'"Whitehead. Adventures Of Ideas, p.2^1.
^Whitehead. Process And Reality, p.*+87.
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feeling. Something which Whitehead himself says could be
applied here:
We have here an example of the principle that
dominates the history of ideas. There will be
a general idea in the background flittingly,
waveringly, realised by the few in its full
generality — or perhaps never expressed in
any adequate universal form with persuasive
force. Such persuasive expression depends on
the accidents of genius... ^1+3
On the other hand, as we have already made clear, the
absolute pole is a particular unity only because it is the
objectification of the ultimate category of the "one", which
is an aspect of the principle of creativity. To apply the
term absolute to creativity, or to God equated with creativ¬
ity, i.e. creativity subjectively, is to suggest that ulti¬
mately there is one particular unity.
The implications of such a suggestion were introduced
before. In summary, such a suggestion implies that the pro¬
cess of the universe culminates in the realisation of a
particular predetermined unity. God, one might say, becomes
an absolute unity as the multiplicity of the relative pole is
more and more taken up into the absolute pole. In which
case, the absolute pole is understood as the ultimate deter¬
mination of the process within the cosmos.
The above is clarified if we look again at Whitehead's
concept of God. According to Whitehead God is an actual
entity. In expanding this idea he says,
Thus, analogously to all entities, the nature of
God is dipolar... One side of God's nature is
constituted by his conceptual experience. This
experience is the primordial fact in the world,
^^whitehead. Adventures Of Ideas. p.18.
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limited by no actuality which it presupposes.
It is therefore infinite, devoid of all nega¬
tive prehension. This side of his nature is
free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually
deficient and unconscious. The other side
originates with physical experience derived
from the temporal world, and then acquires
integration with the primordial side. It is
determined, incomplete, consequent, 'ever¬
lasting', fully actual, and conscious. His
necessary goodness expresses the determin¬
ation of his consequent nature.^)|1[
The issue to which the above addresses itself is how
God is to be understood as an actual entity, who is the ob¬
jectificat ion of creativity for all other actual entities.
The answer is that for God unity, or the conceptual pole,
does not require an object. God as the objectification of
creativity is the primordial embodiment of the conceptual.
God's pole of unity is described as "free, complete, primor¬
dial, eternal, etc.", because it depends upon no particular
unity. The unity primordial to God is of the character of
the unity of creativity, i.e. undetermined.
Relative to the events which originate in the temporal
world, God's conceptual pole becomes a particular unity.
This particular unity is described as "determined, incom¬
plete, consequent, 'everlasting', etc.". In other words, to
this particular unity the term absolute can be correctly
applied. It serves men as an object of the concept of unity.
However, as God requires no object for his conceptual pole,
continuing change, which from our viewpoint contradicts the
term absolute, i.e. referring to a particular unity, does
3^Whitehead. Process And Reality. pp.*+88-*+89.
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not in fact alter God's primordial nature. Indeed, the
unity of whatever events originate in the temporal world
correctly express the primordially, undetermined nature of
unity.,
This point of our discussion is well summarised by
Whitehead:
For God the conceptual is prior to the physical,
for the World the physical poles are prior to
the conceptual poles.
A physical pole is in its own nature ex¬
clusive, bounded by contradiction; a conceptual
pole is in its own nature all-embracing, un¬
bounded by contradiction. The former derives
its share of infinity from the infinity of
appetition; the latter derives its share of
limitation from the exclusiveness of enjoy¬
ment.^
God, we might say, is the Subject by virtue of his con¬
ceptual pole. That is, he is creatively objectified. He is
Object for the world, however, because by a scheme of limi¬
tation his particular unity can serve as a physical feeling
which gives rise to a conceptual feeling of the principle of
the indeterminate "one".
Finally Whitehead says,
The perfection of God's subjective aim, derived
from the completeness of his primordial nature,
issues into the character of his consequent
nature. In it there is no loss, no obstruction.
The world is felt in a unison of immediacy.
The property of combining creative advance with
the retention of mutual immediacy is what in the
previous section is meant by the term 'ever¬
lasting '
What emerges from our study of Whitehead is that his
^"^ibid. p.*+93« ^^ibid. p.*+89«
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understanding of the absolute pole is chiefly a temporal
concept. The absolute pole is the unity of the past in the
divine consciousness. However, the past of the divine con¬
sciousness is also the whole of the pasts of all finite
consciousnesses.
As we have already seen, the past does serve as a prin¬
ciple of limitation. The past of any consciousness limits
its own present possibilities. We discussed in Chapter XVII
the problem that at that point Whitehead's epistemology did
not explain how the pasts of finite consciousnesses were
unified. Now we have the answer in Whitehead's understanding
of the concept of God's absolute pole.
Of course, the absolute pole is not the only factor
which unifies reality. The fact that all entities share
creativity also accounts for unity. As Whitehead said, all
entities are a part of the "creative advance." The absolute
pole, on the one hand, gives a unity of "mutual immediacy."
In other words the whole of the past limits the mutual pres¬
ent of all entities, just as the past of a single entity
limits its present possibilities.
However, as we have indicated many times, unless the
principle of limitation participates in the process of events
it is deterministic. Clearly the past does participate in
the process of events. In Chapter XVII we saw Whitehead
point out that past experience is an essential factor in the
ability of finite consciousness to make judgments about the
future meaning of its objects. Without the past being dura-
tionally present, finite consciousness has no future aim.
Likewise, on the cosmic level, the absolute pole is necessary
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for God's subjective aim. Without God's aim there would be
no cosmic future. The participation of the past in the est¬
ablishment of the future, which in turn becomes the past,
demonstrates that the principle of limitation does partici¬
pate in the process of events.
Whitehead suggested that the past of a finite conscious¬
ness must be joined with the presentational immediacy of felt
objects before judgments can be formed. However, his under¬
standing of the absolute pole does not allow it to divide
itself into the diversity of objects necessary for conscious¬
ness. While Whitehead's absolute pole does participate in
the process of events, it does not do so by dividing itself.
At this point Whitehead differs from several other Process
thinkers considered here.
Diversity, which is one part of the primordial potential
for activity, is as necessary to the divine consciousness as
it is to finite consciousnesses. Of course, the divine con¬
sciousness differs from finite consciousnesses in that it can
utilise the pure potential of eternal objects. Finite con¬
sciousnesses require "objects" in which eternal objects
adhere in a definite past of some actual entity. Indeed, as
we saw, God could not be the object for finite conscious¬
nesses without the absolute pole, which is his past.
The above formulation solves the great problem for
Process thought concerning the understanding of the concept
absolute. If, as many pre-Whiteheadian Process thinkers
did, one thinks of the term absolute as referring to some
ultimate principle which divides itself in order to produce
diversity, then it is very difficult to consistently adopt
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the analogy of a conscious organism to describe the universe^
1?he reason being that the consciousness of an organism re¬
quires that it have external objects. Yet if the absolute
principle divides itself, the division must remain internal;
otherwise there would be no way of accounting for cosmic
unity.
Therefore, Whitehead has suggested that the term absolute
should not be applied to the whole of the cosmic conscious¬
ness, but merely to one aspect of it. External to the unity,
i.e. absolute pole, of the cosmic consciousness are the
eternal objects. This dipolar nature of the cosmic conscious¬
ness is a primordial fact and not the result of a division of
a primordial unity.
However, we began by saying that finite consciousnesses
required external objects, and we have not clarified how
eternal objects serve as the external objects for the cosmic
consciousness, understood as a dipolar entity. The external
objects of the cosmic consciousness- are the novel feelings
of finite actual entities.
Here we must remind ourselves that, for Whitehead, the
objects of finite consciousnesses are also feelings. The
fact that feelings are both external and also internal is
what makes the interaction possible between subject and ob¬
ject. Furthermore, as we have seen, an object that becomes
an internal feeling both remains the same and is also changed.
It remains the same in that the eternal objects which compose
it remain changeless. On the other hand, objects are changed
by the subject's judgments about them based on the subject's
particular past.
2*+l
Likewise, the objects of the divine consciousness, when
they become internal feelings, both remain the same in terms
of eternal objects, but they are changed according to the
unique past of God. While God1 s past is; called the absolute
pole, this usage of the;term absolute does not logically pre¬
clude objects being external to the absolute pole.
For consciousness to occur in a finite organism, that
organism must be a unity, dipolar in nature, and relative to
its objects. By "Whitehead's formulation, the divine con¬
sciousness is also a unity, dipolar in nature, and relative
to its objects. We conclude, therefore, that Whitehead has
an understanding of the term absolute which is most consis¬
tent with an analogy between the activity of finite conscious¬
ness and universal activity.
Nevertheless, we are merely in the preliminary stages
of outlining the full implications of Whitehead's understan¬
ding of the term absolute. The best way to further develop
these implications is through illustrations such as those
which make up the remaining Chapters.
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PART III: THE TERM ABSOLUTE IN PROCESS THEOLOGY
CHAPTER XX: Issues For Theology
According to the Whiteheadian system reality is unified
in two ways. First it is unified by the fact that all enti¬
ties share a common principle of creativity. Second reality
is unified by a common past retained in the absolute pole of
God. Both aspects of unity are essential for conscious
activity, and neither denies true diversity. However, the
former is the source of pure potential. As Whitehead says,
"This factor of activity is what I have called 'Creativity;'."
^h-7
•The potential is made available to finite actual
entities only through the actual entity God. Without God
there would be no principle of limitation for finite conscious¬
ness.
Creativity itself offers an infinity of possibilities
for activity. However, as we have seen in our consideration
of epistemology, finite consciousness cannot function apart
from some limitation of its possibilities. Therefore, the
absolute pole of God is the only one of the two forms of
unity that can serve consciousness as a principle of limita¬
tion, because the absolute pole, being the concrete unity of
the past, limits the present of any actual entity to a finite
number of possibilities, and thus provides an "aim" for that
entity.
^^Whitehead. Adventures Of Ideas, p.230.
However, the fact that at a present instant the number
of possibilities for any finite entity are limited by the
absolute pole does not mean that an infinite number of possi¬
bilities cannot also exist. Because of the principle of
creativity the potential possibilities open to the universe
as a whole are infinite. Another way of describing the infinity
of possibilities for the universe is by pointing out that the
particular possibilities which are now realised were not pre¬
determined to be realised.
God, from his unique perspective, may judge with great
accuracy the probability of future events. After all, with
the whole of the past for reference, God knows better than any
other actual entity the probable future. Nevertheless, even
God participates in creativity, which is ultimately an inde¬
terminate activity.
The distinction which Whitehead maintains between God
and the principle of creativity is a problem for Christian
philosophical tradition, because tradition has generally made
God the Creator. Therefore, it would have been more consis¬
tent with the tradition if Whitehead had made God the
creative principle, and sole unifying factor of the universe.
As it is, creativity appears to become a god beyond God.
However, to equate Whitehead's dipolar God with creativity
requires that one accept a deterministic system, and give up
the analogy between a conscious organism and the universal
activity, and the dipolar concept of the universe. These
points require some explanation.
If one accepts the dipolar God as a conscious actual
entity unique because of his universal perspective, then the
2^f
divine consciousness like finite consciousnesses must have
a principle of limitation. Furthermore, if a dipolar God
and the ultimate principle of activity, i.e. creativity, are
one, then the only possible limit for the divine conscious¬
ness would be an ultimate concrete unity of all reality.
Indeed, equating a dipolar God with creativity would mean
that the term absolute refers to a concrete unity of all
reality within God. Such an understanding of ultimate con¬
crete unity, we have seen, implies that the activity of the
universe moves toward a final goal — a total unity. How¬
ever, if the whole of reality is taken up into a concrete
unity, then the Whiteheadian concept of dipolarity must be
set aside. Thus equating a dipolar God with creativity can¬
not satisfy the overall Whiteheadian cosmology.
Of course, some objective idealisms, for example,
attempted to maintain that God was conscious and yet not di¬
polar in the Whiteheadian sense. However, we have presented
conclusive evidence against the possibility of conscious
activity existing apart from relationships of true diversity.
Another alternative, that we considered, was the sug¬
gestion that the analogy between a conscious organism and
the universal activity cannot be maintained. In this case
one may either deny that activity is organised at all, or
else one may choose something like mechanism, which says
that activity is ordered by an abstract physical principle.
We have already explained why Process cannot accept
traditional objective idealism or mechanism. Therefore, in
order to consistently avoid determinism, while retaining
the Process model for consciousness, Whitehead must avoid
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associating the concept of absoluteness with the ultimate
principle of activity. However, he must retain the concept
of 'absolute pole' as a principle of limitation for conscious
activity. Both of these he accomplishes by drawing a dist¬
inction between the unity of the single conscious entity
God, and the principle of unity in creativity, which all
entities share.
What this distinction suggests is that, while conscious
unity depends upon God as conscious, unity qua unity does not.
Likewise, while conscious unity requires a principle of
limitation, in the form of God's absolute pole, unity of it¬
self has no concrete limits. Nevertheless, we must not
suppose that conscious activity is essentially different than
the principle of creativity. Indeed the very existence of
consciousness proves its participation in creativity.
Another way of stating this last point is to say that while
the activity of our particular universe follows the model of
consciousness, we cannot suppose that another universe, in
another epoch, might not follow a different model. Although
we must add that activity would, according to Whitehead,
3I+8
always be composed of true unity and true diversity.
Therefore, while retaining the concept of God's absolute
pole and relative pole, Whitehead could not equate God with
creativity. As we have seen, the term absolute must refer
to both a particular concrete content and to a principle of
limitation. Creativity, on the other hand, has no particular
Whitehead. Process And Reality, p.28.
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concrete content, and is unlimited activity.
Nevertheless, it is possible to read some of Whitehead's
major works in such a way that the term absolute would appear
to apply to creativity. For example, in Process And Reality
"creativity" is one of the three members of the "Category of
0I4.9Ultimates" along with "many" and "one". Furthermore, as
John Cobb points out in his A Christian Natural Theology,
Whitehead's use of the concept of creativity changes. For
example Cobb points out:
In Science And The Modern World, we encounter
four metaphysical principles: the underlying
substantial activity and its three attributes
— eternal objects, actual entities, and the
principle of limitation. In Religion In The
Making, subtle but important changes have
occurred in the understanding of these four
elements in the philosophic system...Since
God is now considered as an actual entity,
we might consider the four metaphysical prin¬
ciples as reduced to three: creativity
/above in the text Cobb refers to this as a
"weak" form of substantial activity/7, eternal
objects, and actual entities including God as
a special case.^Q
Cobb concludes his very important analysis of the history and
development of the concept of creativity in Whitehead by
saying: "Clearly he retained throughout his life the sense
that the ultimate fact is the process itself of which God,
the eternal objects, and the temporal occasions are all
o i?l
explanatory. "J
Undoubtedly a dilemma for theology, growing out of the
^^ibid. p.28.
3^°Cobb, John B, , Jr. A Christian Natural Theology.
Based On The Thought Of Alfred North Whitehead. (London:
Lutterworth Press, 1966). pp.1^8-1^9.
ibid. p. 168.
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idea that Whitehead used the term absolute to refer to crea¬
tivity as "absolute" is already becoming clear. If creativity
is really called absolute — in the usual sense of that term
—, then a distinction between it and God subordinates God to
creativity in all of his aspects. In which case creativity
becomes a sort of "god" beyond God. It is this very concern
which drove Bishop Temple to say,
...if only Professor Whitehead would for creativity
say Father, for 'primordial nature of God' say
Sternal Word, and for 'consequent nature of God'
say Holy Spirit, he would perhaps be able to show
ground for his gratifying conclusions. But he
cannot use those terms, prceisely because each
of them imports the notion of Personality as dis¬
tinct from Organism. The very reason which gives
to the Christian scheme its philosophic superior¬
ity is that which precludes Professor Whitehead
from adopting it.^2
The solution to the above theological problem, taken by
Lionel Thornton, was to equate God with the ultimate activity.
"God," he says, "is thus Absolute Activity, not in process of
realisation but in concrete unchangeable reality."353 As we
will see later, this solution poses considerable problems in
relation to several important Whiteheadian concepts. In
particular, we will see that this solution necessarily leads
to the denial of God's dipolar nature. Furthermore, Thorn¬
ton's move is unnecessary, because God's absoluteness does
not depend upon his being equated with creativity. As we
have seen, creativity for Whitehead does not have the attri¬
bute of absoluteness.
3^Temple, William. Nature, Man And God. (London: Mac-
millan and Co., Limited, 193^)• p.259.
■^^Thornton, Lionel. The Incarnate Lord. "An Essay Con¬
cerning The Doctrine Of The Incarnation In Its Relation To
Organic Conceptions." (London: Longmans Green and Co., Ltd.,
1928). p.86.
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One possible theological alternative to Thornton's
solution is to find some way to understand the term absolute
as referring to a pole of God, while avoiding the conclusion
that creativity is a god beyond God. Just such a formula¬
tion, we will argue, was achieved by men such as Sartshorne
and Christian. Furthermore, we will argue that this alter¬
native is far closer to Whitehead's own position. However,
we will also be forced to point out that, while both solu¬
tions do in fact adopt certain elements of Process Thought,
they must finally adopt radically different understandings
of central points in Christian theology.
The full implications of Whitehead's understanding of
the term absolute become clearer as we consider the differ¬
ences between those theological formulations that maintain
the distinction between God .and the principle of creativity,
.and. those that do not. We will begin with a consideration
of those thinkers who fit the former category- They are,
we will demonstrate, more consistent with. IMteheadian
thought.
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CHAPTER XXI: Charles Hartshorne's Influence On Theology
We will begin our considerations of the implications of
the Whiteheadian understanding of the term absolute with a
consideration of how it helped to shape speculations, rele¬
vant to theology, which were formulated by Charles Hartshorne.
"Theologian" is not the correct title to apply to Hartshorne.
As he himself says, "This may make it clear that it is the
philosophical not the truly theological element in the Chris-
o cjll
tion tradition that I as a philosopher venture to attack."-^
However, his philosophy of religion remains very important
to our study.
In general Hartshorne's work represents an attempt to
understand the term absolute as referring to one pole of God,
along with a relative pole. Indeed, he uses the term "abso¬
lute pole" more frequently than any other post-Whiteheadian
thinker.
Hartshorne's willingness to adopt the Process understan¬
ding of absoluteness comes in part from the fact that he sees
it validating what he considers to be the view of God held
by most theologians and religious people; namely, "The
1
'stand' which theologians on the whole, still propose to
retain, and which is alone self-consistent, as judged by its
relations to the other strand, is the popularly familiar
^^Hartshorne, Charles. Man's Vision Of God. (Hamden,
Connecticut: Archon Books, 196*+). p.xiv.
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definition of God as everlasting, all-controlling, all-
knowing, and ethically-good.or 'holy1 to the highest possible
155
degree.
Process, he feels, can validate this view against the
long standing dogmatic position, which, he will show, is, in
the view of Process, filled with contradictions. The dog¬
matic or "secular-strand," based on Greek thought rather
than Christian experience, he illustrates as follows:
God, for all the church writers, and for many
others, including Spinoza, was; the 'absolutely
infinite', the altogether maximal, supreme, or
perfect, being. All his properties, including
the popular religious ones so far as philoso¬
phically valid, were to be deduced from this
absoluteness or perfection, as is so beauti¬
fully explained by St. Thomas Aquinas.
Some of the implications in the secular view Hartshorne
sums up in the following: "It simply denies certain all-
pervasive, infinitely fundamental aspects of life — change,
variety, complexity, receptivity, sympathy, suffering, memory,
anticipation — as relevant to the idea of God."3^7 Further¬
more, he says that the implication of this brand of theism is
that "no act can, in its consequences, be better than any
158
other,as God in himself remains quite impassible to all
human actions.
Finally, he says that this type of theism makes complete
nonsense out of the incarnation. If, as he says, Jesus is
really supposed to be God loving man, it is quite contradic¬







The above criticisms result in large part from the dog¬
matic application of the Greek view of absoluteness. On the
other hand, by adopting the Process usage of the term abso¬
lute, Hartshorne gives us quite different possibilities upon
which to base a systematic theology.
The point that we want to notice most carefully is that
Hartshorne sees that in Process God's absolute pole is not to
be equated with an ultimate or supreme unity. He says, "On
the other hand, if supreme is identical with absolute or non-
relative, and yet the supreme includes all things, hence all
•3 /Lr\
relations, the result is a contradiction."-3
Seeing this point, he does, as we would expect, adopt
the position that the absolute pole is rather one aspect of
God.
I am arguing that the absolute is, rather, an
abstract feature of the inclusive and supreme
reality which is precisely the personal God.
If one must speak of 'appearance', then the
absolute, simply as such, may be termed the
appearance of ultimate reality to the abstract
cognition, including the divine self-cognition
in its abstract aspect. The absolute is not
more, but less, than God — in the obvious
sense in which the abstract is less than the
concrete.2^2
The above quotation seems to be consistent with our
interpretation of creativity as being distinct from God in
Whiteheadian thought. First of all, here and in Whitehead,
-^-^ibid. p. 168.
3^°Hartshorne, Charles. The Divine Relativity. "A Social




the term absolute refers to only an aspect of God, and not
to something that is more than God, e.g. it does not refer to
creativity. Second, here and in Whitehead, the absolute pole,
as: an aspect of the objectified God, makes possible human
knowledge of God's own "self-cognition in its abstract aspect,"
i.e. the totally indeterminate unity of creativity. Indeed,
Hartshorne later says, "We are an absolutely inessential (but
not inconsequential) object for him; he is the essential
object for us."^2
Furthermore, like Whitehead, Hartshorne argues that the
absolute pole is the pole of unity of relations, and that no
relations fall outside of this pole.
If the relation of the absolute to the world
really fell wholly outside the absolute, then
this relation would necessarily fall within
some further and genuinely single entity which
embraced both the absolute and the world and
the relations between them — in other words,
within an entity greater than the absolute.
Or else the world itself would possess as its
property the relation-to-God, and since this
relation is nothing without God, the world, in
possessing it, would possess God as integral
part of its own property, and thus the world
would itself be the entity inclusive of itself
and the absolute.
Thus, consistent with Whiteheadian thought, the absolute
pole is a unity of all realised relationships. It serves as
an object for man. Therefore, there is no god beyond God,
because all realised relationships are unified in God's abso¬
lute pole. However, the potential for relationships is
362ibid. pp . lU-l -l*+2.
^^Hartshorne. Man's Vision Of God, pp.238-239.
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possible between entities, because all entities including
God share in creativity.
Having established that Hartshorne adopted the general
Whiteheadian understanding of the term absolute, we may next
consider how this influenced the development of his important
philosophical conclusions.
In the first place, his understanding of the term abso¬
lute seems partly responsible for his re-evaluation of
Anselm1s ontological argument. Hartshorne says,
What Anselm had discovered, or almost discovered,
was that existence and actuality (or concrete-
ness) are in principle distinct, and that two
kinds of individuals may be conceived, those
whose existence and actuality, although distinct,
are both contingent and those — or that one —
whose actuality but not existence is contingent,
this second kind being superior to all others.
According to this view, any individual, no matter
how superior, exists by virtue of contingent
concrete states; but whereas with you or me it
is always possible that there should be no such
states at all, with God, though any such state
is contingent, that there is some such state is
necessary.
In studying the absolute pole as a principle of limita¬
tion, we said that while man needed a particular unity — an
object — in order to conceptualise unity, God was primordi-
ally a unity in one aspect, quite apart from any object.
Naturally, we were assuming in that discussion that just as
creativity included a multiplicity as well as a unity, so
God, as creativity objectified, included a relative as well
as an absolute pole. This meant that the pole of unity was
o 6U-
Hartshorne, Charles. Anselm's Discovery. "A Re¬
examination Of The Ontological Proof For God's Existence."
(LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing House, 1965^- pAO.
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necessarily made up of some relations, but the particularity
of these relations was a concrete absolute unity only for
man.
Picking up this general point and developing it, Harts-
horne concludes that his whole formulation can be read to
mean that God depends upon no specific relations for his
existence, but only his actuality is contingent. On the
other hand, man depends for both his existence and his actu¬
ality on a particular state, just as he depends upon a
particular concrete aspect of the absolute pole. Further¬
more, as man depends for his knowledge on an object, Whitehead
said that, without a particular actual unity, we could have
no concept of unity. Hartshorne goes on to say that to be
able to know God depends upon God's existence.
The fact that the concrete aspect of the absolute pole
is here thought of as being merely a unity of all presently
realised relationships, and not a factor of total determina¬
tion, means that relations themselves are not always causally
derived. "In final metaphysical analysis: that acts occur
for which there is no complete causal derivation is not 'ir¬
rational1 if the essential function of reason is to explicate
and serve creativity (rather than to foresee its results);
deity, however, cannot be conceived as a mere product of
creativity, but only as its supreme and indispensable aspect,
whose flexibility is coincident with possibility itself, and
is thus on both sides of every contingent alternative, hence
^-^ibid. p. 53.
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itself not contingent but necessary.'0
We quoted the above in order to note that, along with
Whitehead, Hartshorne understands the limits of conscious
activity to be directly connected with the concept of the
absolute pole. That is, the absolute pole as an object makes
it possible for us to conceptualise an indeterminate unity,
i.e. the unity of creativity itself. Hartshorne says,
We are all in the free, partly-contingent
divine life within our own contingency and
freedom. That this is possible means that
the divine life does not consist in mere
'power', mere control, but has also a pass¬
ive aspect, as all life indeed must have.^^,
We are free because the principle of unity is indeter¬
minate. The absolute pole is a particular unity in God, but
it is accompanied by a relative pole. God is contingent
because the absolute pole does form a unity of the past
events of the temporal world.
It becomes quite clear that such a formulation would
indeed make concepts such as change, variety, complexity, and
sympathy relevant to our idea of God. Furthermore, it gives
a basis for the evaluation of human actions. Those actions
which are creative — which promote new relations — are of
value. Hartshorne expresses it this way: Man's purpose is
to be altruistic toward God, i.e. "to serve and glorify God
so as to contribute some value to the divine life which at
present it otherwise would not have."3^3 The point being
366ibid. p.71. 367ibid. p.109.
3^3Hartshorne. The Divine Relativity, p.133*
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made is expanded in the following,
...the exceptional status of God can itself
be put as a transcendental or strictly uni¬
versal rule. Thus, 'Every individual whatso¬
ever interacts (at least/ with some other
individuals, and also, and in all possible
cases, with God, who alone universally inter¬
acts.' This rule is absolute. For since God,
in a fashion, interacts with, that is, both
influences and (in subsequent states) is
influenced by, himself, all individuals what¬
ever interact with deity as well as with at
least some individuals other than deity.
Having shown that Hartshorne does adopt the Whiteheadian
position that the term absolute refers to one pole of God, we
then moved to a consideration of how this understanding of
the term absolute influenced Hartshorne's general formulations
about the existence of God and His nature. Now we are ready
to look at certain further implications of these formulations
that are especially relevant to theology. We shall consider
the theological implications under the three headings of
Christology, soteriology and eschatology.
Christology
The matter of Christology has already arisen in Harts¬
horne' s list of contradictions that result from the traditio¬
nal dogmatic view of God's absoluteness. Specifically he
says,
The incarnation is supposed to solve the prob¬
lem also. I can only say that if it is Jesus
as literally divine who loves men, really
loves them, then my point, so far as I can
see, is granted. If not, then the problem is
unsolved. Instead of simply adding Jesus to
an unreconstructed idea of a non-loving God,
should we not take him as proof that God
^69J 'Hartshorne, Charles. A Natural Theology Fdr Our
Time. (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing House,
19S7). p.63.
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really is love — just that, without equi¬
vocation.
As we have seen, the idea of God is reconstructed by
Hartshorne in such a way that his absoluteness does not pre¬
vent direct relations between man and God. And it is the
very directness of this relationship which leads Hartshorne
finally to say,
Although I believe the doctrine of the Incar¬
nation enshrined important religious truth, I
feel in honesty bound to add the following.
I very much doubt if there ever has been or
ever can be a form of theism which will enable
such phrases as 'Jesus was God' or the 'divin¬
ity of Jesus' to have a sufficiently unambigu¬
ous meaning to entitle them to serve as req¬
uirements for Christian unity,
It is not difficult to understand the "important reli¬
gious truth" which he refers to; namely, as he said in the
previous quotation, Jesus, if he has any meaning at all,
must be an example of God's love for men, i.e. God's related-
ness to man. Notice, however, that we did not refer to Jesus
as "the" example or revelation of God's love.
Such a stand would be impossible from the Process view¬
point, partly because of its peculiar understanding of the
term absolute. God as absolute, in the traditional or Greek
sense, cannot relate directly to man. However, by the Pro¬
cess view, the absolute pole, which is nothing other than
37®Hartshorne. Man's Vision Of God. p.l65«
^^Hartshorne, Charles. Reality As Social Process.
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953^* P*l52.
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the particular unity of relationships between God and the
world, is itself the objectification of God's participation
with man that Jesus is supposed to reveal. In other words,
172
we know God by our own participation in creating with God.
God's relation to man is not to be understood in terms of a
single event such as the incarnation; rather God relates to
man through all events.
Nevertheless, Jesus may be more significant than the
above seems at first to allow. Hartshorne says,
The infinite fullness of the divine life is
empirical not metaphysical. Empirical science
and theology (revealed theology is in this
sense empirical) are the sources for any know¬
ledge we have of God beyond the bare outline
of the dimensions of his being. That he has an
infinitude of contingent features is meta¬
physical; what these features are is not ...
Only philosophy, science, and religious
theology, theology drawing upon special ex¬
periences of gifted individuals and groups,
can together furnish man with his greatest
measure of such total knowledge.
Jesus may well fit into the category of "gifted indivi¬
duals". However, as Hartshorne himself sees, from the
traditional theological viewpoint, to say this is merely to
assert "...the truism that a certain man (like all things,
but more richly or purely than others) is a manifestation
of divine love."^1+
The problem of how Jesus can represent a unique rela¬
tionship between God and the world, which results in part
172
Hartshorne. Anselm's Discovery. p.5l«
^^Hartshorne. Man' s Vision Of God, pp.3^5-3^6.
•^^Hartshorne. Reality As Social Process. p.l53«
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from the -understanding of the term absolute, will regularly
reoccur in our study. Indeed the problem will become more
apparent when, in studying men such as Thornton, we can ob¬
serve that he must give-up the Process understanding of the
term absolute at the point of Ghristology.
Soteriology
The point at which we will take up the topic of Soteri¬
ology is with a consideration of the common Christian analogy
of participation in the 'Body Of Christ', as a description
of the salvific state. To begin with St. Paul refers to
Jesus as the head of the body. Such an organic-social ana¬
logy is open to at least two quite different interpretations,
called by Henri Bergson "closed" and "opened" understandings
of society. Bergson says, "...if we wish to deal with fully
complete societies, clear-cut organizations of distinct indi¬
viduals, we must take the two perfect types of association
represented by a society of insects and a human society, the
one immutable, the other subject to change; the one instinc¬
tive, the other intelligent; the first similar to an organism
whose elements exist only in the interest of the whole, the
second leaving so wide a margin to the individual that we
cannot tell whether the organism was made for them or they
375
for the organism." y
In large part the interpretation of an organic-social
175
^Bergson, Henri. The Two Sources Of Morality And
Religion, trans., R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton.
(Garden City, New York; Doubleday Anchor Books, not dated),
p.117* First published in 1932, the English translation
appeared in 1935-(copyrighted by Henry Holt and Company,
New York).
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analogy that one chooses depends upon his understanding of
the concept of absoluteness. According to Karl Popper, if
one adopts the Platonic understanding of God's absoluteness,
a closed society results from that interpretation.378
Popper points out that for Plato forms, including the
form of the Good, are changeless. Change can only be away
-\nn
from the forms.J Man can change only for the worse, i.e.
decay. Only reason can break the law of decay by allowing
man to return to the forms.378
Following the Platonic concepts, to become part of the
"Body Of Christ" is to return to the divinely predetermined
plan. It is to become a part of a society with a single
purpose as determined by Christ, its head.
This dream of unity and beauty and perfection,
this aesthetieism and holism and collectivism,
is the product as well as the symptom of the
lost group spirit of tribalism. It is the ex¬
pression of, and an ardent appeal to, the
sentiments of those who suffer from the strain
of civilization.
Popper's argument seems conclusive on the point that
by his understanding of the Greek interpretation of absolute¬
ness, salvation must mean conformity to a predetermined plan.
Salvation is the sacrificing of one's individuality for the
common good of the whole. The rejection of individualism
Popper traces to "Plato's identification of individualism
378Popper, K.R. The Open Society And Its Enemies. (Lon¬
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952). Second Edition,
revised. Vol. I. p.3«
377ibid. p.l>+. 378ibid. p.20. 379ibid. p.199-
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with egoism (which) furnishes him with a powerful weapon for
his defence of collectivism as well as for his attack upon
oOA
individualism.11 As we move ahead it will become clear that
the "Body of Christ" analogy often falls under the influence
of the so-called Greek understanding of absoluteness.
Certainly Process is interested in finding an analogy
to describe relations. "Accordingly," says Hartshorne, "a
principal task of any theology is to examine the relations in
which things stand in our experience in order to discover the
direction in which the indeed superior, but not in every sense
incomparable, relations to God are to be sought."3
However, such relations cannot be established on the
basis of man coming into line with a predetermined plan of
unity. Granted, Process does think of the absolute pole as
a unity of relationships, just as the "Body of Christ" is a
unity of relationships; however, Process1 absolute pole is
not ultimately a particular unity. Thus the very useful
organic-social analogy must take on quite a different empha¬
sis for Process:
In sum, then, God's volition is related to the
world as though every object in it were to him
a nerve-muscle, and his omniscience is related
to it as though every object were a muscle-
nerve. A brain cell is for us, as it were, a
nerve-muscle, and a muscle-nerve, in that its
internal motions respond to our thoughts, and
our thoughts to its motions. If there is a
theological analogy, here is the locus. God
has no separate sense organs or muscles, be¬
cause all parts of the world body directly
38°ibid. p.101.
38"4iartshorne. Man' s Vision Of God, p. 17^.
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perform both functions for him. In this sense
the world is God's body.^Q2
This use of the above analogy clearly implies the neces¬
sity of real individuality. The necessary unity is one for
individuals, and as such it is not a unity which makes for a
final and perfect harmony.
We must accordingly admit that in some sense the
world body is not an absolute, perfectly harmon¬
ized unity. It may be absolutely unified in so
far as unity is the basis of co-presence to one
awareness, the divine omniscience; but there is
experiential warrant for admitting that a kind
of conflict and evil is compatible with such co-
presence, since otherwise we could not ourselves
be aware of conflicting factors,
If there is an ultimate concrete unity one may think of
evil as being overcome through perfect harmony. On the other
hand, if the absolute pole is merely a unity of the various
relationships growing out of the temporal world, perfect
harmony is a contradiction, and in that sense evil cannot be
overcome.
However, Hartshorne says,
The justification of evil is not that it is
really good or partly good or necessary to
good, but that the creaturely freedom1 from
which evils spring, with probability in
particular cases and inevitability in the
general case, is also an essential aspect
of all goods, so that the price of a guar¬
anteed absence of evil would be the equally
guaranteed absence of good... Risk of evil
and opportunity for good are two aspects of
just one thing, multiple freedom; and that
one thing is also the ground of all meaning
and all existence.^g^
~^2ibid. p.l85« ^^ibid. p.195.
^^Hartshorne. A Natural Theology For Our Time, p.81.
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The understanding of the term absolute in Process
affects soteriological formulations in such a way that the
concept of the overcoming of evil by a perfect harmony is
quite inconsistent. This is certainly true in the sense in
which Jesus is thought to overcome evil. Indeed, according
to Process the price of overcoming evil would be to destroy
the possibility of good. Works, as we have said before, can
only be good if God relates to man, and in order to have
such relationships the Process understanding of the term
absolute as referring to a pole of God must be allowed.
Eschatology
In a strict sense of "last things" one can hardly speak
of a Process eschatology. It is of course true that Process
is interested in the future. It looks to the infinite possi¬
bilities for the universe as a great hope for mankind.
Whitehead himself says, "I wish I could convey this sense I
have of the infinity of the possibilities that confront hum¬
anity — the limitless variations of choice, the possibility
of novel and untried combinations, the happy turns of experi-
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ment, the endless horizons opening out."-'
Yet, influenced by an understanding of the term abso¬
lute, this hope is not an eschatology. The new, as we know,
is the result of new relations, which in turn form a part of
the concrete content of God's absolute pole. However,
•^^Dialogues Of Alfred North Whitehead. Price, p.160.
2(h
Hartshorne points out, "It is true that there can be no
absolutely maximal complexity; however, transcendence as
such is not properly defined as an unsurpassable maximum of
this or that."-^^
The absolute pole, being the objectification of a
totally indeterminate unity, cannot be properly understood
as a maximal complexity — a certain predetermined level of
relatedness. That would imply that there is a finite number
of possible relationships, and that after these have been
achieved the absolute pole is realised as a maximal complex¬
ity. While such a view would indeed allow the creation of
an Absolute in time, it contradicts itself by the assumption
of an absolute determination standing behind the absoluteness
of temporal relations. This Whiteheadian Process, as we have
seen, does not affirm. Yet some writers will attempt to make
something like this the Process position.
In other words, we may say that from the point of view
of our interpretation of Whiteheadian thought, shared by men
such as Hartshorne, Process is 'everlasting'. There are no
"last things" in an ultimate sense.
^^Hartshorne, Charles. Creative Synthesis And The
Philosophic Method. (London: SCM Press, 1970)* p.236.
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CHAPTER XXli: William Christian's Influence On Theology
William Christian, like Hartshorne, is perhaps better
called a philosopher than a theologian. However, his book
An Interpretation Of Whitehead1s Metaphysics needs to be
considered, at least briefly, because it is a strong re-
emphasis of the fact that the understanding of the term
absolute in Whiteheadian Process thought should be interpre¬
ted in a way similar to the one that we have seen developing
in Hartshorne.
In his well known discussion of "actual occasions"
Christian makes it quite clear that the "absolute" cannot be
an ultimate principle of concrete unity of all reality. He
says,
The satisfaction of an actual occasion is an
immediate feeling which, when it perishes,
exists as an object for occasions which suc¬
ceed it... In its feeling of satisfaction the
occasion has become a complete and fully con¬
crete thing. If an occasion were only a
process of internal change, it would not
be complete or fully concrete.
The point seems to be that an entity, or occasion,
cannot be fully concrete without its own unique aspect of
unity. The defence of this view is quite significant for
our purposes. For it suggests that if Process1 absolute
pole is equated with the principle of -unity, then no entity
^^^Ghristian, William A. An Interpretation Of White¬
head' s Metaphysics. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
19597T ppMX?.
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other than God would have a concrete unity of its own. The
foregoing is the same as denying that a true diversity exists
among actual entities. Therefore, a distinction must be
made between God's unity and a unity shared by all entities
individually.
Christian points out that, given the fact that there
must be a real multiplicity in order to account for activity,
the boundaries of each actual occasion must be definite.
That is, each actual entity must have a unity of its own.
Such definite boundaries may be accounted for scientifically
by the thesis that no two actual occasions can have any
oOO
spatiotemporal parts in common. If, as was suggested
before, the absolute pole, as a particular unity, is part of
an actual entity — God — then it could not include other
actual occasions' spatiotemporal parts.
The absolute pole, understood as the ultimate principle
of unity, suggests Christian, does not allow for indivi¬
duality .
The implicit criticism is that philosophers
of Process have left out a doctrine of real
individuals. They have not done full justice
to our experience of the world. A notion of
real individuals, in which ends are not only
aimed at but attained, is necessary to make
the notion of process itself intelligible.
Specifically Christian argues that the absolute pole,
while itself a unity, does not provide unity for "events".
It is a unity of objects and not of events. It is, so to
388lbid. p.lO>+. 389ibid. p.117.
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speak, the Object of objects. It includes the sum total of
the past. To clarify:
...objects differ from events in relation to
space and time. Objects are nonextended, have
multiple location, and coincide. Events on the
contrary are extended, have single location
and do not coincide.
Furthermore, Christian believes that Whitehead intended
to suggest just such a concept. "He thinks the 'underlying
unity', which Bradley rightly asked for, does not have to be
the Absolute. "39^" If the Absolute and the principle of unity
were one and the same, the Absolute would prevent other enti¬
ties having their own unity, and thus would determine their
organisation.
While the absolute pole provides the principle of limi¬
tation necessary for conscious activity, the unity of indivi¬
dual events comes, as we have seen, through the principle of
creativity. To this latter 'underlying unity',creativity,
the term absolute does not apply.
Because Christian sees the term absolute applying to one
aspect of God, and not to some ultimate principle of unity,
he is in the position to allow God to participate in the pro¬
cess of events. Christian rightly sees that Whitehead's
radically different understanding of the term absolute helps
to account for a new theological question. "Unlike that
provoked by traditional theology, which forces us to ask:
How can an utterly unchanging being have any real knowledge
39°ibid. p.179. 391ibid. p.236.
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of the changing world?, the question Whitehead's view pro¬
vokes is: How can a constantly changing being, have a fully
determinate experience of the changing world?"392
Christian's answer to this latter question is that a
clear understanding of the absolute pole removes any possible
dilemma. The absolute pole is enjoyed by God as his "imme¬
diate satisfaction." However, this satisfaction is not
complete. The best way to express its incompleteness is by
saying that God's primordial nature, i.e. the indeterminate
unity of pure creativity, objectified in his absolute pole,
cannot be satisfied by any particular unity. Of course
Christian does not put ife in just these words. J He says,
"Now God's aim is at maximum intensity of experience for
himself and for the world. "39lf
Whatever particular unity is achieved, God's aim is
toward the still existing infinity of possibilities. While
he holds the past as a particular object and limitation, he
is also the source of an aim which directs activity beyond
a particular satisfaction. As Christian points out,
Again, the continuity of the world in time re¬
quires the doctrine of God. The past which has
pjerished can be given for the present and im¬
pose conformity on it, because God is the
ontological ground of its givenness. The given-
ness of the past for the present, and the
conformity of the present to the past, is the
basis in experience for the continuity of
time. The temporal continuity of standpoints
of actual occasions is an abstract aspect of
the influence of actual occasions on their
successors. And since the influence of actual
occasions requires God for its explanation,
392ibid. p.296. 393ibid. p.297. 39^iMd. p.308.
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the temporal continuity of the extended world
requires the doctrine of God.^c^
Only because the absolute pole is the formation of a
particular unity, whose content is not all of reality, can
true individuality co-exist with the concept of the absolute
pole. The absolute pole is thus an aspect of God, and the
term absolute cannot be applied as descriptive of creativity.
As Christian says, "...God is neither absolutely complete nor
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absolutely independent..."J
In some other Process theologians we will see the sug¬
gestion that the coneeptiof eternal process can be maintained
if a dipolar God is equated with creativity, in a way that
makes the absolute pole the sole principle of unity. Such a
formulation is characterised by the suggestion that the
absolute pole is a principle of a particular kind of world
unification which is God's aim. Once this unification is
achieved, harmony will reign, but individuals will continue
to interact. This is tantamount to the concept of a spirit¬
ual society in which there is unity of purpose but indivi¬
duality continues. It is a unity "in which" individuality
is allowed, not a unity "along with" individuality. Such an
interpretation would imply that finally, if not at present,
God does include the cosmos within himself. That is, the
absolute pole becomes the unity of the cosmos; the absolute
pole becomes a determinate principle of unity.
While this may indeed be a view easier to reconcile
^^ibid. p.335* ^"^ibid. p.375*
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with traditional dogmatic positions, Christian well argues
that it is not the Whiteheadian viewpoint:
(a) God is not the cosmos, nor does he in¬
clude (in Hartshorne's sense) the cosmos;
and (b) his actuality is always conditioned
though never determined by the cosmos. This
view agrees with traditional theism, against
traditional pantheism and panentheism, in
asserting that God is neither identical with
nor inclusive of the world. It agrees with
panentheism and traditional theism, against
traditional pantheism, in asserting that
God transcends the world. And it agrees with
traditional pantheism and panentheism,
against traditional theism, in asserting
that God is conditioned by the world.^7
The points made by Christian in the above quotation
each reflect the Process understanding of the term absolute.
First, God does not include the cosmos, because there is no
ultimate concrete unity of all reality. The absolute pole of
God is merely a unity of "objects" and not of "events."
Second, God is conditioned but not determined by the cosmos,
because events become objects but the absolute pole does not
ultimately determine events. The past merely limits present
possibilities. On the other hand, if the absolute pole was
ifeid* p.^07. The reference to Hartshorne concerns a
position once held by him, against Christian's, that God in
Whiteheadian thought could be considered a society of actual
entities, (cf., e.g., Man's Vision Of God, pp. 238-21+0.)
Hartshorne modified this view in his later works. He says,
"I once held this doctrine of absolute simultaneous inter¬
action myself. I cannot now believe it. But there does seem
to be a puzzle. Contemporaries apparently form a whole which
is actual or concrete, and yet this whole is not a subject...
True, the whole will eventually be in a subject, but not
until a long time has passed, unless one conceives deity as
somehow escaping relativity principles. (As ubiquitous, God
must somehow be a, in principle, unique case.) However, I
should deny interaction between God, as in a certain state,
and any other individuals in a strictly simultaneous state.
On the most concrete level, that of states, there is action,
not interaction." (Creative Synthesis And The Philosophic
Method, p.115.).
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considered to be an ultimate unity, then God would — if not
at present at least finally — include the cosmos. Likewise,
if the absolute pole was understood to be the determinate
organisation of activity, events would not condition God.
From our consideration of the work of Hartshorne and
Christian we may now list several guidelines for theologians,
relative to the Process understanding of the term absolute,
which must be observed, if a strict application of Whitehead-
ian metaphysics is to be made:
(a) The dipolar God should not be equated with crea¬
tivity, as that would make the term absolute refer
to creativity, and suggest that the organisation
of activity is predetermined.
(b) The absolute pole of God should not be equated with
an ultimate principle of unity, as that would
suggest that the organisation of activity is pre¬
determined.
(c) The principle of unity, of which the absolute pole
is an objectification, is indeterminate.
(d) The concept of divine perfection does not depend
upon God being an ultimate unity, rather upon God
being a concrete unity of the highest possible
degree.
(e) God and the world relate through all events, and
together participate in creating the absolute pole.
(f) As the unity of the absolute pole does not include
the cosmos, it is not a guarantee of harmony or of
the overcoming of evil.
(g) The absolute, as a pole of God, implies the priority
of process, and does not lead to an end of that
process.
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CHAPTER XXIII: Examples Of Whiteheadian Process Theologians
In this Chapter we will consider a selection of some of
the works of Schubert M. Ogden and Daniel Day Williams.
These two writers do not exhaust a category in which one
might also include others. However, their works will serve
as especially clear illustrations of some of the theological
implications relative to the Process understanding of the
term absolute.
A. Schubert M. Ogden
Ogden clearly accepts the position that God is the
objectiflcation of the creative principle of reality, but
that all entities participate in creativity. He says,
I hold that the primary use oh function of 'God'
is to refer to the objective ground in reality
itself of our ineradicable confidence in the
final worth of our existence. It lies in the
nature of this confidence to affirm that the
real whole of which we experience ourselves to
be parts is such as to be worthy of, and thus
itself to evoke, that very confidence. The
word 'God' then, provides the designation for
whatever it is about this experienced whole
that calls forth and justifies our original
and inescapable trust...
The designation of worth is the way that God has exis¬
tential meaning for man. Such a meaning comes only from a
God understood in terms of the Process dipolar concept. As
Hartshorne pointed out, and as Ogden restates, a totally
^■^Ogden, Schubert M. The Reality Of God. (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1966). p.37«
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absolute God means that all human actions are devoid of
worth, i.e. have no ultimate significance.399
On the other hand, a God who is dipolar gives meaning,
as human events help to create the very unity which is his
absolute pole. Without God and the absolute pole, human
actions would indeed appear random and without significance.
The absolute pole is the objectification of a specific whole,
without denying man's contribution to that whole. Just this
objectification, according to Ogden, often appearing in a
form called "myth", is a part of human experience; "...myth
is characterized, first of all, as a way of representing
linguistically a basic field of human experience — namely,
that field in which each of us is aware of himself and the
world as parts of an encompassing whole.
Indeed, we can only account for our feeling of the whole
because of the absolute pole, which is an object of that
feeling. Ogden is in close agreement with Whitehead that
physical feelings in man always precede conceptual feelings.
Ogden's point is that once the myth of God is viewed in
terms of the Process understanding of God's dipolar nature,
the myth is "De-mythologised", i.e. it is related to human
experience. The Process understanding of the term absolute
allows us to get behind the myth to the existential situation
1+01
which it objectifies, namely, that events have worth
3"ibid. p.51. **00ibid. p.ll*f.
^^"Ogden, Schubert M. Christ Without Myth. "A Study On
The Theology Of Rudolf Bultmann". (London: Collins, 1962).
p. 30.
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because they influence the trend of formation in the whole
of reality.
Having argued that the Process understanding of the
absolute pole relates God to the existential situation,
Ogden fully realises that the price of this formulation is
a necessary re-interpretation of Christology. Ogden was a
student of Bultmann's, but felt that his teacher was not
prepared to fully de-mythologise Christ. Ogden points out,
Contrary,to Bultmann, who, significantly,
offers no scriptural support for his claim,
the New Testament does not affirm that in
Christ our salvation 'becomes possible'.
It affirms, rather, that in him what has
always been possible now 'becomes manifest,'
in the sense of being decisively presented
in a human word of witness.^2
Ogden's Christology relates to our interests, because
in part it is the understanding of the term absolute, which
makes it impossible to assign overall significance to a
single event. The absolute pole, the unity of the past, is
composed as the result of all events. It is this whole which
allows man to see his worth. All human actions are therefore
"redeemed", i.e. given worth as part of the whole, in God.
"The claim 'only in Jesus Christ' must be interpreted to
mean, not that God acts to redeem only in the history of
Jesus and in no other history, but that the only God who re¬
deems any history — although he in fact redeems every




re-presented in the word that Jesus speaks and is." J
Jesus clearly does not present a new order of reality.
He does not represent a culmination of one absolute plan for
all of history. Rather, according to Ogden, he shows us
that all history is redeemed. "To say with the Christian
community then, that 'Jesus is the decisive act of God' is
to say that in him, in his outer acts of symbolic word and
deed, there is expressed that understanding of human exist¬
ence which is, in fact, the ultimate truth about our life
before God; that the ultimate reality with which we and all
men have to do is God the sovereign Creator and Redeemer, and
that in understanding ourselves in terms of the gift and
demand of his love, we realize our authentic existence as
men."
From man's point of view we are related to creativity
only as it is objectified in God. As redeemer of history,
God is the actual concrete reality which gives man's actions
worth; and God is creator in the sense that without his con¬
crete reality creativity would not be available. Therefore,
"The purpose of Jesus' ministry, whether of word or deed,
was far less to speak about man and his relationship to God
— although he did that, too — than to speak of that rela¬
tionship so that it itself could be encountered in its full
1+05
existential reality." In other words, Jesus shows that
we are all of God. That is to say, God's absolute pole is
^•^Ogden. The Reality Of God, p.173*
^^ibid. pp. 185-186.
-'Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p.190.
276
made up of our redeemed history. We participate in a whole
because of our contributions to that whole.
Ogden argues that his understanding is sufficient to
make Jesus a decisive act.^^ However, Jesus reveals that
all history is redemptive history; his is not a uniquely
redemptive history. Clearly, this is a considerable depar¬
ture from many other views, which do think of Jesus as an
uniquely redemptive history. Ogden's alternative position
concerning Jesus results in large part from the fact that
the term absolute in Process must be understood as referring
to a unity of all past or realised events, and not to a
particular predetermined unity, which can be accomplished
through a single event.
Ogden's formulations also influence, as he sees himself,
eschatology.
Hence, from the standpoint of Christian faith
itself, none of the traditional eschatological
symbols may be thought to refer to thihgs or
events in principle beyond our present experi¬
ence and knowledge. This is because their real
reference is always to the abiding structure
and meaning of our actual existence here and
now, which faith presently understands. They
are, we must say, ways of symbolizing or re¬
presenting the promise implied by the reality
of God, which promise is known and affirmed
by Christian faith whenever it becomes actual.
The promise of the reality of God is the redemption of
all history. It is not the promise of a particular end to
^^Ogden. The Reality Of God, p.186.
^^ibid. p.210.
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history. As we said earlier, all technical references to
"last things" lose their meaning if the absolute pole is not
a particular ultimate unity — either predetermined or yet
to be finally determined.
B. Daniel Day Williams
Having seen how the Process understanding of the term
absolute was adopted and then applied by Ogden to Christology
and eschatology, we will briefly consider some of the ideas
introduced by Daniel Day Williams. Williams' book The
Spirit And The Forms Of Love is an attempt to give meaning
to the concept of divine love through the application of
Process thinking. Here we will also see the particular in¬
fluence of the Process understanding of the term absolute.
Williams says,
When we search for the unity of love amidst
those forms we discover that love has a
history. The spirit is not a static ideal
but a creative power which participates in
the life it informs. Here is the key to
everything we shall be saying in the dis¬
cussion of love.^g
What Williams calls "the spirit of Love" appears to have
the very qualities that we have heretofore associated with
the Whiteheadian principle of creativity. Indeed, we will
see that he in fact makes love meaningful by substituting it
for that principle, formulated by Process.
He begins his very interesting book with a discussion
^°^Williams, Daniel Day. The Spirit And The Forms Of
Love. (London: James Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1968). p.4-.
278
of the history of the understanding of love as it developed
within the Western Christian tradition. He speaks of three
1+09
historical formulations which he calls the Augustinian,
iflO
the Franciscan, and the Evangelical or Reformation con-
i+H
cepts. His descriptions of these positions, for our
purposes, are not as important as the fact that he finds it
1+12
necessary to reject each of them.
However, he is most sympathetic to Augustine's formu¬
lation of love. Nevertheless, Williams sees the Augustinian
concept of God as inconsistent with his formulation of love.
Williams says, "What Augustine does is to conceive God the
Creator and Redeemer with all the absolute aspects which
neo-platonism has ascribed to the trandscenent and changeless
l+l^
One." J Williams cannot accept the neo-platonic concept for
the following reasons: (1) It denies human freedom; (2) It
makes the new impossible; (3) It makes the human world of
change an inferior world; and, (*f) It makes it impossible to
If! Ll
account for the Incarnation and the Atonement. Indeed,
says Williams, love can have no meaning apart from individu¬
ality, freedom, action and suffering, causality, and impar-
ifl^
tiality — the very things which a neo-platonic
understanding of God as the Absolute make impossible for God.
Lf°9iMd. p.53. Lfl°ibid. P.67.
tfllibld. p.76. lfl2ibid. p.90.
^^ibid. p.92. ^S-bid. pp.95-100.
^ibld. pp. 11*+-122.
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Therefore, if we wish to see God participating in love,
we must have a formulation in which his creative and redemp¬
tive roles do not depend upon his being "absolute" in what
Williams calls the neo-platonic sense.
If God is love and the ground and the struc¬
ture of love, then he remains in the absolute
integrity of his being what he is throughout
all time and all circumstances... Yet God con¬
stitutes with his creatures the metaphysical
situation in which their love can be real, and
in which love between himself and the creatures
can be actualized.
In other words, Williams wants to make a distinction
between God as in some sense absolute, and God as partici¬
pating in the spirit of love. The way in which Williams
formulates his own position on love is by making the term
absolute refer, not to an ultimate plan or unity, but rather,
to a flexible state. He says,
The Kingdom of God is the goal of his creation,
but we need not conceive the Kingdom as a fixed
'state of being1 toward which things tend. The
Kingdom of God is fulfilment of God's being in
relation to every creature, and if being is
love, then the Kingdom must be an infinite
realm of creative life.^,^
Of course Williams has introduced theological terms to
express his point, but behind them we can clearly see the
influence of the Process understanding of the absolute pole.
Just as his term love has the characteristics of creativity,
so his Kingdom of God is similar to Process1 absolute pole.
Both the Kingdom of God and the absolute pole are unities
Ifl6ibid. p.125. i+17ibid. p. 135.
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of relationships between God and man. Neither are fixed
states, although they are both objective realities. Both
the Kingdom and the absolute pole are spoken of as fulfiling
God. Thus Williams makes a distinction between the unity of
love in which all entities participate, and the unity of
God's Kingdom.
Furthermore, Williams goes on,
What it means for God to love the world, to
suffer, to give freedom to the creatures and
to will communion with them is the very mys¬
tery of existence. We must not equate our
being with God's and say that love, suffering,
freedom, and creativity, mean for him precisely
what they mean for us. What we can do, however,
within the perspective of Christian faith, is to
give an account of the love of God which does
not make nonsense of the profoundest aspects of
love in human experience. If we say that the
imago dei in man is his creation for communion
with God and the creatures, we mean that God
wills communion on terms of man's real free¬
dom and responsiveness.
In other words, man like God participates in the spirit
of love, just as for Whitehead all entities participate in
the principle of creativity. The term absolute does not
apply to love. Love is not a concrete unity nor a principle
of limitation, rather it is a dynamic principle of communion,
i.e. freedom and responsiveness. On the other hand, the term
absolute would apply to the factor of God's being in relation
to every creature. No other entity relates to "all" entities.
Therefore, the term absolute is applied to God in terms of
his unifying of relationships. Because of God's unique rela-




same experiences as does God. In other words, the human
individual's participation in love is here described as
God's will that man should commune with him. This is God's
will because he himself participates in the principle of
love. "Man, created in God's image, is created for partici¬
pation in the infinite life of communion within the ever¬
lasting creativity of God."Lf"'~^
Such an analysis says Williams is proven true by the
fact that it fulfills the baiic human longing. "Begin with
the assertion that the fundamental human craving is to belong,
to count in the community of being, to have one's freedom in
and with the response of others, to enjoy God as one who makes
1+20
us members of one society."
For Williams the absolute pole or Kingdom of God is not
only a unity, but it is also a principle of limitation. He
says, "Something must re-create the capacity to belong in
the society of God's creatures so that man finds his security
in giving himself to the service and enjoyment of God and
i+2i
His Kingdom as the ultimate context of every human love."
Love in itself is an unlimited potential for new possi¬
bilities of relatedness. However, man requires some
limitation on his possibilities. That is, as Williams says,
man must have an ultimate context to which he can refer every
human love. This context is God's Kingdom. Thus God's






It can therefore rightly be called "absolute" by the Process
understanding of that term.
Based on Williams understanding of love and the King¬
dom of God, the incarnation and atonement have radically new
meanings. Beginning with the incarnation:
What Jesus reveals on the cross surely is not
that human love suffers while divine love
does not. What he reveals is the love which
does not shirk suffering, and that love is
God himself at work... The truth of impassi¬
bility is that God's love is the everlasting
power and spirit of deity.*. God's love is
absolute in its integrity forever.^2
In other words, Jesus, according to Williams, does not
make man's relationship to God possible, rather he demon¬
strates the nature of God's relationship to man. God relates
to man not in a single event, but through all events. There¬
fore, of atonement Williams says,
Atonement is creation. The new community
brought into being through the renewal of
love has in its structure the experience
which brings about the renewal.
Williams also says, "Love is not possession, but partici-
, . ,pu¬pation. "
The Kingdom of God, which Jesus spoke about, is not a
future state in which men are finally brought into relation
with God. Instead, the Kingdom already exists for all who
are aware of their participation with God in creative acts
of love. Furthermore, participation with God is constantly
renewed as new possibilities of love are realised by man.
"Atonement is creation," means that as human events enter
If22ibid. p. 185. ^ibld. p.187. ^ibid. p.209.
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into the unity of God's absolute pole, that unity becomes
ever new — a new community of love.
If the Kingdom was thought of as a concrete future
state, it would be a predetermined unity within God. How¬
ever, as Williams said, "Love is not possession but partici¬
pation." Man could not participate in something already
determined, because his action would have no ultimate sig¬
nificance. If man's actions have no ultimate significance,
then he does not relate to God.
On the other hand, it is because of the significance
which the absolute pole, i.e. God's Kingdom, allows man's
actions to have that atonement becomes possible. Apart from
God there could be no significant acts by Williams' formu¬
lation. Therefore, Williams does understand man as being
in need of God for atonement.
In summary it may be helpful to review how Ogden and
Williams attempt to formulate in theological terms the phil¬
osophical guidelines which we indicated were necessary in
order to adopt the Whiteheadian understanding of the term
absolute, (cf. p. 271). The key problem, of course, is to
avoid equating God with creativity in such a way that the
term absolute must logically refer to a determinate plan of
unity. Ogden avoids this by suggesting, much like Chris¬
tian, that God's wholeness is the objectification of man's
participation in the creation of the unity of the universe.
Williams, somewhat differently, speaks of love as the
essential creative reality in which both God and man par¬
ticipate. The purpose in either case is to avoid making
God an impassible "Absolute", and the way they do this is
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to understand God's absoluteness as somehow distinct from a
general principle of unity in which all entities, including
God, participate.
For both men God's unity is understood as redeemed
history; that is human history given worth because it par¬
ticipates^ the shaping of reality. All history becomes the
history of the relationship between God and the world,
because of God's redemptive act in making it a unity. The
making of this unity is a creative function shared by God
and man. However, God's further creative function is to
open for men new possibilities of relations beyond any par¬
ticular unity.
The absolute pole, the particular unity of redeemed
history, is called by Ogden the object of the experience of
the whole, and by Williams the Kingdom of God. Because of
the nature of the absolute pole, neither of these can be
static.
As all history is redeemed, Jesus can hardly be called
the Redeemer. Ogden argues, therefore, that his role is to
re-present for our conscious awareness that which is implic¬
itly revealed to all men in their feeling of the worth of
human actions. Likewise, Williams says that Jesus exempli¬
fies that a relationship of love is the essential nature of
God. In neither case does Jesus' incarnation totally change
the nature of the God-World relationship, it merely enriches
it — perhaps to the highest possible degree. Of course,
any other role for Jesus would suggest a separation existing
between God and man prior to Jesus.
The above does not suggest that these men want to play-
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down Jesus' significance. Once man sees his worth clearly
objectified, or sees the principle of love humanly objectified,
his actions are changed. He will respond to Jesus by acting
in a way increasingly compatible with human worth or love.
Finally, not only is all history redeemed, but it is
redeemed now. Eschatology takes on a present rather than a
future meaning. Yet this emphasis on the present opens,
rather than closes, the future. History by its very nature
continues infinitely. Man, according to Williams, is created
for communion, i.e. relationships with God, and this fact
demands a continuing history. God did not create toward any
end less than infinite enrichment.
What we in fact observe in the above summary is exactly
the kind of Process influence on theology which we suggested
in our consideration of Hartshorne and Christian. The Process
understanding of the term absolute significantly changes es¬
chatology, Christology, and soteriology. In fact these
changes seem too radical to be reconciled with most tradit¬
ional dogmatic formulations.
However, the theologians we have studied were prepared
to make the adjustments in theological thinking in order to
adopt the Process understanding of the term absolute. We
shall now turn to other theologians, who are generally
attracted by certain Process formulations, but who find it
necessary to compromise the Process position when it comes
to accepting the distinction between a principle of unity in
which all entities participate, and a concrete unity in
God's absolute pole.
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Our particular interest is not to classify all White-
headian influenced theologians into over-precise categories.
Indeed, a really satisfactory classification of the schools
of thought growing out of Whitehead's writings would have
to consider many factors other than how the term absolute is
understood and applied. Our purpose is merely to show how
significant the use of the term absolute is as one factor in
determining differences among theological formulations.
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CHAPTER XXIV: Lionel Thornton's Incarnational Theology
Hartshorne, Christian, Ogden and Williams demonstrate,
as we have seen, writers who reject any interpretation of
Whiteheadian thought which makes the term absolute refer to
a universal principle of activity, rather than to an aspect
of God. Accepting this distinction does, however, cause its
supporters to introduce several significant changes in theo¬
logical formulations. Although we have already indicated
our preference for the foregoing interpretation of the abso¬
lute's reference, in spite of its implications for theology,
we have also indicated that an alternative interpretation of
the term absolute is held by other theologians, who also
state that their theologies are intended to reflect Process
thinking.
As we have said, equating a dipolar God with creativity
is necessarily a contradiction. Once the absolute pole is
associated with an ultimate principle of unity, God can no
longer relate to the world. Unfortunately, our formulation
of the reason for this distinction between God and creativity
cannot easily be discovered in Whitehead's writings. We
Llo£
know from Cobb's excellent study ' that Whitehead changes
his mind as to the specific relationship between God and
creativity. And, Whitehead does not specifically explain
the stages in his thinking which lead to his conclusions.
^^^Cobb. A Christian Natural Theology. pp.l*+9f.
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Nevertheless, we can show that because of the necessity
of understanding the term absolute as referring to a pole of
specific unity in God, the alternative of simply equating
God and creativity produces a very subtle form of determin¬
ism. In other words, the influence of the concept absolute
is what finally makes it essential to clearly determine one's
position in respect to a distinction between the dipolar God
and creativity. We will begin our illustration of those who
do not make this distinction with some of the writings of
Lionel Thornton.
Thornton is an obvious choice for several reasons.
First, his work The Incarnate Lord, with which we will be
concerned, is an attempt to develop a theology specifically
consistent with Whitehead's works up to Process And Reality.
Second, he closely follows Whiteheadian thought at nearly
every point except that he does equate God and creativity.
Third, in spite of generally great likenesses between Thorn¬
ton's development of his position and the development made
by Hartshorne, Christian, Ogden and Williams, some of his
key theological positions do in the end differ from the lat¬
ter four's positions, because of his interpretation of
creativity. Fourth, the results of his equating the dipolar
God with creativity lead to deterministic conclusions.
If we can show that it is in fact the influence of the
usage of the term absolute that accounts for three and four
above, we will have made our point. Furthermore, we hope
to give evidence for the suggestion that the reason for
equating God with creativity is that it appears to allow
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reconciliation between Process and some other theological
positions on key issues.
In the foregoing Chapters we have made it quite clear
that what we mean by Process and determinism make them totally
incompatible. Therefore, to say that one combines Process
and deterministic qualities is to suggest some gross incon¬
sistency. Of course, our interest is not to hunt for all
the possible inconsistencies. We merely want to show how an
association of the term absolute with creativity produces
these inconsistencies, and why, from a theological point of
view, certain writers may easily get caught in inconsistency
If26
with regard to the use of the term absolute.
We have pointed out in the previous Chapter that White-
headian Process theology has a very difficult time in dealing
with Christology. However, Thornton feels that the formu¬
lations developed by emergent evolutionism and Process
clarify, rather than confuse, the meaning of the incarnation.
In his book The Incarnate Lord Thornton suggests that
there were three possible philosophical systems which might
have served the needs of his day: Hegelian Idealism, Evolu¬
tionary Mechanism, and Emergence/Process. The first two
views, he suggests, have no possibility of accounting for
By in large the general agreement is that Whitehead
is a true philosopher of Process and is in no sense deter¬
ministic. Therefore, deterministic implications in a writer
would wrongly be ascribed to a Whiteheadian influence.
However, Karl Popper argues that Whitehead in fact repre¬
sents a newer form of an essentially Hegelian position,
and therefore opens himself to deterministic interpretation.
Popper is the only author known to the writer who develops
this interesting,but otherwise unsupported thesis, cf. The
Open Society And Its Enemies♦ Vol. II. pp.2*f7f.
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the Christian experience of the incarnation.
Neither the immanent development of the
Hegelian Idea nor the mechanistic concep¬
tion of evolution left room for such past
action of divine transcendence upon the
field of history as the doctrine of Incar¬
nation asserted... For according to one
view the manifestation of the Idea in
history is to be sought, not in a parti¬
cular event of the past, but in the full
development of the process; whilst accor¬
ding to the widely diffused doctrine of
evolutionary progress towards a future
goal, the ideal end of human endeavour
must be sought in that future, and could
not have been revealed once for all in
the historical Christ
In other words, Thornton understands that the doctrine
of the incarnation wants a culminating historical event,
which does not prevent process, but which nonetheless gives
meaning to the process. The analogy of organism, he says,
used by emergence and Process, gives a model which makes
*+28
sense out of these two demands.
Referring in particular to the concept of emergent
levels he says,
At every step the whole which is typical for
that grade is something more than a collection
of its parts. The parts are held together in
a unity; and the particular principle of unity
which is there manifested is the highest law
of being in that level, it is the distinctive
principle which informs entities on that
level. 1^29
The above relates to the concept of organism because when
we consider "...unity In complexity, of wholeness pervading
Llov
'Thornton, Lionel Spencer. The Incarnate Lord. "An
Essay Concerning The Doctrine Of The Incarnation In Its
Relation To Organic Conceptions." (London: Longmans Green
And Co., Ltd., 1928). p.22.
lf28ibid. p.32. If29ibid. p.37.
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a variety of parts, which we conceive the organism as
possessing at any given moment of time, then we have a con¬
cept of the complete life-story of the organism as a concrete
entity immanent in the spatiotemporal succession of events,
yet transcending it.1,1+30
The principle of organism Thornton refers to as the
lloi
"Eternal Order." J Man, adds Thornton, is the highest
level of emergence because of his participation directly in
Lo 2
the eternal order through his consciousness of it. J The
transcend&sto reality of the unity of the eternal order fills
the incarnational demand for the present fact of ultimate
unity. The continued ihdividuality within the eternal order
allows for an on-going process.
The eternal order is therefore understood as a field
of change,composed likewise of unity and diversity.
However, this field of change is set in what Thornton calls
"Absolute Actuality."
The source of such creative activity will then
be a Being who embraces all the significance
of His creation, whose actuality transcends in
concreteness and comprehensiveness all that is
to be found in the developing series of his
creatures. God is Absolute Actuality, not in
process of realisation but in concrete un¬
changeable reality. But then He cannot be
simulv the goal of a developing series. He
must embrace in Himself that eternal order,
with its transcending forms, principles and
standards, is independent of the cosmic series.
God is the all embracing changeless being who includes
activity within himself. Activity itself is composed of an
1+30ibid- p.^l. Lf31ibid. pp. 56-57.
^3^ibid. pp.56-57? and p.67.
1+33ibid, p.8l»-. 1+3S.bid. p.86.
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aspect of all-embracing unity and of individuality. There¬
fore, says Thornton, we can think of God or Absolute Being
Ll"3 i?
because He is revealed through the eternal order.
The above is essentially Thornton's analysis of Process.
Before going on to see how he applies it to theology, we may
consider its relation to the Whiteheadian position.
Clearly the eternal order is dipolar, rather like
Whitehead's God is dipolar. However, the eternal order is
not God. God is the changeless absolute actuality which in¬
cludes the eternal order. Therefore, God himself could not
be dipolar. However, Thornton is keenly aware of this prob¬
lem as he says, "For religion the ultimate reality is not
primarily unity or absoluteness or an eternal order, but God
in His concrete individuality, with whom our concrete indi¬
vidualities have direct affinity and relations, analogous to
the concrete relations of individuals in the social organ¬
ism.
Therefore, Thornton admits, we experience God as if he
were what we have described as the eternal order, i.e. as
I07
being dipolar. J Here Thornton and Whitehead would be
nearly at one. If Thornton said that God was the eternal
order, which pointed to an indeterminate principle of activ¬
ity, they would be in full agreement.
Indeed, Thornton lays further groundwork for just such
an agreement by the suggestion that the eternal order has to
serve as an object for man or man could not know it.
^^ibid. p.87. ^^ibid. p. 9*+. ^ibid. p. 109.
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All our knowledge of physical objects is depen¬
dent upon the immanence in them of forms and
principles of the eternal order. The more, then,
the eternal order is immanent in objects, the
more we shall know, the more they will mean to
us. Thus the progression of knowledge does not
merely keep step with the ascending series; it
advances upon it. The higher the principle of
unity embodied in an object, the more affinity
does its meaning have with our minds.^8
It seems that.we are almost on the verge of being told,
in a Whiteheadian fashion, that God is the eternal order,
which is really an objectification of a principle — perhaps
the principle of creativity. However, at this point it
becomes clear that Thornton and Whitehead are not talking
about the same things at all. The language looks similar,
but Thornton does not draw a distinction between the unity
of God and a principle of unity in which all entities par¬
ticipate.
For, according to Thornton, the objectified eternal
order reveals to man that there is a unity in which he does
not participate.
For all revelation as it converges upon man
reaches its fulfilment by incorporation into
concrete human activity. We have seen, in
conclusion, that in man's experience of the
eternal order revelation passes through the
limitations of knowledge to a deeper level
of concreteness in the activity of the devel¬
oping character and its response to the good;
and again that through man's ethical failure
to respond to the good he can find no ade¬
quate fulfilment within himself of this
perpetual tendency of revelation to incor¬
porate itself into concrete human activity.
The solution is found in religion. For God
is the concrete actuality who is both agent
and content of all revelation.
Lf38ibid. p.127. ^39ibid. p. 151.
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In other words, Thornton says that the concept of abso¬
lute actuality, which is the changeless principle behind the
activity of the eternal order, must also have a concrete
content. The only way to provide for this is to say that the
eternal order, the agent of the revelation, and the absolute
actuality, the content of the revelation, are both God.
This is quite different from Whitehead, who if he used
Thornton's terms, would have said that God is the eternal
order and therefore must be a concrete object of the physi¬
cal feeling, but that this feeling gives rise to a conceptual
feeling of an indeterminate principle of creativity, in which
both God and the World participate. Because, according to
Process, activity can only be explained if there is true
diversity, and true diversity demands that all entities have
their own unique identity.
Thornton's formulations, on the other hand, suggest a
God behind God — an absolutely ultimate God behind the
unity of activity. The absolute God of ultimate reality
must necessarily be a particular, ultimate and predetermined
unity. Indeed, Thornton admits this. He says,
For the eternal order provides the principles
of unity which determine the directive move¬
ment of the organic universe, of man and of
history. But these principles of unity, while
adequate in their totality to determine the
directive movement of the cosmic process, are
not adequate to provide a goal in which that
process can come to rest. The process passes
beyond each of them; and the self-determining
activity of man, which is the highest of these
principles in the series, is by its very nature
self-transcending and therefore incapable of
providing a last term for the process
^°ibid. pp. 213-21*f.
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Of course, as a true Whiteheadian would say, the eternal
order does not provide an end for the process. However,
that is because process itself is the ultimate. If process
is not the ultimate, then there can be no real process at
all. The very suggestion of a goal to the process means
that the concept absolute has been understood as referring
to an ultimate and predetermining principle of unity. As
Ogden so well pointed out, a formulation such as Thornton's
suggests that process occurs within the 'absolute'; but this
statement is completely inconsistent. By definition some¬
thing which is absolute is what it is. If it is said to be
a unity of ultimate reality, then there is no room for the
individuality necessary for change and activity.
We can see now that Thornton has made the absolute pole
a unification of all reality by equating a dipolar God with
an ultimate principle of process. The implication of this
he rightly interprets to be that process has a final end.
However, he misses the point that if this is in fact true,
then no real process could occur at all.
Furthermore, we are now in a good position to understand
why Thornton fell into this inconsistency. If the eternal
order reveals God and is God, it means that Thornton can
suggest quite easily that the name given to the "person" of
God as agent of revelation is Jesus Christ. "For the
doctrine of the Incarnation declares that Jesus Christ is





Indeed, for Thornton Jesus Christ (embodied eternal
order) functions much like God in the Whiteheadian system.
But if Christ is the adequate embodiment of
the kingdom of God, He embraces within Him¬
self the eternal order and all its principles
of 'unity. He is therefore the adequate goal
of history, and takes up the universe and man
into Himself .^2
That is, the pole of unity of Jesus, like that of White¬
head" s God, is a unity of history which serves as a goal for
man by being the unity in which man can participate toward
shaping reality. Put in other words, "Absolute Actuality as
it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word becomes the
)t.)p
principle of unity in a human organism." J
Jesus for Thornton is understood as the passive aspect
of an otherwise impassible God. While this passive aspect
is quite carefully described in Process terms as having an
absolute and a relative pole, the fact that it is embodied
in a higher absolute actuality renders it contradictory.
The fact is that if God does not reveal himself as himself,
then he does not relate in himself. In true Process a
mediator between God and the world is not an allowable
formulation, as long as such a formulation implies that
behind relationships is a principle that does not partici¬
pate in relationships.
In a final effort to try and assure the reader that he
does not wish to suggest divine impassibility, Thornton
looks to the doctrine of the Trinity to argue that God as
Iflf2ibid. p. 21*4-. ^3ibid. P'232.
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absolute actuality does have relations within himself.
At every stage in its manifestation the
created principle of finite individuality is
seen to have two aspects, unity and plural¬
ity. It moves steadily towards higher forms
of unity. But at no stage in the organic
series is the aspect of plurality eliminated.
Consequently if the analogy between finite
and absolute individuality is to be drawn at
all, it is a highly arbitrary procedure to
select one aspect of individuality for the
purpose of the analogy and to ignore the
other; to regard individuality in God as an
undifferentiated unity, when the experience
of individuality, from which the analogy
is drawn, is of a wholly different charac-
ter.1|)|1|
This is really not a solution at all. Williams, we
may recall, pointed out that relations demand more than in¬
ternal individuality if they are to be authentic (Williams
would say loving). They also require freedom, action and
suffering, causality, and impartiality. y And it is
exactly these things that the term absolute, used to refer
to one aspect of ultimate reality, does not allow. Whatever
sort of relations occur within the God of Thornton's theolo¬
gy, they are relations that have no analogy to human
experience.
We have seen that to a point Process formulations serve
other, more traditional concepts of theology quite well.
However, at the point of the distinction between the absolute
pole and an indeterminate principle of unity, the would-be
Process theologian faces real difficulties. This fact, as
^ibid. p.390.
^-'Williams. The Spirit And The Forms Of Love. pp.HU--
122.
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we have seen illustrated here, is especially true in areas
such as Christology and eschatology. Only by changing from
the Process understanding of the term absolute was Thornton
able to speak of a goal for all process, and a unique place
for Jesus Christ within his system. Yet this change is far
from insignificant, as it re-opens many of the very dilemmas
— especially determinism — which Process was so eager to
avoid.
Thornton is interesting because the way he uses and
misunderstands Whiteheadlan Process thought is really quite
obvious. Therefore, his work is a great help in allowing us
to clarify the issues involved. However, we will next move
to theological thinkers who are somewhat more subtle in the
way in which they alter Whiteheadian Process thought as it
is interpreted by Hartshorne, Christian, Williams and Ogden.
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CHAPTER XXV: Norman Pittenger's Theological Response
To Whiteheadian Influence
In his book Christology Reconsidered Pittenger says of
Thornton that,
While he is prepared in the earlier portions
of The Incarnate Lord to accept and to use
(to great effect) the philosophy of process
developed by Professor Alfred North Whitehead,
he draws back as soon as he comes to the con¬
sideration of the sense in which Jesus may be
styled final and the way in which it may be said
of Jesus that he transcends other revelatory
activity of God. At this point, but not before
or elsewhere, he feels obligated to insist that
the whole Logos. as we might describe it, is
;intruded into the world in the incarnation
of the Word in Jesus Christ; thus he succeeds,
quite contrary to what must have been his
intention at the beginning, in making that
event partake of an entirely different order
from all the rest of the divine revelatory
activity in the creation.
It is very important for Process not to think of Jesus
as the sole or entirely special revelation of God, since, as
we have illustrated, the concept of a dipolar God demonstrates
that God relates through all events. Therefore, Pittenger
takes the alternative of suggesting that the relation between
God the man Jesus, and God and other events in the world,
are not different in kind, but in "degree". He expands on
this point when he says,
The locus of that specific activity which we
designate when we say Jesus Christ is the
total complex of event, compounded of long
MifC. .
Pittenger, Norman. Christology Reconsidered. (London:
SCM Press, Ltd., 1970). p.l9«
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Jewish preparation, the appearance and life
of Jesus himself, the response made to him
as; he was received in the days of Palestine,
in the experience of him as risen from among
the dead)and in the primitive and continuing
Christian community which also responded to
him — and, by legitimate extension, the
totality o f his impact upon human history
down to the present moment. The man of
Nazareth is indeed the center, or as I have
phrased it the focus, of that activity of
God* )p| y
Pittenger becomes even more specific about Jesus'
relationship to God by saying that Jesus more fully than
any other event fulfils God's aim; which is that the world
kl+8
should realise its deepest potentialities. Therefore, in
order to help us develop a model of what it means to say
that Jesus realised God's aim to a unique degree, Pittenger
says; "Rather, the model which we shall find most satisfac¬
tory for understanding Jesus of Nazareth is that of a man
who with his own distinctive qualities and gifts is yet most
deeply conscious of tjie history out of which he has emerged,
is profoundly aware of his relationships with his fellowmen
and his responsibility towards them, and is; most seminal
(we might put it) in providing opportunities for further and
richer development for others in the years which follow his
M+9
necessarily limited period of life in this world."
In the above Pittenger has succeeded in describing
Jesus to be exactly like the Whiteheadian God. First Jesus
is said to hold deeply in consciousness the history out of
which he has emerged; but since Pittenger earlier suggested
^ibid. p.86. 1+1+8ibid. p.83. ^ibid. p.70.
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that Jesus emerged out of all history, Jesus must hold all
history in deep consciousness. All of the past is the content
of the absolute or mental pole of God. Second, Jesus is pro¬
foundly aware of relationships. Indeed, the uniqueness of
God's relative pole is that it is relative to the highest
possible degree. Finally, Jesus provides opportunities for
the future. According to Pittenger the scope of this pro¬
vision takes on a divine dimension.
Pittenger even says that Jesus is God "incognito."
For Christian faith, at any rate, if man is to
see God 'plain' it must be under the incognito
of manhood, which is; why Christians believe
that God is incarnate, enmanned, in the human
life of the Man Jesus. We do not see God 'plain'
in nature, but we see something of what he does
and how he does it, under that natural incog¬
nito. And from what he does and how he does it,
we learn something of what he is.^Q
Pittenger has clearly made some changes from Thornton's
position. What the changes amount to, however, is that
instead of doing what Thornton does, and making Jesus break-
in on history, Pittenger says that Jesus himself emerges out
if51
of history. He is a newly emergent level. Of course
Thornton talks about emergence, but, as we have said, his
Christological formulations indicate that he really does not
take seriously the implications of Jesus as himself emerging.
That is, Thornton breaks too radically the continuity of
history at Jesus.
^^Pittenger, Norman. God's Way With Man. (London:
Hodder And Stoughton, 1969). p.*+-6.
^^ibid. p.lMf.
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We might say that Jesus for Pittenger is Thornton's
eternal order with a real history. That is, Jesus is God
fully revealing himself through a process of history. Process
is thus the content of revelation.
The agent of the revelation is Christ, i.e. a new dimen¬
sion of society. "God has established through that event,
with the free consent of those who were participant in it, a
society or community of fellowship — in Christian terms, the
Church — in which there is common life, life in Christ, for
the promotion of the good of each entity and for the good of
the whole.
If we are right that Jesus is God, then in Jesus, God is
revealing himself. We therefore get hack to Thornton's point
that;, through Jesus, God is revealed as the ultimate process
itself. To be more specific, Jesus reveals a dipolar God,
who is equated with the ultimate process of the universe.
Indeed we are specifically told by Pittenger that God
has two aspects;
Whatever 'absolutes' we attribute to God consists
in his uhfailing capacity to be himself, even
while he is also intimately related to all that
goes on and may go on. He is indefatigable Love,
luring and attracting others to new and untried
modes for love's expression.}^
We have often repeated that the absolute pole is for
Process a specific concrete unity as Pittenger implies in
the above. However, if God as dipolar is the content of
^^2Pittenger. Christoloev Reconsidered. p.lU-2.
^^Pittenger, Norman. The Christian Church As Social
Process. (London: Epworth Press, 1971). p.121.
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revelation, this means that his absolute pole is a specific
ultimate unity. Indeed at one point Pittenger interprets
God as the source of ultimate creativity:
He is also the 'chief exemplification'(in White¬
head's phrase) of all principles necessary to
describe the world. Hence as the chief exempli¬
fication and the ultimate source of creativity,
he is the creator (not the artificer, but the
artist or poet) and the redeemer ( the one who
saves all that can be saved) of the world, as
we have presupposed and on more than one occasion
explicitly indicated. God is the center of the
cosmos, not man.^^
Interestingly, Pittenger realises that if God is the source
of creativity, the universal process must have a final goal.
He says, "The final goal is 'in' God — in fellowship with
cosmic Love to know the enabling and ennobling of all that
1xejpj
we have in us to become."
By changing Thornton's concept of the eternal order to
a concept of Jesus himself as an emergent level of reality,
Pittenger has certainly moved a bit further from a dogmatic
position. However, it is clear that he does not really fit
into a Whiteheadian system as regards the use of the term
absolute. As we have seen for Pittenger Jesus is God's reve¬
lation of himself as the principle of creativity. In which
case the absolute pole becomes a pole of ultimate reality.
Therefore, the distinction between the two forms of unity is
not maintained.
The advantage that Pittenger's formulation has for his
^^Pittenger. God's Way With Man. p.l71»
^-^Pittenger. The Christian Church As Social Process.
p. 60.
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theology is that it appears to allow him to retain the idea
of a God that relates, without disallowing a goal for the
process. In talking about churches he says, "Nothing that is
good need be altered in content, but a wholly new spirit will
enter into the life of a congregation that is thoroughly con¬
scious of the stupendous fact that it is a 'cell' of the Body
of Christ, with the vocation to be Christ to the particular
1+56
community in which it is set." As we discussed earlier,
the analogy of the Body of Christ can be interpreted to mean
that, as head of the body, Christ becomes a singularly domin¬
ate event so that the individuality of any other events, or
societies of events, within the body, are subordinated to the
good of the whole. The fact that subordination as Pittenger
suggested, might occur with the consent of the occasions
involved does not mean that such a structure could actually
exist. Indeed Hartshorne and Christian seem to suggest that
the harmony implied by such a formulation is not in fact
possible in a Whiteheadian context.
Therefore, we must conclude that, while Pittenger is
clearly not a traditional dogmatic theologian, his Christol-
ogy, in particular, is not immediately persuasive as being
a contribution to consistent Whiteheadian Process thinking.
Indeed, his Christology raises some doubts about whether it
is at all compatible with his use of the term absolute.
Unless the issues surrounding the use of the term absolute
can be more satisfactorily dealt with, Christology seems to
remain a very difficult topic for Process theologians.
1+56y Pittenger, Norman. The Historic Faith And A Changing
World. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950)• p.137.
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CHAPTER XXVI: Two Further Theological Responses
To Whiteheadian Influence
We will conclude our discussions of Whiteheadian in¬
fluenced Process theologies with Bernard Meland's The
Realities Of Faith and John Cobb's A Christian Natural
Theology. In terms of the implications of the use of the
term absolute, we find these men closer to a strict White¬
headian position, as we have developed it, than either
Thornton or Pittenger. However, they also demonstrate certain
inconsistencies with the Whiteheadian understanding of the
term absolute, by tending to equate a dipolar God with the
principle of creativity.
A. Bernard Eugene Meland
Like several of Pittenger's works, Meland's The Reali¬
ties Of Faith places a strong emphasis upon establishing a
unique role for Jesus while maintaining a dipolar concept
of God. Pittenger, as we recall, attempted to modify Thorn¬
ton's Christology by arguing for the emergence of Jesus out
of history, rather than accepting a sudden entry of the
•Logos' into history, which tsnds to make the incarnation
the sole event relating God and man. Meland goes even fur¬
ther than Pittenger in modifying Christology by suggesting
that before Jesus the Hebraic concept of covenant also
reveals a God who relates to man — a dipolar God: "...the
covenant relationship — the notion that God comes to man
in a personal encounter and established a relationship with
his people, binding them together in a mutual pact of
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obligation and responsiveness. It is a relationship correl-
1+57
ating faithfulness and freedom."
The idea of a relationship which represents mutual
freedom, Meland takes as central to the Process conception
of God. Indeed, he says it is an attempt to respond to the
lf58
issue of the Many and the One.
The events of the Cross and Resurrection give Western
Christianity, however, a special and distinctive understand¬
ing of the principle of relatedness implied by the covenant.
"Together these two themes provide the clue to what is dis¬
tinctive in our Western Christian conception of goodness,
which, implies an attitude of abandon toward the cost of rela¬
tionships and its corollary, an investment of self, with
confidence in the ultimate resolution of the crises that may
follow from such a course, issuing in possible death and
1+59
momentary defeat."
According to Meland, therefore, Jesus illustrates that
the cost of relationship — the giving of one's self — is
rewarded by a resulting unity which affords the individual a
depth he could not otherwise have. Jesus' self-sacrifice
opened up new possibilities for relationships between man
and God, just as the formation of any unity always opens up
new possibilities of relationship. Indeed; Meland says,
Relationships thus provide a dimension of
meaning and possibility of creativity which
exceed the reality of parts taken as isolated
data. It is the mystery of relationships,
^^Meland, Bernard Eugene. The Realities Of Faith.
"The Revolution In Cultural Forms." (New York: Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1962). p.*+6.
^8ibid. p.*+7. ^9ibid. p.M-9.
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giving to events or phenomena their incalcul¬
able quality even as they yield to our appre¬
hension of them, which contributes to a sense
of depth in dealing with the living situation
in any of its aspects.^gQ
Of course, one might well remain consistent to Whiteheadian
thought, and nevertheless maintain that Jesus' actions opened
more possibilities for relationships than the actions of any
other single entity.
To this point nothing that Meland has said would suggest
that his Christology denies that God himself relates to man
through all events, i.e. that he has a relative pole. In
fact, Meland has clearly said that God did relate to man
other than through the incarnation. Nevertheless, as Meland
gives more attention to his Christology, the nature of God's
relatedness becomes less consistent with the Whiteheadian
understanding of dipolarity. In order to analyse this fact
we must begin by looking more carefully at Meland's use of
the concept of relatedness.
To relate consciously, says Meland, is to gain a vision
Lf6l
of the possibilities that come only from relationships.
It is a vision of unity, which may rightly be called faith.
However, says Meland,
There is no faith that may claim ultimacy in
the sense of possessing or conveying absolute
truth. Yet there is no faith devoid of ulti¬
mate reality in what it bodies forth. This is
to say that all faiths are relative in what
they are able to embody and express of ulti¬
mate reality. The point that we need to grasp
if we are to assume a constructive stance in
Lf60ibid. p.9^. 11-61 ibid. p.l6l.
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this new imagery of thought is that relativity
is itself a witness to ultimacy.^2
Essentially the above is consistent with the Whiteheadian
concept of the absolute pole of God. The absolute pole could
be called an object of faith having a concrete content, but
its content would not be all of reality. Therefore, one can¬
not speak of ultimate, absolute truth, i.e a particular
ultimate unity.
However, the above quotation must also be understood
by considering what Meland means by the use of the term
•relativity'. He says,
But relativity does not necessarily mean the
loss of all decisive norms or of decision in
the judgment of meaning or value. Neither does
it mean indifference to these concerns. It
does not imply that one thing is as good as
another, one faith as good as another faith.
On the contrary, it denies simply the reality
of arbitrary absolutes and invests absolute¬
ness: in reality itself, wherever it occurs,
under whatever guise it appears.^^
In Meland's formulation of relativity, there is the
equating of the dipolar God with "ultimate reality". It is
true, according to Whitehead, that some factor unifies present
reality. However, relativity is a real cosmic factor pre¬
cisely because God's absolute pole does not include the
present subjective aim of all entities. The principle of
individuality is rigorously maintained by the denial of
simultaneity between contemporary occasions.
Therefore, the absolute pole of God must be a unity of
lf62ibid. p.163. t+63ibid. p.163.
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all non-contemporary occasions, and not of all reality.
Otherwise, if the absolute pole is a unity of the contempor¬
ary occasions, there is no real individuality. Therefore, to
say that Process "invests absoluteness in reality itself,
wherever it occurs, under whatever guise it appears," and to
equate God with ultimate reality, one must be very careful
about how the term "reality" is used. If reality means
objective reality, well and good. However, if reality is
meant in a broader sense to include the cosmos, the formula¬
tion is inconsistent. As we have often suggested, to ascribe
absoluteness to ultimate reality — Whitehead's creativity
— by equating it with a dipolar God is by implication to
contradict the very possibility of activity.
Unfortunately, in the quotation immediately preceding
the above, Meland uses the term ultimate reality, and says
that relativity is a witness to ultimacy. If he means that
relativity, with a particular, i.e. not arbitrary, unity, is
witness to the ultimate reality of a dipolar God, who also
has a particular, not an arbitrary unity, then he in fact
falls into the trap of making the term absolute refer to an
ultimate unity.
It is again Christology that lays this trap. As Jesus
is equated with relativity by Meland, and as God is equated
with the ultimate, we have another case of God being equated
with creativity. Such an equation always means that the
absolute pole of God functions in a predetermined way. In
other words, the unity with God which Jesus reveals is an
ultimate unity which functions as a divine plan.
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We already have evidence that Meland does in fact equate
God with the ultimate. Further evidence of this is Meland1 s
use of Imago Dei in company with the concept of God as
Creator. He says,
The Imago Dei is thus seen to he a kind of
formula in Christian doctrine, conveying the
fact that every man stands related to his
Creator, and through this bond with every
other man, as creature. Creation thus lays
upon each individual man a threefold demand,
which is what gives complexity to his exis¬
tence. He is made for God, he is made for
other people, he is made for himself. The
living out of these relationships becomes
man's daily burden as well as his opportun¬
ity. And it is his ultimate hope.^^
In the above we see no clear evidence of Meland talcing
seriously the Whiteheadlan point that man is not only a
creature, but is also a co-creator with God. The reason for
this is that by making God the ultimate reality, Meland has
equated the dipolar God with creativity. Therefore, the
term absolute would apply to an ultimate concrete unity,
which could not have relationships. In other words God
could not relate directly to man.
If man does not directly participate in creativity, then
Jesus, as the principle of relativity, according to Meland,
reveals and makes possible this participation. Meland speaks
of Jesus as revealing a "New Creation" which emerged from
1+6 6
history. ^ The new creation sounds very good indeed.
The orders of justice and reason were not set
aside. They were the antecedent structures in
^ibid. p.207. 1+6^ibid, p.261.
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which the new emergence, agape, appeared in
the relations of men who had become responsive
to Christ. The initiating vehicle of agape,
releasing the matrix of sensitivity or creative
ground of spirit into full actuality as a
historical being, was the person of Jesus. All
one can say is that this structure of conscious¬
ness became the bearer of sensitivity in which
love was dominant
Clearly the above analysis equates Jesus with Meland'$
description of relativity. Thus relativity becomes similar
to Thornton's order, i.e. Jesus; and ultimate reality, i.e.
God, to Thornton's absolute actuality. That is, the ulti¬
mate principle is a God who relates, but also has a pole of
unity. However, as we have seen, such a formulation disre¬
gards the implications of the term absolute applying to
God's pole of unity. The absolute pole is a particular
unity and a principle of limitation. If the ultimate has a
particular unity, then that unity predetermines the plan and
goal of all reality. Jesus thus becomes the revelation of
a. particular plan and goal, and the new creation is thought
of as a final unity in which relations continue. However,
such an idea, as we also have indicated, is contradictory.
B. John B. Cobb, Jr.
Cobb in his book A Christian Natural Theology argues in
the Whiteheadian tradition that God has a dipolar nature.
For example, he says,
At this point, I suggest that the otherness of
God expresses itself, paradoxically if you
will, in his absolute nearness. Every other
If66ibid. pp.258 -259.
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entity can be somehow distanced, either as
temporally past or spatially separate, but
God's presence is absolutely present. He is
numerically other, and qualitatively, incom¬
prehensibly other. But this other is spatio-
temporally not distant at all.^y
On the one hand, says Cobb, God does have an aspect of
"otherness", but at the same time he is present in events.
Indeed, according to Cobb, God is unlike any other entity in
that he alone relates to "all" events, i.e. to the "whole"
process of events.
Cobb arrives at his understanding of dipolarity by
starting with the assumption that while Whitehead thinks of
God as a concious actual entity, one is better to think of
^+•68
God as a living person. 'What makes a living person unique
for Cobb is his "soUl."
The soul is not an underlying substance under¬
going accidental adventures. It is nothing but
the sequence of the experiences that constitute
it. 1^9
Therefore, the concrete content of the divine soul would
be the unity of God1s experiences — which in fact means all
events. In keeping with this understanding of soul, God,
says Cobb, must be a society of actual occasions, i.e he must
V70
share the immediacy of all actual occasions.
^Cobb. A Christian Natural Theology, p. 2*4-3 •
^68itid. p.188.
^^ibid. p.*4-8. This is not to suggest that animals
other than man are without souls, (cf. p.56).
lf7°ibid. p.189. One might be reminded of the distinction
that Christian made between God as a unity of past events,
i.e. objects, and present events, i.e. events of immediacy,
which are not included in God's absolute pole. Here Cobb is
suggesting that God is a unity of objects and events.
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Cobb readily admits a possible objection to this position.
One may object that the concrete individuality
of the past in its own subjective immediacy is
lost. That is true. But if the same living per¬
son now enjoys a new experience that includes
everything in the old and more, this loss seems
to be no loss of value.
Therefore, we have established that the pole of unity
in God is what Cobb calls a soul. However, as God also has
a relative pole, there must be a diversity of events or pot¬
ential events which gives the divine soul its complex
character. Cobb accepts this point, and argues that God is
called dipolar because he is the ultimate source of both
unity and diversity.
Cobb begins,
Whitehead explicitly explains that creativity is
in his system what prime matter is in Aristotle,
namely, the material cause. This suggests, cor¬
rectly, that the problem of a doctrine of crea¬
tion in Whitehead is much like that in a
philosophy based on Aristotle; the role of the
creator is to provide form for a reality given
to him.
Cobb's above analysis of Whitehead's position is not
totally justifiable. Activity, as ultimate, implies for
Whitehead that individuality must always be maintained along
with unity. That is, there must be a distinction between
the unity of God's absolute pole, and a principle of unity
in which all entities participate. Therefore, only the past
is included in the absolute pole, while the present retains
its multiple character. God, it is also true, must work
If71ibid. p.191. if72lbid. p.206.
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within creativity as a given. However, what Cobb neglects
to mention is that creativity for Whitehead is not shaped by
God alone; rather the form which creativity takes is also
contributed to by man. It was to assure man's participation
in creativity that led Whitehead to draw the distinction
between creativity and God.
However, Cobb would clearly not agree with this distinc¬
tion. He says,
We have already seen that the decisive element
in the initiation of each actual occasion is
the granting to that occasion of an initial
aim. Since Whitehead attributes this function
to God, it seems that, to a greater degree
than Whitehead intended, God must be conceived
as being the reason that entities occur at all
as well as determining the limit within which
they may achieve their own form.^7^
What Cobb suggests is that God himself provides the
necessary multiplicity for activity to take place. In other
words, God is equated with creativity. However, in all of
this Cobb has simply ignored the implications of the absolute
pole. When a dipolar God is equated with creativity, the
absolute pole becomes a specific unity of all reality. Once
an ultimate unity has been accepted, the only process that
one could talk about is a process within the absolute pole.
However, such a formulation suggests that process can take
place without true individuality. That is, to use Cobb's
terms, God's soul becomes the only source of unity, and
other entities, therefore, lack a true unity of their own,
^73ibid. p.211.
i.e. they lack a soul.
If God is equated with the principle of creativity, he
is certainly Creator in a more dramatic sense than White-
headian thought would allow. And so long as one ignores the
implications of the term absolute in this formulation, it
appears to be another step in reconciling Process to more
traditional theologies. However, once the implications of
the term absolute are introduced, such a formulation becomes
impossible.
If God is creativity, and if one admits the necessity
of his dipolarity, then God becomes the determination of
everything and process is a mere delusion. Of course, in
Cobb's defence, we must agree that is is quite easy to over¬
look the fact that the unity of God's soul must have
absoluteness. However, as we have seen, it is in large
part the very implications of the absoluteness of God's pole
of unity that led Christian, and finally Hartshorne, to
accept that God was in fact an actual entity, and therefore
did not share the immediacy of other actual entities.
We have used Thornton, Pittenger, Meland and Cobb to
illustrate a group of Whiteheadian influenced Process theo¬
logians who make various efforts to get around the "White¬
headian distinction between God and creativity. Their
reasons for the attempt to avoid the Process implications
of making the absolute pole less than an ultimate principle
of unity have become clear. The Process use of the term
absolute, as we have seen, introduces radical changes in
theological concepts such as- Christology, soteriology,
eschatology and God as Creator.
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CHAPTER XXVII: Whiteheadians, Teilhardians and
Theologians of Hope
In Chapters VIII and XVI attention was given to the
works of Teilhard de Chardin. This was done for two specific
reasons. First of all Teilhard's thinking was a product of
many of the same influences which contributed to what we
now call Process philosophies. Therefore, his writings.,
though not generally available until the late 1950's, fitted
historically into the period of our study. Second, his
formulations were very useful in helping to clarify some
other Process positions, including that of Whitehead.
From what has already been said about Teilhard, it is
clear that he could well be seen as a potential influence
on theology. However, as his chief works were unavailable
until recent years, his influence became important only in
the 1960's. Whitehead's writings, on the other hand, while
not widely read or acknowledged before the publication of
some of Teilhard's works, nevertheless, as we have seen,
exercised considerable influence on the writings of a few
philosophers of religion and theologians. Therefore, at
the contemporary revival of interest in Whitehead himself,
a limited but significant Whiteheadian school was already
established.^^
1+7 if
A very complete bibliography of writings in the
area of Process Thought, which demonstrates quite clearly
the revival in interest in the topic, is to be found in:
Process Philosophy And Christian Thought. Delwin Brown,
Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves, eds. (New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971)•
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Interestingly, the new awareness of Whitehead and the
wide response to the publication of Teilhard's works have
developed alongside one another, with relatively little
thought of or interest concerning the relationships between
these two thinkers. In our paper we have made certain
efforts to relate them, relative to our particular interests.
Chapters XVI and XVII contained discussions of some of the
major differences between Teilhard's and Whitehead's under¬
standings^ of the term absolute.
It would of course be interesting to show in detail how
the theologies influenced by Teilhard, and those influenced
by Whitehead, differ respective to their different under¬
standings of the concept absolute. However, we chose only
Whitehead's work to illustrate the importance of the influ¬
ence of the term absolute. To illustrate the point in equal
detail among Teilhardians would greatly lengthen our study.
Furthermore, our point of the importance of the usage of the
term absolute has already been made. And our earlier com¬
parison of Teilhard and Whitehead, along with the development
of Whitehead's influence on theology in terms of the use of
the term absolute, may perhaps serve as a guide for some
equally careful analysis of Teilhardians.
Nevertheless, we can briefly demonstrate that some of
the chief differences between contemporary Whiteheadians
and Teilhardians center around issues associated with their
respective understandings of the term absolute. By simply
pointing to these differences, therefore, we will be able
to give an additional illustration of our point that the
term absolute must be carefully understood, if one is to
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clarify much of the reasoning behind certain theological
formulations which grow out of Process Thought.
The content of our illustration is the newly published
Hope And The Future Of Man, which is a collection of papers
from a conference among Whiteheadians, Teilhardians and
Theologians of Hope at Union Theological Seminary in New
if7 5
York. As the title of the book suggests, eschatology is
a major topic. This topic, we have carefully illustrated,
is greatly influenced by how one understands the term abso¬
lute.
Cobb in speaking of Whitehead says that, while there is
an element of anticipation for the future, Whitehead places
if76
the locus of value in the present. While Cobb under¬
stands that others have a specific future in mind, he says,
But Whitehead did not share that vision.
For him, the course of events has neither
beginning nor end. Human history, of
course, does have a beginning and will
have an end, but the end will be simply
extinction... Whitehead took this infinity
of process quite seriously.
On the other hand, Philip Hefner points out that for
Teilhard the future is far more specific.
To sum up, it is impossible to understand
the future except relative to a deep probing
of the past-present of which it is, the
future. It is impossible to understand the
Hopje And The Future Of Man. Ewert H. Cousins. (3
Cromwell Place, London: The Teilhardian Center For The
Future Of Man, 1973)* British edition, paperback.




past-present (which is the present identity
of man and the world) except relative to
the future which reveals what is is destined
to become.
Here is a very important issue. Hefner sees the present
as; influencing a definite future. Whitehead, according to
Cobb, sees the present as influencing an infinite process.
This very problem of eschatology we have already traced in
part to the influence of the understanding of absoluteness1.
Thus we see illustrated how central its influence can be on
establishing theological positions.
Another point which we made was that the distinction
between God1s absoluteness and creativity greatly influences
the Whiteheadian formulations. Wolfhart Pannenberg points
to this issue as being the source of a second division
between Teilhardians and Whiteheadians:
To be sure also in Whitehead1s perspective
God is the source of unity by providing the
subjective aim for every occasion which rea¬
lizes itself by a process of subjective
unification of its world. Could not this
unifying activity be interpreted to mean a
degree of participation in God1s act of
creation in the sense of Teilhard's creative
unification? The difficulty is that creativ¬
ity in Whitehead's own thought is separated
from his idea of God. The consequence seems
to be not only that Whitehead's God is
hardly conceivable as creator of the world
in the strict sense of a creatlo ex nihilo,
but also — and even more important —
that an unlimited pluralism of events
results, each of which forms a unity in
itself but does not converge with all
^^Hefner, Philip. "The Future As Our Future: A Teil-
hardian Perspective." ibid, p.17.
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others toward a final unity of all actual
occasions -i+yy
Daniel Day Williams in his response to Pannenberg
clarifies the point that Whiteheadians do not totally split
creativity off from God.**80 We have ourselves demonstrated
this by referring to God as the objeetification of creativ¬
ity. Of course, we also said that to forget that God
"objectifies" an ultimate is to run into the danger of making
the absolute pole an ultimately determined unity. However,
the absolute pole is within God; it is not a pole of the
principle of creativity. Williams agrees with our point
when he says: "What Whiteheadians do say is that the unity
of the creative process is to be found in the community of
God's being with his creatures, not in the absolute -unity
if81
which is summed up in a final event."
The German school of theology sometimes called The
Theology of Hope, in which Jilrgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannen¬
berg and Johannes Metz are often included, is a third
modern tradition with interesting parallels, as well as
dis-similarities, to Whiteheadian thought. The view of
eschatology is an example in which Williams see Theologians
of Hope at issue with Whiteheadians. He says,
Now what does Professor Pannenberg see in
process thought which differs from his
position? This, I think: he sees process
^^Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Future And Unity." ibid, p.6*+.




theology as hating a more loosely organized
universe in which there is an endless plur¬
ality of events; and therefore no final
event which consummates or determines the
unity of the whole.
In view of the above illustrations, the understanding
of how Process uses the term absolute is of key importance
if one wishes to sort out and appreciate certain of the
chief differences between it and other modern theological
positions. Of course, work similar to what has been done
for Whiteheadians in this paper remains to be done for
Teilhardians and Theologians of Hope. Hopefully, we have
illustrated how interesting such a project would be.
Recently, the importance of the use of the term absolute
has been somewhat overlooked. This is indeed unfortunate
as the implications of the term continue to form a signifi¬





What is Process Philosophy? Clearly this question can
he answered in several different ways. One could say that
it is a philosophy which takes the human experience of
change seriously — ultimately seriously. Another definit¬
ion might be that Process is a philosophical response to
the biological theory of evolution and the physical theory
of relativity.
Both of these explanations have certain merits, and
could hardly be called wrong. However, on the one hand,
Plato and Hegel, for example, who are not called Process
philosophers, certainly concern themselves with the signifi¬
cance of change. Therefore, the emphasis on change is not
quite adequate as the way of fitting Process into the
history of philosophy.
On the other hand, as we have seen, evolution and rela¬
tivity influenced the rise of philosophies other than
Process, including Neo-vitalism and Neo-mechanism. Further¬
more, while Process styled many of its present formulations
in response to positions taken by various natural sciences,
other of the Process formulations pre-dated modern science
to the time of Plato and Aristotle, and are thus better
understood as responses to differing philosophies. There¬
fore responsiveness to the theories of evolution and
relativity does not capture the peculiar significance of
Process.
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However, it is impossible to appreciate what modern
Process is attempting to suggest philosophically, without
a careful reference to certain important scientific devel¬
opments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
To reach an adequate understanding of Process, therefore,
one must analyse it in such a way that it is seen simul¬
taneously in the context of the histories of science and of
philosophy.
Our thesis has been that one very useful and essential
way to define Process philosophy, keeping in mind the above
demands required of that definition, is through an analysis
of its understanding and use of the term absolute.
In the early Chapters we saw that the issue of absol¬
uteness developed in science when the physical theory of
mechanism began to be called into question by such new
sciences as biology and psychology. Mechanism assured con¬
tinuity and causality by asserting that physical laws were
absolute. Neo-vitalism insisted upon the necessity of true
individuality and freedom, which meant ultimate pluralism
and the relativity of laws.
Mechanistic formulations demanded an 'absolute1 when
they suggested that unity cannot be accounted for without
changeless laws. Vitalistic formulations argued that the
absolute laws are predetermining, and they must therefore
be rejected as eliminating the possibility of plurality.
However, vitalism was left with the problem of accounting
for unity.
Process thinkers observed that for themselves the real
significance of vitalism was that it experimentally demon-
32*+
strated that the activity of life, especially self-conscious
life, required both true unity and true diversity. As the
concept of absolute physical laws eliminated true diversity
in the material world, the source of activity could not be
innate to matter. Mechanism had merely taken the fact of
activity for granted, without stopping to consider that when
the term absolute, which always suggests ultimate unity, is
applied to a principle that governs the activity of all
reality, the diversity required for activity cannot be ex¬
plained.
Therefore, vitalism appeared to be justified in suggest¬
ing that some "vital force" had to be the real source of
activity* However, the vital force was not totally random
activity. Even the activity of life appeared to follow
certain organisations. Of course, if the unity factor in
the vital force had been referred to as absolute, then vital¬
ism would have had the same problem as mechanism regarding
true diversity.
What was required by vitalism, therefore, was a cosmic
activity in which a principle of unity and a principle of
diversity were the relata. This point having been accepted
by Process, there remained the problem of deciding what was
the nature of the activity that related these two factors.
The most widely adopted model for what relates unity and
diversity was that of an organic principle. Generally, the
universe was thought of as a single conscious organism,
which divided itself into parts, thereby allowing for
internal relationships.
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However, it appeared that, as the entire universe was
unified by the cosmic organism, it was perfectly correct to
refer to the organic principle as absolute. Whitehead
observed that this formulation continued to imply that the
universe was determined by the nature of the organic prin¬
ciple. In other words, the unity of any part of the cosmic
organism was in fact the unity of the whole organism; and
its parts, therefore, made no distinctive contributions to
unity.
The only way to avoid the determinism of the activity
of entities in the universe, said Whitehead, was to think
of each entity as being an organism in its own right. That
is, every entity was to enjoy its own unique unity. Of
course, to think of each entity as being 'absolute' would
lead to ultimate pluralism. Therefore, Whitehead suggested
that in the wider sense absoluteness should apply to the
unity of the actual entity God. Of course, in the narrow
sense all entities have "individual Absoluteness." To
understand this conclusion we must look once more at the
term absolute.
Whitehead noted that the term absolute had been used
in two respects. In mechanism, and in some forms of vital¬
ism, it had referred to an abstract principle of unity.
On the other hand, philosophy used the term absolute to
refer to a concrete unity whose content was all of reality.
Whitehead saw that both of these understandings of absol¬
uteness made valid points. However, in formulating a
consistent concept of absoluteness they needed to be combined.
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If unity was correctly thought of as an abstract prin¬
ciple, then mechanism afforded no solution as to why this
unity was not presently realised. Likewise, if all reality
was already concretely unified by the Absolute, as some
philosophy suggested, there was no accounting for present
activity.
However, if the term absolute referred to both a
concrete unity, and also an abstract concept of unity, then
Whitehead saw a way that unity could exist along with diver¬
sity, and activity could be explained. Whitehead argued that
the concrete unity of the universe was the past. The past
alone was absolutely organised and determined. Therefore,
he assigned the whole of the past to be the concrete content
of the absolute pole of God. However, as the present became
actualised it moved into the unity of the past. Therefore,
the past was also an abstract principle of unity. Thus
understood, the absolute pole allowed for an indeterminate
future.
No finite entity unifies the whole of the past. There¬
fore, Whitehead assigned the term absolute to the infinite
entity God, who alone holds the whole of the past in the
present of his absolute pole. However, explaining why White¬
head referred only to the divine unity as absolute, does not
explain the nature of that unity, which assures diversity,
shared by all entities. In taking up the question of the
unity of the present we began by moving into the field of
philosophy.
The place of Process within the history of philosophy
during our period of study was the second topic considered.
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The field of philosophy during the late nineteenth century
was roughly divided between Positivists and Romanticists;
the former being materialists and the latter spiritualists.
The spiritualists, generally influenced by the Kantian
and Hegelian traditions, believed that their positions could
be held against the positivists, as no supportable alterna¬
tive to idealistic epistemology could be presented.
Idealistic formulations demanded an absolute Subject, who
held in a unity the plurality of changeless forms. These
forms served to organise or limit the conscious activity of
all finite organisms.
The idealistic epistemology, if accepted, leads directly
to a specific metaphysical position — determinism. In this
regard the positivists and the spiritualists were quite the
same. The former saw reality determined by material laws,
the latter understood reality as determined by the spiritual
subject — God.
However, the argument for relativism, i.e. pluralism,
entered the field of epistemology at this time with renewed
force. The traditional opponents of the idealists had been
the realists. Traditional realism had always- suggested that
knowledge was relative. It was relative to a given subject's
perception of a given object. This, of course, implied a
plurality of subjects and objects.
The great strength of idealism had been its ability to
account for the unity of knowledge. Realism, on the other
hand, had as its strength the ability to nicely explain the
errors and differences of perceptions, but was unable to
account for the unity of consciousness.
Process thought saw that part of the problem facing
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idealistic epistemology was a confusion over the implications
of the term absolute. In terms of conscious activity, ideal¬
ism suggested that the term absolute referred to a unity which
served for the evaluation of mental data, but clearly this
unity did not totally determine mental activity. In other
words, the limitation of conscious activity allowed for div¬
ersity. Metaphysically, on the other hand, the term absolute
referred to an ultimate concrete unity which did not allow
diversity.
In giving the term absolute the same reference in both
epistemology and metaphysics, Whitehead argued that every
actual entity, including God, had its own unique past as a
principle of limitation. As we have already said, to God's
past Whitehead gave the name absolute pole. Furthermore,
Whitehead said that what makes unique history possible is
that all entities share in a principle of activity, called
creativity.
Thus there are for Whitehead two forms of unity. The
first is the absolute pole of God. The second is the common
sharing of all entities, including God, in the,.principle of
creativity. However, the principle of creativity is not
referred to as absolute. In the first place creativity has
no concrete content; it is pure activity, yet to be made
concrete. The only unity with a concrete content, in any
ultimate sense, is God's absolute pole. In the second place
creativity does not serve as a principle of limitation; it
is sheer potential. Only the past, i.e. God's absolute pole,
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places limits on the whole of the universe.
The above understanding of the term absolute not only
allows for the free activity of finite entities, but it
actually promotes it. If a finite entity confronted an
infinity of possibilities, it would be unable to act. By
limiting the number of possibilities, the past makes the
future actions possible. Whitehead speaks of God's providing
an initial "aim" for all entities, when he wishes to make
clearer that the past allows for the future, i.e. that
limitation makes activity possible.
Therefore, by presenting an analysis of the develop¬
ments in the Process understanding of the term absolute, we
have arrived at a way of defining Process thought. We have
defined Process as a trend in twentieth-century philosophy,
and not as the discovery of a single thinker. The chief
problem has been to find the basis upon which the various
strands of Process' development could be related. Apart
from such a basis the conclusions of Process thinkers can
appear to be a total contradiction to traditional philos¬
ophical formulations.
For example, when one first encounters the term absolute
in Whitehead's writings, its meaning appears to be totally
foreign to the usual understandings of the term. However,
as we have shown, this is: not the case. The Process under¬
standing of the term absolute is reached only after a
thorough analysis of what the term implied for thinkers in
the sciences and in-'philosophy. Of course, as we have seen,
the term absolute also is especially helpful in illustrating
how Process thought developed. Indeed, the development of
the understanding of the term absolute serves as the basis
for connecting the various aspects in the overall formula¬
tion of the Process position.
Just how the Process understanding of the term absolute
affects the special science of theology was the topic of
our last Chapters. Here, with particular reference to the
Process position held by Alfred North Whitehead, we gave
further attention to the principle of creativity. Know¬
ledge of this principle depended upon an object. The
objectification of the principle of creativity is God.
God was further described as an actual entity; that is,
as having an absolute and a relative pole. The absolute
pole represents the ultimate category of the 'one', but as
a concrete object it it the particular unity of all realised
possibilities of relatedness. Therefore, God has absolute¬
ness in the sense that his is a unity of all relationships.
Our particular thesis was to show that a clear under¬
standing of the Process use of the term absolute helped to
clarify the reasoning behind some of the important develop¬
ments among Process theologians. We therefore made special
reference to the influence of the understanding of the term
absolute on Christology, soteriology and eschatology. The
details of this influence have been carefully analysed, and
do not need to be repeated here.
Therefore, our intention is to move into reflections
on some of the consequences of the Process understanding of
the absolute pole for the whole of Process thought. Such a
procedure will allow us to better demonstrate the signifi¬
cance of our thesis, by looking at it in the broadest
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possible context. To begin with, mankind, according to
Process, is but a perishing event in an infinity of change.
The absolute pole is powerless to bring creation of new
relationships to a termination.
Of course there is harmony within the absolute pole; a
unity cannot be otherwise. However, there is no possibility
of the cosmos ever being taken up into that pole. Cosmic
harmony, whatever that might mean, cannot include change-
lessness. Furthermore, all our experience leads to the
conclusion that change can produce error, disharmony, dest¬
ruction and suffering. The new which is produced by change
always provides the possibility of disaster. Genetic changes
mean:death to organisms, political changes mean unrest and
C
revolution, gala'tic changes mean the destruction of solar
systems. Nothing definite finally survives the fact of
change.
Men seem anxious about change, and no philosophy app¬
reciates this fact more than Process. God has been a source
of comfort from the fear of change: He who was called:change¬
less could be appealed to to take us up into Himself and
preserve us. No, says Process, this simply is not true.
If God is changeless, he has no concern for our comfort, if
he changes we cannot turn to Him to escape change. God for
Process is powerless to comfort those who are afraid to
perish as individuals, and who find no comfort in the fact
that the whole of the past is preserved in God.
In our day, on the other hand, many find it quite
satisfactory to get along while accepting the fact that, if
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God exists at all, he is powerless. Those of this group
who are humanitarians sometimes look to the possibility of
mankind — human society — forming at least a temporary
Utopia. Unfortunately, such Utopias are usually based upon
the concept of conformity. Undoubtedly man can learn to
conform, but what does this accomplish? Clearly it -vail not
stop the process of the cosmos. Sickness will continue,
natural disasters will go on, and men who have learned only
to conform -- to avoid the new — will perish as a species;
just as all species who are no longer able to adjust perish.
Of course, man might remain static for millions of years
before becoming extinct, but length of time is of little
value to the cosmos.
Give escape from change or Utopian concepts a theologi¬
cal expression, and we have one way of understanding the two
great, doctrines of salvation: Nirvana and Heaven as popular
concepts. Process denies both. Nor, as man should now be
clear, can God change this situation. He cannot even send
his son to create the possibility of a perfect cosmic
harmony.
If Process is right, and man cannot escape change, then
the alternative is for man to use change. The complaint is
sometimes made that the modern world changes too fast. Per¬
haps it does not yet change fast enough. To be more
specific, it seems that some areas of human activity, such
as the social sciences, cannot keep pace with the natural
sciences. Therefore, the argument is made that there is
merit in slowing change.
Process could only deny this. If there is value at
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all, that value must be understood within change. It is
the results of change, after all, that shape reality. This
is where Process sees God as providing a certain kind of
security. It is the security that no new efforts lack
meaning, as they remain an everlasting aspect of reality.
Of course, some particularly harmful changes might well
produce results that most men would feel hardly comforted to
know were everlasting. However, it is true that Process
goes on to point out that even the worst of changes, by
creating a new unity, open possibilities, that otherwise
would not have been available. Ultimately, Whitehead bel¬
ieves, God's goodness will assure that these possibilities
counteract the harm done.
In a sense this is quite logical. The absolute pole
does have the power to make a unity out of all relation¬
ships. The results of this new unity may well be positive
to some entities and harmful to others. The point seems to
be, however, that while a man cannot be assured that his
actions will bear good fruits for him, he may well be assured
that what he does will be good for some entity at some time.
As Process never ends, entities continue to exist because of
whatever unity is the absolute pole. The absolute pole has
the power to assure that nothing can be ultimately destruc¬
tive to all entities — this is how God's goodness must be
understood.
On the other hand,the more possibilities that are
opened up to human action, the greater is the chance that
some of those will provide the possibilities that man him¬
self requires. That is, the greater will Man' s chances be
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that he can adjust to change. Here is the key. Value is
understood in terms of change, and value is enjoyed if one
is ahle to adjust to change. As change is inevitable, man's
hope is to assure that some of the possibilities opened up
by change are of value to him. This is possible because
participation in the very nature of change is open to man
as it is to all entities. In other words, man's hope is in
his being the forerunner of change. The more he incorpor¬
ates change, the more he becomes like God.
Teilhard, for example, suggested that man could adjust
to change through an increasing emphasis upon research.
That is, he could acquire the knowledge to participate in
change consciously, by understanding it and directing it.
Here God's absolute pole is a real help. As we have said
before, it assures that changes will count. They cannot be
meaningless.
Of course, there is no justification to the suggestion
that Process promotes research only within the natural
sciences. Indeed, the concept may apply to research in any
field, including theology. No one could, for example, deny
that Jesus, Buddha, and Muhammed opened countless possi¬
bilities for man. Unfortunately, religions tend to see
their accomplishments in terms of static and final achieve¬
ments rather than as possibilities to be taken up and
developed even further. However, nothing is final. There
is no structure in all reality that can promote finality.
Clearly Process cannot be Viewed as consistent with
most dogmatic formulations of a religion. Dogmas may Indeed
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provide insights into new possibilities of Knowledge, but
the dogmas themselves must be developed rather than advo¬
cated. They are akin to scientific hypotheses which remain
useful for a long period of time, but fade more and more
into the background as new experiences are uncovered.
Therefore, for example, the Christian Process Theologian is
one who attempts to develop all the possibilities that a
particular dogma might offer.
This means that dogmas must necessarily receive greatly
diverse interpretations. The more consistently a specific
dogma is interpreted, the less useful it becomes. Important
dogmas are those which allow many developments. Any dogma
will finally be exhausted, but its worth will have been
judged by how far it has carried man to new possibilities.
Religious communities, therefore, should best be under¬
stood as groups of people involved in the research and
development of dogmas. Their cohesiveness will not be based
on agreement, but on the mutual benefit acquired through the
enjoyment of new possibilities. Furthermore, there is no
reason to assume that the dogmas, from which they will work,
will be borrowed from a single tradition. The only reason
to class Process theologians as Christian, for example, is
that, as a matter of convenience, it designates those who
deal chiefly with materials from the Christian tradition.
The careful study of the Process understanding of the
term absolute leads us to conclude that many of its impli¬
cations for Process thinking, as summarised in the foregoing
pages of this Chapter, come into conflict with traditional
theological formulations. Furthermore, the final Chapters
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of our paper demonstrated that it is difficult to compromise
the Process position, in order to make it appear more consis¬
tent with such areas of theological concern as Christology,
sbteriology and eschatology. Nevertheless, what we have
said need not eliminate the possibility of Process thinking
serving as a useful tool for traditional theology, in spite
of its understanding of the term absolute.
However, the evidence suggests that its usefulness
does not lie in its specific conclusions, but rather in the
"method" that it follows. Therefore, we will conclude by
illustrating this point. To understand the Process method,
we must make explicit the point that the term absolute
refers to a single aspect within a "relative" universe.
Speaking of everything from ethics to perceptions as
"relative" is far more consistent with common usage today
than many theologians and preachers appear to realise. The
point is that some concept of relativity is real to many
people. However, in the popular understanding of relativity
there is a danger of its becoming a twentieth-century brand
of hedonism. In both the "individual" serves as the point
of reference for decisions to actj the difference being
that in the former, unlike in the latter, the individual
depends upon the objective reality of his relationships.
However, relationships may be engaged in purely for one's
own immediate advantage. Man's wastefulness of natural
resources is just such a relationship. The general argument
put forward to discourage a hedonistic way of viewing the
individual as "the" point of reference is that if one does
those things which reduce the possibilities of his
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continuing to have relationships, he is engaged in self-
destruction. Continuing with our above illustration: if
man wastes his natural resources, the human species will
die out for want of food, fuel and water. This we might
call the commonsense check on the dangers of the popular
understanding of relativity.
Thus we suggest that the idea that an individual dep¬
ends upon relationships is not an uncommon understanding.
This means that the consideration of the implications of
relationships becomes a valuable source of information for
a decision to act. The problem for commonsense is setting
the "limits" on any attempt to analyse the relationships,
that must be considered, respective to a decision to act;
because in a relative universe, says Process, relationships
in the abstract are infinite.
We may finally move directly to our point that Process
is a method. In particular it is a way of dealing with the
modern theory of relativity. In part its usefulness can be
understood as a way of understanding what the term absolute
can refer to within a relative universe. It therefore
provides a special understanding of "fact": a single fact is
a limitation, rather than an "absolute". It is a limitation
resulting from the particular relationships constituting
the perspective of a given individual or group of individuals.
The term absolute refers to the totality of realised rela¬
tionships, of which single facts are a part of the concrete
content.
The role of the Process philosopher can be to guide men
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in selecting the most appropriate limits; that is, to help
men draw the line at how many relationships must be taken
into consideration, realising that total knowledge of con¬
crete relatedness is available only to God, before a decision
to act can be reached. Furthermore, as the facts upon x^hich
any decision is: made are now understood as a part of related¬
ness, no decision to act can excuse men from continuing to
do research into the whole of relatedness. No topic can
ever be closed from further investigation. This is what
Teilhard implied when he spoke of the necessity of more and
more human energy going into research.
If the above paragraph soundsrather like a scientist's
view of truth, our point is in part being well made. Many
of the greatest Process thinkers, Whitehead and Teilhard
included, were men of science. While one must deplore the
generally inadequate background in the natural sciences
given to many secondary school and even university graduates,
Process as: a method, as we hope to show, is not useless to
those disciplines often thought of as far removed from the
natural sciences. Indeed, a scientist, who is in fact a
technician, would find the Process method as foreign to him
as would the theologian who functions as a dogmatist.
The comparison made in the above will be clarified as
we outline and develop the Process method. This method may
be summarised as being composed of three major assumptions.
First it assumes that facts- are concrete limitations of
reality. They are useful but not definitive, and they
^^xeiihard. Human Energy, pp.135-136.
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depend upon God as a principle of limitation. Second this
method assumes that the more relationships considered within
a decision to act the more valuable will be the results, with
the following qualification: The role of the expert, includ¬
ing the theologian and the scientist, is to determine the
narrow margin between sufficient consideration of relation¬
ships and a confusion of data. Such expertise is achieved
by research. However, research does not mean the elimina¬
tion of commonsense. Third the results of any action are
assumed to elude absolute prediction, even by God. There¬
fore, the method assumes a "follow-up" operation — to use
modern terminology. Limitation, research, and follow-up:
these are the three key insights into the adoption of a
Process method.
Limitation for Process is based upon three principles:
heredity, chance, and God. With the fairly recent discovery
of the DNA and RNA radicals, genetic research has achieved
an extraordinary new level of precision. Whatever one may
think of Jacques Honod as a philosopher, his book Chance
l+8*+
And Necessity is a clear account of certain directions
in modern genetic research that must surely influence all
thinking about the place of the human species in the uni¬
verse. One point of his study, relevant to our discussion,
is the great extent to which all human action is governed
by the individual's genetic structure. For example, there
appears to be evidence that the ability to use language is
a part of the genetic code.
LlQL.
Monod, Jacques. Chance And Necessity, trans.,
Austryn Wainhouse. (London: Collins, 1972).
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Of course the details of genetic research must be left
in the hands of those who are trained in the relevant dis¬
ciplines. However, the trend of their discoveries is quite
consistent with a Process- understanding of the past as a
principle of limitation. Man's particular genetic develop¬
ment* covering perhaps millions of years, imposes the great
limitation that a fairly narrow range of conditions are
necessary to the survival of the human species. Therefore,
any decision to act must consider those relationships that
make survival possible. For example, one of the chief rel¬
ationships that must be considered in the adoption of power
stations using atomic energy is the balance between the
necessity of energy for life, compared with the possible
dangers resulting from reactor failures. At some point a
decision must be reached on the basis of the immediate dem¬
ands for survival — and the need for such a decision
results in part from the way we are genetically.
In moving to the factor of chance, as an aspect of
limitation, we enter onto a rather difficult topic. Stud¬
ents of heredity, since Darwin, have talked about chance
as an element in evolutionary adaptation. On the other
hand, most Process thinkers introduce chance as a factor in
discussions of mathematical or logical "probability." An
adequate comparison of what chance means in these various
disciplines has, so far as the writer knows, not been made
in recent years. However, there does seem to be consistent
agreement on the fact that chance should not too quickly be
associated with freedom or indetermination. Rather, chance
is more correctly included within a discussion of limitation.
3^1
Perhaps a place for us to study chance is at the local
bookmakers. Bets fall in a spectrum between a "long-shot"
and a "sure-thing." The beginner may assume that the person
placing a bet has only a few possible choices. This is far
from true. A staggering number of combinations for placing
a bet are available at the most modest establishments. The
mathematician, armed with figures and a slide-rule, would
turn the placing of a bef into a study in probabilities —
this has been known to happen. Others study the conformation
of the field (in the case of horses or dogs more so than
football), while still others select the most appealing name.
No one is a sure winner, but skill and experience are usually
more successful.
The point is that a given individual's chance develop¬
ment of certain of his genetic potentials — often at the
cost of others — gives him a decided advantage in particul¬
ar situations. Therefore, the writer would define biological
chance as the skills which a given individual has developed,
respective to the situations in which he is forced to
function.
Thus far, the writer feels that the reader will be
quite willing to accept the point that heredity and chance
help to make up what we call limitation. However, when we
introduce God as a principle of limitation our meaning may
appear obscure. Therefore we might remind ourselves that
one of God's functions is to present a universal spectrum
for chance, somewhat similar to that spectrum introduced
for the individual by his heredity.
3^2
Because we live in a universe of relativity, i.e. all
things being related, every human action necessarily has
universal significance. Yet the problem for commonsense is
to place the concept of the "universal significance" of
human actions into a meaningful perspective. In Cobb's
opinion, as we saw, the greatness of a religion rests in
its ability to allow adherents to discover such- meaningful-
ness. Norman Pittenger and Teilhard de Chardin, agreeing
in principle with Cobb, judge Christianity very highly
because its doctrine of love supplies a meaningful perspec-
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tive in which all action can be universally related. y
Thus to show love in a? particular relationship is to act in
a universally valid fashion — "to do God's will on earth
as it is in heaven."
Indeed one of the ways in which Process supports the
Christian ideal of "love" relationships is its contention
that God's concrete nature is a unity of relationships.
Therefore, relationships, i.e. actions, which promote unity,
are of the greatest value to the cosmos. For, only in the
formations of unity are new possibilities opened for enti¬
ties.
A fact is a limitation based on reference to heredity,
chance and God. The fact is relative both to the individual
and to the totality of the universe. Having thus discussed
the "basis" of fact, we must move to the "establishment"
of facts by research. Of course, research can be carried
1+85̂
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out in any field, but, because of the Process understanding
of limitation, the three most crucial areas of research are
biology and genetics, mathematics and logic, and philosophy
and theology; other areas of research support these three.
One of the most perplexing efforts made in modern
thought has been the attempts at classification of the
sciences. Although surprisingly few people see this as
being a, problem. However we are not attempting such a
classification. Nevertheless, it seems clear that even a
brief survey of Process thinkers will reveal the emphasis
placed upon the three areas of research mentioned above.
Teilhard somewhat developed genetics, Whitehead was a mathe¬
matician, Hartshorne is a student of logic, and Pittenger
and Cobb are theologians, etc. This is not an accident, but
the direct result of the Process method. In other words,
Process holds that research in these three areas can con¬
sider the greatest number of relationships, while avoiding
confusion of data.
As all three areas are necessary, no one of them can
claim absolute superiority in its ability to arrive at
"facts". Furthermore, what we have just said is easily
grasped by commonsense through an illustration of one of
the most pressing^contemporary issues. Birth control, for
example, directly relates to genetic science. The informa¬
tion that birth control is practised differently by different
parts of our society may well affect the the long-term
genetic make :;,up of the species. Apparently the numbers of
births among professional couples in the United States is
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decreasing more rapidly than among certain other groups.
What, if anything, should be done about this? Such a ques¬
tion can hardly be answered apart from a consideration of
population growth trends in general. Thus we have need for
mathematics, whether it is applied by a sociologist or
economist. However, we also know that worthwhile statisti¬
cal studies must be made and understood partly in terms of
emotional, philosophic and religious attitudes.
Without going into detail, the above example should
make the point of how these three areas of research interact
around a vital issue. The problem which the Process method
hopes to correct is the fact that these areas do not always
work in. a. complementary fashion. Of course, each of these
areas is extremely technical, and each of them appears to
illustrate vast internal disagreements. Even mathematics
is not always a field for clear agreement — though some
philosophers assume that math, is as clear-cut as 1+1=2.
Nevertheless, the Process method assumes that facts are
best reached when the three areas are harmonised. There¬
fore, in adopting the Process method, one must be prepared
to cope with the fact that men such as Hartshorne make no
apologies for their use of formal logic. Thus the basis of
fact is turned into concrete action through research, which
includes a harmonising of data from biology and genetics,
mathematics and logic, and philosophy and theology, and all
other areas which support these disciplines.
Finally we come to the concept of "follow-up." The
writer is not completely happy with this term, but is unable
to find a better one. Research at its best will allow the
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greatest number of relationships to be clearly considered
in terms of a decision to act. Yet the very nature of
limitation and research allows for a "field of indetermin-
ation," which demands a follow-up.
Unfortunately an understanding of 'indeterminate' is
usually reached through a concept such as the "unknown
future". However, the future is not something to be dis¬
covered, but is something to be created, according to the
Process understanding of the absolute pole as the whole of
the past. We must, therefore, make a clear distinction
between the concepts of the future and of an indeterminate
field of action. One may say anything about the future or
nothing. The two approaches are one and the same. As the
future is an infinity of possibilities, anything which one
wishes to say about it is correct. This would include con¬
tradictory statements. "The sun will rise tomorrow" and
"The sun will not rise tomorrow" are equally true statements
about an infinity of possibilities.
What we commonly call the "present" is the real inde¬
terminate field. It is the field of action qua action.
Whenever an action takes place new relationships are set up
with consequences that even the most thorough research could
not have absolutely predicted. In this sense action is dis¬
continuous with the past. Of course, in most cases the
discontinuity cannot be observed. However, in the wider
sense we do experience discontinuity as growth, development,
movement — the dynamic aspect of reality. At this point
the reader may draw back in disbelief. Surely there is
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nothing which demonstrates continuity better than the
growth of a tree or the development of a ffietus.
If this is true, then diversity and newness cannot be
explained. If all movement is an absolute continuity, then
human action has no ultimate meaning. An absolute continu¬
ity implies that every action is predetermined. A predeter¬
mined action has no value in and of itself. Process thought
firmly insists upon the ultimate meaningfulness of action,
which demands a corresponding field of indeterminateness.
However, as we have tried to make clear, this field cannot
be one of infinite possibility. Such a field would in it¬
self make action impossible. Therefore, within a given
present there must be a finite number of possibilities, i.e.
of possible relationships. This finite number is indeter¬
minate in two ways. First it can be indeterminate in the
sense that only certain of the possible relationships will
be realised. Second it is always indeterminate in the exact
results of "the relationships that are realised. This means
that Process must hold that no relationship is always true
in terms of giving specific results.
Most school boys of today are aware that sometimes
1+1^2, when they are working with a base other than ten.
The discovery of this simple fact is what is meant by
follow-up. It may be supposed that many people added 1+1
and got 2 for many years without ever considering that this
relationship was not always and everywhere the same. It is
this very assumption of absolute consistency that Process
is unwilling to accept. In the Process view there is
decreasing evidence that facts may be called absolute.
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Thus even relationships, which in the past appear to hold
true, must remain open for investigation. This does not
mean that in the past certain relationships were not true,
but it does not therefore follow that they continue to be
true now. The above opens the whole question of what is
objective knowledge. Because of this the reader should
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refer to Karl Popper's treatment of that subject.
None of the above observations about Process thinking
would deny the point that God, because of his unique per¬
spective, "knows" the possible future with the highest
possible degree of probability. Indeed, it would seem that
the theological concepts of God's omniscience and human
freedom might be helpfully reconciled by a careful consid¬
eration of modern theories of probability.
It may well serve as a review of what we have been
saying if we examine how the present comes to be an indeter¬
minate field, as opposed to an infinity of possibilities.
In other words, we need to explain why the fact of discon¬
tinuity does not deny the present unity of reality. The
obvious answer is that some ultimate continuum or principle
of unity must have a place in reality.
Whitehead, we may remember, calls this ultimate prin¬
ciple, creativity. Another way of speaking of the continuum
between the whole of the past and the whole of the present
is that the continuity results from Relativity itself. The
universe is the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow —
relative. To speak of a relative universe, in the
^^Popper, K.R. Objective Knowledge. (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1972).
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Whiteheadian sense, is to speak of entities unified by a
present potential for relatedness. This insight becomes
the ultimate basis which Process offers for a commonsense
understanding of relativity. Man is not determined by his
being relative to other entities in the universe, rather
man has the indeterminate potential to relate to all other
entities. In his relations, therefore, man helps to deter¬
mine the universe rather than only being determined by it.
If theologians find the Process method foreign to their
immediate assumptions, that is understandable. However, it
would be unfortunate indeed if the method was rejected on
the grounds that it is totally useless for traditional theol¬
ogy. Living in the age of relativity unquestionably presents
man with new and difficult problems, as well as exciting
possibilities. Procedures are needed if we are to effec¬
tively meet both the problems and the possibilities, and
Process seems to offer a set of such procedures. That the
Process method can be adapted to very different situations
is proven by the growing scope of literature in the general
Ll87
field. ' The point of these comments has been to encourage
the even wider consideration of the value of Process as a
method for theology, in spite of the fact that its under¬
standing of the term absolute leads to a new set of
assumptions about God.
Ll87
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"Relationship, Relatedness and Relativity"
The concepts of "relationship", "relatedness", and
"relativity" are widely used without a clear distinction in
meanings. In part the ambiguity arises from the fact that
in defining or illustrating any of these three concepts
one or both of the two remaining terms are often implicitly
or explicitly included in the definition. For example, a
"relationship" is sometimes defined as a "relatedness"
among objects or qualities.
More precisely, however, a relationship implies a
multiplicity of objects or qualities, which makes a related¬
ness possible. F.H. Bradley says,
I still insist that for thought what is not
relative is nothing. But I urge, on the other
hand, that nothings cannot be related, and
that to turn qualities in relation into mere
relations is impossible.^
Bradley's statement not only points to the idea that
for thought relationship implies a multiplicity, but it
also raises the issue that individual qualities are in fact
realised only in terms of relatedness. That,is, no single
object or quality is recognised totally apart from the con¬
text of a specific relatedness.
In keeping with this line of speculation, Varisco says
that relationships and relatedness imply one another. "It
"'"Bradley. Appearance And Reality. p.30.
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is now clear," he says, "that the necessity of relations
completely solves the problem of reconciling -unity and mul¬
tiplicity -- of making us understand how unity and multi¬
plicity imply each other, so that the one is impossible
2
without the other, exists only in the other."
What has just been said is clearly subject to the inter¬
pretation, hinted at by Bradley, namely, that objects or
qualities do not exist apart from the fact of relations.
Indeed, the theories of relativity speak to this supposed
necessity of relatedness. As Whitehead puts it:
One of the most general philosophic notions to
be used in the analysis of civilized activities
is to consider the effect on the social life
due to the variations of emphasis between Indi¬
vidual Absoluteness and Individual Relativity.
Here 'absoluteness' means the notion of release
from essential dependence on other members of
the community in respect to modes of activity,
while 'relativity' means the converse fact of
essential relatedness.^
In view of the above we may now make a brief summary
of at least one way of distinguishing the three concepts
under consideration. The concept 'relationship' refers to
the interaction among objects or qualities, which objects
or qualities have 'individual Absoluteness'. Christian,
for example, holds to such individual absoluteness in the
following:
The actual world is a plenum of actual occas¬
ions. The region basic to any occasion has
definite spatiotemporal positions and boun¬
daries, and no two occasions have the same
^Varisco. Know Thyself. p.l5Li-.
^Whitehead. Adventures Of Ideas, p.5*+.
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region. The extensive relations between the
regions of actual occasions are limited to
(a; external connection and (b) mediate
connection. Any mediating region which is a
real standpoint is externally connected with
the real standpoints it mediately connects.
Thus the region of an actual occasion is
exclusive of the region of any other occas¬
ion. No two actual occasions have any
spatiotemporal parts in common. In this
sense an actual occasion transcends every
other occasion.^
'Relatedness' refers to a relationship in which the
resulting interpenetration of objects or qualities is deter¬
mined by a factor outside of the relationship. This
understanding of relatedness can be expressed as an increase
in complexity or quality. Driesch speaks of the complexity
of relatedness: "If, then, in a given natural system an in¬
crease of the degree of manifoldness, i.e. of complexity,
occurs, of the kind just explained, and if on the other
hand, we know that this increase has not been prepared in
any way inside or outside the system in space, that there
has not been any kind of spatial preformations, then, unless
we are to violate the rationale of change, we are obligated
to introduce non-spatial factors of becoming, and credit
them with the increase of complexity that has occurred."^
However, this very understanding of relatedness calls
into question the 'individual absoluteness' of the qualities
or objects involved. Absoluteness appears to be a charac¬
teristic of the relatedness or unity, rather than of the
p.
Christian. An Interpretation Of Whitehead's Meta¬
physics. p.lOU-.
^Driesch. The Problem Of Individuality, pp.51-52.
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multiplicity. In other words, the relatedness determines
the factors involved in the relationship.
The very point of traditional realism, on the other
hand, is that relations do not alter those things which
relate. As Perry points out, "But according to the theory
of the externality of relations, terms acquire from their
new relations an added character, which does not either
condition, or necessarily alter, the character which they
7
already possess."
Finally, the theories of relativity address themselves
to the formation of a system which includes both the con¬
cepts of relationship and relatedness. That is, relativity
takes into consideration individual absoluteness as well as
essential relatedness. As Whitehead says,
The stubborn reality of the absolute self-
attainment of each individual is bound up
with a relativity which it issues from and
issues into. The analysis of the various
strands of relativity is the analysis of
the social structure of the Universe, as
in this epoch.q
While in the following we will look for the more
philosophical aspects of the theories of relativity, it will
also be well if we state them more or less in the scientific
terms of their original formulations; attempting, however,
to avoid the complex mathematical notations. We are interes¬
ted here in four theories of relativity; the Classical, the
c
Bradley. Appearance And Reality, p.20*+.
7
'Perry. Present Philosophical Tendencies. p.319*
O
Whitehead. Adventures Of Ideas. p.376.
353
Special and General theories of Einstein and the Whitehead-
ian theory.
All four theories of relativity assume both the fact of
multiplicity and the fact of unity. Therefore, each must
account both for the factors of a relationship, and that
which relates. According to the Classical theory of rela¬
tivity, adopted by Newtonian physics, material bodies are
related in absolute time and absolute space. Einstein
summarises the classical theory as follows:
If relative to K, K' is a uniformly moving
co-ordinate system devoid of rotation, then
natural phenomena run their course with
respect to K1 according to exactly the same
general laws as with respect to K. This
statement is called the principle of rela¬
tivity (in the restricted sense).^
In other words, the laws of measurement, of Euclidean
geometry, holding in all those situations: described above,
provide for the explanation of how systems relate. While
this; does not deny multiplicity, the laws implied function
independently of any specific system.
Einstein, while agreeing that the Newtonian formulation
is generally true for experience, says that it cannot cover
all situations. Northrop gives a very good summary of how
Einstein's Special Theory of relativity and Newton's theory
differ:
It may be noted, parenthetically, that
Einstein has not, as; many people have sup¬
posed, departed from the distinction
introduced by Newton between the private
Einstein, Albert. Relativity The Special And The Gen¬
eral Theory. "A Popular Exposition." trans. Robert W.
LawsorTI (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1921). Sixth edition.
P»13«
35^
time and space, varying from person to person,
and with circumstances, which we immediately
sense, and the public time and space of physics
... Einstein has merely changed the mathemati¬
cal definition of the public time and space,
revealing thereby an essential connection bet¬
ween them, and a resultant relativity, the
same for everybody, varying not with the sense
organs, of the observer as do sensed space and
time, but with the astronomical, physical ob¬
jects to which the scientist chooses to refer
his measurements.-^
The formulation of Einstein's Special Theory of relat¬
ivity takes into consideration the observer's point of
reference, with the result that the measurements achieved
are relative to it. Einstein says, "Every reference-body
(co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; unless we
are told the reference-body to which the statement of time
refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of
an event."11 In other words, those factors which relate
help to determine the nature of the relatedness. The prin¬
ciple of the relatedness is not independent of the relation¬
ship .
The Special Theory is merely a correction to the
Classical theory concerning "a uniformly co-ordinate system
devoid of rotation." It only allows for movement in a
vacuum without regard for gravitational fields. Einstein
therefore points out its weakness: "'All bodies of reference
K,K', etc., are equivalent for the description of natural
phenomena (formulation of the general laws of nature),
Northrop, F.S.C. The Meeting Of East And West. "An
Inquiry Concerning World Understanding." (New York: Collur
Books, 1966). pp.76-77.
11Einstein. Relativity The Special And The General
Theory. p.26.
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whatever may be their state of motion,' cannot be maintained,
because the use of rigid reference-bodies, in the sense of
the method followed in the special theory of relativity, is
12
in general not possible in space-time description."
Therefore, Einstein introduced the General Theory of
Relativity in order to extend the application of the prin¬
ciples introduced in the Special Theory. For our purpose it
is best to illustrate Einstein's General Theory by a brief
consideration of the concept of "ether". As motion at a
distance cannot be accepted by physics — it implying action
from without a system — a field is required in which action
must take place. That is, a field is required if action is
understood to occur in situations other than those involving
contact between bodies. "Thus the endeavour toward a uni¬
fied view of the nature of forces leads to the hypothesis
of an ether.
In pre-scientific times, action was generally thought
to be the direct result of bodies coming into contact with
one another, otf of bodies being moved by a force from out¬
side of the system — a supernatural force. These ideas
attempted to speak to the nature of the ultimate source of
activity, and also to describe finite observations about
the nature of action. With the rise of modern science,
certain concepts, such as the law of gravity, suggested
that one body could influence the action of another body,
12lbid* P»97»
^Einstein, Albert. Sidelights On Relativity, trans.,
G.B. Jeffery and W. Perrett. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
1922). p.5.
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without the bodies coming into direct contact. As such
relationships as gravitational influence did in fact occur,
some principle of relatedness was necessary in order for
the relationship at a distance to be possible. Ether,
therefore, became the name given to the factor of related¬
ness between bodies whose influence on each other's actions
was not the result of direct contact, and certainly not the
result of a supernatural force.
Classical relativity assumed a mechanical quality for
li+
the ether, namely, its immobility. This was rejected by
Einstein's Special Theory, and the understanding of the
nature of the ether was replaced by his General Theory.
"According to this theory the metrical qualities of the con¬
tinuum of space-time differ in the environment of different
points of the space-time, and are partly conditioned by the
matter existing outside of the territory under consider¬
ation.
'The relationships among objects in Space-Time are
influenced by certain effects which the objects have upon
Space-Time itself. Therefore, that which relates is relative
to the relata themselves. And, on the other hand, nothing
exists apart from relatedness. Einstein says, "Since accor¬
ding to our present conception the elementary particles of
matter are also, in their essense, nothing else than conden¬
sations of the electromagnetic field, our present view of
Ik
Einstein. Sidelights On Relativity, pp.10-11.
l5ibid. p.18.
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the universe presents two realities which are completely
separated from each other conceptually, although connected
causally, namely, gravitational ether and electromagnetic
field, or — as they might also be called — space and
matter.
In summary we may now say that "relationship" empha¬
sises the relata, "relatedness" that which relates, and
"relativity" insists upon both as equally necessary factors.
However, we must how turn to the Whiteheadian understanding
of relativity.
The chief problem posed by relativity is the clarifi¬
cation that must be made of the interaction between the
background (that which relates) and the peculiar factors
(the relata). According to Whitehead, Einstein's formula¬
tion — or better his interpretations of the mathematical
17
formulae — were not an adequate clarification.
Einstein supposes that Space-Time has a heterogeneous
structure resulting from the causal influence of mass bod¬
ies. This being the case, Whitehead argues, the relations
1 8
between Space-Time and the mass bodies are external.
Thus we are taken back to the concept of relationship with¬
out relatedness. Nevertheless, Einstein's theory does
have an advantage over the traditional concept of relation¬
ship. Einstein's formulae can be used to calculate the
relatedness between objects provided all the relationships
l6ibid. p.22
17
'Whitehead uses the term "fact" to refer to the back¬
ground ('ether'), and the term "factor" to mean a limitation
within fact — the factor being peculiar to itself. The




involved are considered. However, in the case of relativity,
all relationships means a nearly infinite number. In other
words, all the space-time reference systems in the universe
have to be considered in order to give specific meaning to
a particular space-time reference. The point of reference
of a given individual, for example, can have specific mean¬
ing only relative to all other co-ordinate systems of
reference. Thus Whitehead says, "It has always been a rep¬
roach to those philosophers who emphasize the systematic
relatedness of reality that they make truth impossible for
us by requiring a knowledge of all as a condition for a
19
knowledge of any."
Whitehead proposes to develop a theory of relativity
which accounts for "internal" relatedness. He says,
The point of this doctrine on which I want to
insist is that any factor, by virtue of its
status as a limitation within totality,
necessarily refers to factors of totality
other than itself. It is therefore impossible
to find anything finite, that is to say, any
entity for cogitation, which does not in its
apprehension by consciousness disclose rela¬
tionships to other entities, and thereby dis¬
close some systematic structure of factors
within fact. I call this quality of finitude,
the significance of factors.
Each factor in itself is viewed as a systematic struc¬
ture of factors within fact. This discloser, common to all
factors, is merely a limitation of fact itself. Or as
Whitehead himself puts it:
"^ibid. p.73* 20ibid. pp.17-18.
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In the classical doctrine the ether is the shy
agent behind the veil: in the account given
here the ether is exactly the apparent world,
neither more nor less. The apparent world dis¬
closes itself to us as the ingression of
sense-object amid events.^
At first this sounds rather like the problem faced by
the concept of relatedness. The "ether" is clearly that
which relates, and this seems to override the way in which
the relarta influence the relatedness'. To this possible
objection Whitehead responds,
22
Thus an event signifies objects in mutual
relations. The particular objects and their
particular relations belong to the sphere of
contingence; but the event is essentially a
'field' in the sense that without related
objects there can be no event. On the other
hand related objects signify events, and
without such events there are no such ob¬
jects.
The preceding summaries of various positions have been
far too brief to adequately develop the implications involved
within each of them. However, our purpose has been simply to
establish some distinctions among the concepts "relationship",
"relatedness" and "relativity." On the other hand, we may
relate the above to the topic of our thesis by suggesting
that the concept of relationship implies the absoluteness of
relata (multiplicity); the concept of relatedness implies
the absoluteness of that which relates (unity); and the con¬




Whitehead says, "I give the name 'event' to a spatio-
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